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The Transformative Potential of a Secondary




This Article chronicles the evolution of the secondary market in the debt of less developed
countries, now known as Emerging Markets, in its first six years of development. The secondary
market was important because it provided the debt for use in debt-equity swaps and debt buy-backs
and facilitated portfolio adjustment by banks and other measures that helped to lessen the burdens
of the crisis on creditors and debtors. The Article goes through the chronology of the development
of the Emerging Markets, emphasizing the key events and factors contributing to its development
and the evolving characteristics of the market.
THE TRANSFORMATIVE POTENTIAL OF A
SECONDARY MARKET: EMERGING




In August 1982, Mexico announced the suspension of prin-
cipal payments on its foreign debt. The debt crisis had begun.'
The banks stopped lending to Latin America debtors and, within
a year, twenty-seven countries had commenced the rescheduling
of their debt.2 Within the same period, banks had begun to
swap their loans to Latin American sovereigns between each
other, and' two enterprising individuals had established broker-
ages to facilitate such trading. The secondary market in the debt
of less developed countries, now known as the Emerging Mar-
kets, had also begun.
This Article chronicles the evolution of this major financial
market in its first six years of development. The secondary mar-
ket was important because it provided the debt for use in debt-
equity swaps and debt buy-backs and facilitated portfolio adjust-
ment by banks and other measures that helped to lessen the bur-
dens of the crisis on creditors and debtors. The market played a
significant role in the history and amelioration of the debt crisis.
The other principal reason for this research is so that the
"mystery [which] shrouds the origins of the eurocurrency mar-
kets" will not also envelop the origins of this market. We need
to understand the history of this important market and because
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1. DARRELL DELAMAIDE, DEBT SHOCK 6 (1984). Rescheduling negotiations contin-
ued periodically throughout the 1980s until Mexico's debt was securitized under the
Brady Plan in 1990. The debt negotiators could then rest their vocal chords, at least
until late 1994.
2. PHILLIP A. WELLONS, PASSING THE BUCK - BANKS, GOVERNMENTS AND THIRD
WROLD DEBT 225 (1987).
3. Hal S. Scott & Phillip A. Wellons, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE - TRANSACTIONS, POL-
ICY AND REGULATION 493 (2d ed. 1995).
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the market's founders still work in it, its beginnings have been
able to be reconstructed.
The evolution of the market will be considered in the fol-
lowing three periods.
(i) Birth: 1982 to May 1985;
(ii) Infancy: May 1985 to May 1987; and
(iii) Childhood: May 1987 to March 1989.
The study of the evolution of the market will be continued in a
further Article,4 which will complete the first decade of develop-
ment by analyzing two later periods:
(iv) Adolescence: March 1989 to October 1991; and
(v) Young Adulthood: October 1991 to December 1993.
This Article does not consider the regulation of the market and
the role of the Emerging Markets Traders Association.5
I. BIRTH OF THE MARKET: 1982 - May 1985
A secondary market for the discounted debt of Lesser Devel-
oped Countries ("LDCs") and their corporations had "existed
on a relatively small scale since well before the onset of the crisis
in 1982. "6 The market in the 1970s was tiny and was "almost
exclusively . . . a vehicle through which creditor banks could
manage their developing country portfolios, e.g., by debt-debt
swaps with other banks either by way of outright assignment or
by sub-participations."7 This function was almost entirely carried
out by the banks themselves with the assistance of some small
brokerages that tended to specialize in less commonly ex-
changed debt.' A number of actual transactions will be consid-
ered first in an attempt to convey the nature and flavor of the
origins of the post-1982 secondary market.
4. See Ross P. Buckley, The Facilitation of the Brady Plan: Emerging Markets Debt Trad-
ing from 1989 to 1993, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. (forthcoming 1998)
5. See LDC Traders Group Launched, 858 INr'L FIN. REv., Dec 22, 1990, at 23. The
LDC Debt Traders Association was formed in December, 1990 and changed its name to
the Emerging Markets Traders Association in June 1992. See Chamberlin, Regulating the
LDC debt markets, INT'L FIN. L. REv., August 1992, at 16.
6. UNITED NATIONS CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, DEBT EQUITY CON-
VERSIONS - A GUIDE FOR DECISION MAKERS 18 (1990) [hereinafter DEBT EQUITY CONVER-
SIONS].
7. id.
8. See Linda Corman, Selling the Third World, INT'L Bus 1988. For instance, Turan
Corporation was formed in 1978 and traded Turkish and other debt in the late 1970s
and early 1980s. Id.
1153
1154 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 21:1152
A. Early Transactions
The first transaction in what was to become the modern
market actually preceded the debt crisis by some months. As a
result of the commencement of the Falklands War in April
1982,' Bankers Trust reviewed the credit lines it had extended to
Banco Rio de la Plata and discovered that the Argentine bank
had drawn almost US$80 million on a US$40 million credit line.
Bankers Trust insisted on repayment of the overdraft. Banco
Rio did not have the funds. The two banks crafted a deal in
which Banco Rio gave US$80 million of Mexican government
debt in exchange for US$40 million of Argentine government
debt and US$40 million cash from Bankers Trust.10 Because Ar-
gentina was at war, its debt was considered less valuable than
Mexico's. The US$40 million in cash was then used to pay down
the overdrawn credit line."
Accounting considerations played a major role in this trans-
action. The exchange of US$80 million of Mexican debt for
US$40 million of Argentine debt and US$40 million cash was
attractive as the face values exchanged were equal. As the debt
would have been on each party's books at face value this meant
no writedowns had to be taken or additions made to provisions
for doubtful loans. If the face values had not been equal, each
bank's accountants might have asked unpleasant questions such
as, "Which asset is worth less than 100 cents on the dollar, and
why aren't the balance of those assets in your portfolio being
held on the books at that discounted price?" Here we see com-
pliance with accounting niceties so that losses do not have to be
recorded - but this came at a price. Bankers Trust was repaid
its credit line at the cost of paying virtually full face value for
US$40 million of Mexican paper1 2 - in hindsight a very expen-
sive transaction.
The quest to avoid writedowns and comply with accounting
requirements would lead foreign banks into even more finan-
cially dubious transactions. In the first half of 1983, Banco Rio
de la Plata was involved in a number of transactions in which
9. See Will Two Weeks Steaming Let Off The Pressure?, ECONOMIST, Apr. 10, 1982, at
21.
10. See Interview with Giacomo de Filippis, Chairman of Giadefi, Inc., in New York
City (Apr. 22, 1993) [hereinafter de Filippis Interview].
11. See id.
12. See id. The values of Argentine and Mexican debt were soon to be similar. Id.
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U.S. banks gave private sector Mexican paper plus cash to Banco
Rio in exchange for public sector Mexican debt. The U.S. banks
wished to get out of private sector debt (against which it was
feared provisions would have to be made) into public sector
debt which, backed by the sovereign,. was anticipated would
never require loan loss provisions.13
The financially disastrous aspects of these transactions were
the prices, and hence the ratios, at which the exchanges were
made. For instance, a bank wishing to avoid provisions on a pri-
vate sector loan of US$370,000 would have given the US$370,000
of private sector paper plus US$2,900,000 cash for US$3,270,00
of public sector paper.1 4 Accounting principles ruled. So as to
match the face values of debt and cash exchanged and avoid
provisions on US$370,000 of private sector loans, the bank had
increased its exposure to the region eight-fold.
Not all of the earliest transactions in this market proved to
be poor decisions no matter how bizarre they may appear today.
In one transaction, a bank had US$2 to US$3 million dollars of
Nicaraguan loans worth, perhaps, five cents on the dollar.1 5 To
avoid taking the loss, the bank acquired over six times as much
three-year paper of the Venezuelan Ministry of Defense. This
paper paid interest at twenty percent of which the bank allo-
cated nine percent as its yield on it and sixteen percent to cover
the lost capital on the Nicaraguan debt (which is why six times as
much Venezuelan paper was acquired). The exceptional inter-
est rate doubtless betokened exceptional risk, but the Venezue-
lan Ministry of Defense met its payments on the paper and the
bank covered its losses in Nicaragua. 6
Because of these accounting driven transactions the expo-
sure of major U.S. banks increased in 1982, 1983, and 1984 be-
yond the extent of "voluntary" new lending required in the
reschedulings. This increase was to the benefit of some of the
13. See id. A more complete ignorance of the region's economic history would be
difficult to attain. Id.
14. See id.
15. See William Ollard, The Debt Swappers, EUROMONEY, Aug. 1986, at 67, 74.
16. See id. Of course, if Venezuela had defaulted the bank would have increased its
exposure to the region by over six times. A contributing factor to such transactions lies
in the reward structures and career paths of the individual bankers involved. Excep-
tional risks make sense if they can put off a day of reckoning until, with any luck, the
individual banker will have been promoted to a new position (perhaps even in a differ-
ent country) within the bank or will have moved to another institution. Id.
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smaller German banks and U.S. regional banks which had the
capital, courage, and foresight to sell their portfolios and take
the loss of twelve to twenty percent of face value of the loans.
Given the later prices of the loans, this was a very wise move in-
deed. In the words of Lee Buchheit,
"[f]ortunate indeed are those bankers who in 1983 sold off
their Argentine exposure at a 15 or 20% discount although,
at the time, this was accompanied by a good deal of hand-
wringing, tooth-gnashing and piteous wailing about the cru-
elty of international lending."'
Another type of transaction that kept the brokers active in
1983 was the repurchase of their own debt by a number of the
more astute Mexican companies. In broad terms, a Mexican pri-
vate sector company would secure an agreement with its credi-
tors to exchange Mexican sovereign debt for their own indebted-
ness.18 The company would then purchase Mexican paper at
about eighty cents on the dollar, using the services of a broker to
locate the paper. Some creditors 9 were prepared to take the
loss onto their balance sheet and exchange something, like
US$300,000-400,000 of Mexican government paper for one mil-
lion dollars of the company's indebtedness.20 As the reschedul-
ings progressed, most private sector obligations in Mexico be-
came government obligations. So, with hindsight, the creditors
had given away sixty to seventy percent of the face value of the
loans for nothing.21 Many of the Mexican borrowers who retired
their debt in this manner were financially secure and never de-
faulted on any of their loans (although their loans were restruc-
tured anyway) .22 It is a tempting, yet potentially expensive, prac-
tice for banks to treat all corporate entities from the one jurisdic-
tion alike - in the opinion of Jack de Filippis, up to
17. See Lee C. Buchheit, Return of the Living Debt, INT'L FIN. L. REv., at 28 (1990).
18. See de Filippis Interview, supra note 10.
19. This is particularly true when the creditor's exposure to that debtor was being
liquidated by the transaction, and so no provisions would have to made for other loans
to that debtor in the creditor's portfolio.
20. See Debt Equity Conversions, supra note 6, at 18. This trend to swap out of
private sector loans and into public sector ones at this stage is said to have accelerated
after the widely-publicized problems of the Mexican Alfa group. See id at 18; see also de
Filippis Interview, supra note 10.
21. See de Filippis Interview, supra note 10.
22. See id.; see also Interview with Michael Pettis, Managing Director at Bear Stearns
& Co, in New York City (Apr. 24, 1993) [hereinafter Pettis Interview I].
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US$1,000,000,000 of Mexican debt may have been retired in this
manner in these years.23
In summary, in these first years of the market, those who
acted on the economic fundamentals and sold their loans for
cash early benefited greatly; those who acted for the appearance
of their balance sheets and entered into swaps of their loans,
often acquiring more debt in the process, paid a heavy price2 4
B. Impetus for the Market
Four major factors facilitated the evolution from the ad hoc
inter-bank transfers of before 1982 to the beginnings of a secon-
dary market in 1983 and 1984.25 These were:
1. the willingness of a small but growing group of banks to
sell their debt outright at a substantial discount from face
value;2
6
2. the desire of some banks to adjust their LDC loan portfo-
lios through loan swaps;
27
3. the progressive amalgamation of the debt into a smaller
number of loan instruments by virtue of the rescheduling
process28 this made documentation of the swaps simpler,
23. See de Filippis Interview, supra note .10 (providing one person's uncorrobo-
rated opinion). This remains the tendency of bankers - Australian corporate issuers
endured some years of restricted access to the Euro-markets after Bond Corporation
became the first issuer to default in the prestigious Euro-DeutscheMark market. From
the distance of Europe, all Australian corporations were tarred with the same brush no
matter how conservative their accounting policies or strong their balance sheets. See
Helen E. Hartnell, Address delivered at the Eighteenth Annual International Trade
Law Conference in Canberra 17-19 (October 18-19, 1991) (on file with the Fordham
International Law Journal).
24. Given that the crisis has been largely ameliorated now and interest has mostly
been paid throughout the intervening period, it is arguable that such banks may have
been as well off retaining these loans. Against this is the capital or interest rate reduc-
tions which the conversion of the loans into Brady Bonds in the late 1980s or early
1990s required, plus the further principal discounts required for the sale of those Brady
bonds in the secondary market. Add to these discounts the management time required
to deal with this issue and those banks which liquidated their small exposures to the
region early made, with hindsight, an excellent decision.
25. It was not until some years after 1984 that the market had evolved sufficiently
to be described as a financial market.
26. See Debt Equity Conversions, supra note 6, at 18; See also Lee C. Buchheit,
Legal Considerations in Debt Swapping: Planning and Documentation 2 (Apr. 25, 1989) (un-
published manuscript, on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
27. See Debt Equity Conversions, supra note 6, at 18; see also Buchheit, supra note
26.
28. See Debt Equity Conversions, supra note 6, at 18; see also Buchheit, supra note
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cheaper, and quicker than otherwise would have been
the case; and
4. the gradual simplification of transfer procedures for the
debt which was facilitated by the standardisation of the
transfer provisions in the rescheduled loan agreements.
The first two factors above will be considered further. Factors
three and four were the product of the rescheduling process and
are beyond the scope of this Article.29
1. Outright Sale of Debt by Banks
Only banks with small exposures to the region or large loan
loss reserves could afford to take the losses involved in the out-
right sale of their debt. In the first category were many of the
U.S. regional banks which had only become involved in a few
international loans in the late seventies. In the second category,
and often also in the first, were many of the smaller German
banks which likewise were latecomers to the international lend-
ing game and were further bolstered by the tendency of most
German banks to have rather large hidden reserves. °
Other banks could not afford the losses involved in an out-
right sale because a sale for cash necessitated that the loss on
that transaction be taken onto the books3' and possibly that the
balance of the bank's loans to that borrower would have to be
written down to the same extent by the taking of loan-loss provi-
29. See Ross P. Buckley, Rescheduling as the Groundwork for the Secondary Market in
Emerging Markets Debt (forthcoming DenverJournal International of Law) (considering these
factors).
30. See Wellons, supra note 2, at 253; see also HAy & PAUL, REGULATION AND TAXA-
TION OF COMMERCIAL BANKS 195, World Bank Technical Paper No. 158 (1991). Ger-
man banks commonly established extensive hidden reserves by (i) the use of historic
cost accounting, (ii) writing down the value of certain assets, and (iii) creating excessive
provisions against bad debts. Id. The large German banks publicly increased their
reserves early in the crisis. See Dresdner Tops Up Its Reserves, FIN. TIMEs, Dec. 30, 1982, at
22; see also Stuart Fleming, Commerzbank to Set Aside DM 500 m Bad Debt Provisions, FIN.
TIMES, Nov. 30, 1983. Deutsche bank claimed in 1983 that its provisions amounted to
between 20% and 40% of their exposure to all highly indebted countries and 100% of
its loans to Poland and Yugoslavia. See Wellons, supra note 2, at 194. The German
government assisted its banks by (a) making the provisions tax deductible for five years
pending actual loss, and (b) by easing interest rates on deposits without easing the rates
on borrowing, so that the banks enjoyed a wide and very profitable spread which could
be used to build provisions. Id. at 193-94.
31. This assumes the debt was carried on the bank's books at full face value, which
was almost always the case.
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sions.32 Most of the larger banks could not run such a risk -
the required provisions would have exceeded their total capital.
Nonetheless, had there been more cash buyers in the early
days, there would have been more cash sales.3 3 Right from the
beginning, supply exceeded demand - an imbalance that was
to characterize most of the market's history.34
Giacomo de Filippis established his brokerage, Giadefi Inc.,
in July 1983.3' His first transactions involved acting for a
number of smaller German banks with minor exposures that
they could afford to sell outright.36 This was typically done
through a swap with a U.S. bank in which the German bank
would, for example, sell US$10 million of public sector debt for
US$1.1 million of private sector debt and US$8.9 million cash.3 v
The most commonly traded debt at this time was that of Mex-
ico.3 8 Giadefi would arrange such transactions for a fee of one
or two percent of the face value of the loans, or, sometimes for
the private sector paper. De Filippis recalls selling some private
sector Mexican paper acquired in this way to a canny investor 39
for eight cents on the dollar.4 °
The investor who purchased private sector Mexican paper
32. Loan loss provisions are reserves against bad debts taken by setting aside a
portion of earnings and thus impact a bank's profitability when taken. Whether provi-
sions would have to be made for the balance of the bank's loans to that borrower de-
pended upon the perspective of that bank's auditors - it was to be many years before
the accounting profession settled upon the appropriate conventions to govern such
situations.
33. See Jay H. Newman, LDC Debt: The Secondary Market, the Banks, and New Invest-
ment in the Developing Countries, COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 69, 70 (1986).
34. See analysis of the effects on the market of the round of provisioning triggered
by Citibank's major loan loss provision in May, 1987. See infra note 256 and accompa-
nying text.
35. See de Filippis Interview, supra note 10.
36. German banks were assisted in selling non-performing loans by their tendency
to have relatively large undisclosed reserves and by the tax deductibility conferred on
those reserves in 1983. See Fleming, supra note 30 (discussing German banks' account-
ing practices).
37. See de Filippis Interview, supra note 10 (suggesting why, having lost World War
II, Germany has gone on to win peace).
38. See id.
39. As the transfer of most of the debt was restricted by the original loan agree-
ments to "banks or financial institutions," the investor would have had to fit that de-
scription. A corporation formed to invest in LDC debt and newly incorporated in a tax
haven would probably have satisfied this "financial institution" requirement.
40. That same investor is living to rue the day that he sold loans for eight cents on
the dollar that within two years were trading at about seven times that price.
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at eight percent of face value had only to receive one annual
interest payment to recoup the cost of the purchase - and the
interest payments have continued unabated to this day. There is
a lesson here for investors with spare capital during future finan-
cial crises. 4'
Conversely, the U.S. bank acquiring the Mexican public sec-
tor debt made a disastrous purchase. Soon after the transaction
was made, the values of the private and public .sector loans were
virtually the same. During the rescheduling process, the loans
were combined into one loan instrument with the sovereign as
either obligor or guarantor. Therefore, in the case of De Filip-
pis, the bank paid full face value for US$8.9 million of Mexican
paper which, in three years, would be trading on the market for
fifty to sixty cents on the dollar.4 2
2. Portfolio Adjustment by Banks
During 1983 and 1984, U.S. banks that could not or would
not sell their LDC loans outright had two options. Option One
was to sit tight, lend as little new money as possible without forc-
ing the borrowers into default,43 and wait out the crisis hoping
that growth in LDC economies would permit repayment or that
growth in bank capital would make the problem manageable.
Most U.S. banks followed this course of action. Option Two was
for the banks to rearrange their portfolios of loans to the region.
Passivity is difficult for Type A personalities in the face of a crisis,
so Option Two was quite popular, especially among banks with
smaller exposures to the region for which portfolio adjustment
was feasible.44
There were four principal reasons for a bank to adjust its
portfolio. First, the bank assessed the relative creditworthiness
of different countries. Different bankers had different views "as
to which rescheduling countries stood the best chance of com-
41. Admittedly, these are extreme prices from a nascent market. The uncharacter-
istically low swap price of eight cents on the dollar occured when the market for Mexi-
can paper had just opened. Once the market was established, debt on which interest
was being paid never traded below 30 cents on the dollar. Pettis Interview I, supra note
22.
42. Id.
43. This option was because of the lack of foreign currency with which to service
the loans.
44. The exposures of the major international banks were so large that the banks
tended to leave them and not try to finesse the composition of their portfolios.
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ing out of the tunnel first."45 Accordingly, a bank might choose
to concentrate its exposure to risk in a small number of coun-
tries." This was the most common reason for portfolio adjust-
ment.
4 7
Second, many Latin American banks chose to focus their
exposure on the market that they knew best - their own.
Hence, a number of Argentine banks, where possible, ex-
changed their Chilean, Brazilian, and Mexican loans, for those
of Argentina. 4s The third reason for choosing to adjust their
portfolio ran counter to the first reason. If the bank was unsure
of which countries' economies would improve first, and wary of
allocating its risk exposure to only one or two nations, the bank
could chose to balance its risk exposure across a number of
LDCs in the region.49
The fourth and final reason for portfolio adjustment was
that a large number of small exposures to borrowers in numer-
ous countries was too expensive to manage and administer.
Smaller banks, in particular, could not afford to devote teams of
senior executives to LDC debt. The solution was to focus lend-
ing to one or two countries. ° As Ollard wrote in 1986, "it is
simpler to have $8 million out to a single borrower in Brazil, for
example, than to keep track of $4 million in Chile, $3 million in
Columbia and $1 million in Ecuador."51
It was estimated that in this period three of every four debt
swaps were purely for portfolio adjustment purposes. 52
45. See Buchheit, supra note 17, at 28.
46. See Debt Equity Conversions, supra note 6, at 18; see also House, Documenting
and Implementing a Loan Swap, INT'L FIN. L. REV. 29 (Oct. 1984); Interview with Martin
Benegas-Lynch, International Treasurer, Banco Santander, New York City (Apr. 22,
1993) [hereinafter Benegas-Lynch Interview].
47. See Roberts & Remolona, Debt Swaps: A Technique in Developing Country Finance,
in FINANCE FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES - ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF FINANCE - DEBT SWAPS
21 (1987).
48. See de Filippis Interview, supra note 10.
49. See Benegas-Lynch Interview, supra note 46; see also Interview with Mary Tobin,
Senior Staff Writer, International Financing Review, New York City (Apr. 21, 1993) [here-
inafter Tobin Interview].
50. See Clark, Deals Available to a Bank with LDC Debt, in THIRD WORLD DEBT - MAN-
AGING THE CONSEQUENCES 107 (S. Griffith-Jones ed. 1989) [hereinafter THIRD WORLD
DEBT].
51. See Ollard, supra note 15, at 74.
52. See Martin W. Schubert, Address at the XLII Annual Plenary Meeting Mexico-
U.S. Business Committee 10 (Nov 4-7, 1987) (on file with the Fordham International Law
Journal).
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C. Market Characteristics
From 1983 until early 1985, the market was characterized by
four major features: Hand-crafted, individually documented
transactions; structuring of the trades as ratio swaps; absence of
market structure and rules; and confidentiality. Each feature will
be considered separately.
1. Hand-crafted, Individually Documented Transactions
Each transaction in this period was put together individually
as there were few willing buyers and sellers. It was a telephone
market. Upon a seller approaching a broker, the broker would
often call every other market participant seeking a buyer. Struc-
turing trades required considerable time and effort, while mar-
gins Were commensurately, perhaps more than commensurately,
high. It was common for a broker, when asked to sell some debt
for client, to quote a figure and if the prospective buyer was will-
ing to pay three or four percentage points higher, then this was
pure profit for the broker. 3 For example, a seller might receive
sixty-one cents on the dollar for debt for which the buyer paid
sixty-five cents, with the margin, some 6.6% of the seller's price,
going to the broker. Such transactions were possible because of
the extreme thinness of the market and the absence of publicly
quoted secondary market prices.54 For traders accustomed to
spreads measured in basis points,5" not percentage points, this
was heady stuff. For traders accustomed to twenty trades per
hour, rather than one or two trades a week, it was a difficult mar-
ket.
Typical transaction sizes were not large, relative to what was
to come, and exchanges of debt in the US$1 million to US$4
million range were common.
There was no central location for trading. Transactions
took place on the phone lines between traders in New York City
53. Martin W. Schubert pointed out that "there are numerous cases where inter-
mediary banks have added 4 to 5% commissions to the purchase price of the debt in
dealing with the unsuspecting multinational" investor in a debt-equity conversion." See
Martin W. Schubert, Address delivered at the Washington University's International
Affairs Program Seminar, 20 (Feb. 25, 1988) (on file with Fordham International Law
Journal).
54. Id.
55. A basis point is one-hundredth of a percentage point.
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and Lazard Brothers and Libra Bank in London.56 There were,
at most, a dozen active traders.5 7 Transactions often required
extended periods of time and brokers would often call every
other broker and potential source of debt a number of times
over a period of weeks before he or she would conclude the
deal.58
At this stage, most traders had the documentation for each
transaction individually prepared and negotiated by their law-
yers. Each law firm had their own standard form assignment
agreements which "showed a significant level of drafting individ-
uality. 59
2. Trades Structured as Ratio Swaps
The typical transaction in this period was structured as a "ra-
tio swap" to avoid any need to make loan-loss provisions.60 In a
ratio swap, $X of higher priced-debt is traded for $Y of lower
priced-debt plus $Z cash, where X = Y + Z.61 Because of the
equality in the face values of debt exchanged, loan-loss provi-
sions were not required. These swaps were also known as "par
exchanges. ' 62 Thus, in 1983 and 1984, accountants were still
willing to treat one dollar of Brazilian debt, which traded at a
substantial market discount, as equal to one U.S. dollar.
3. Absence of market structure and rules
In practice, the market was, at this stage, a free-for-all. No-
56. See Lenny Glynn, The Lull in LDC Loan Swaps, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Sept.
1985, at 201.
57. See id. (quoting Giacomo de Filippis' view).
58. As an example of the thinness of the market, one trader offered a tranche of
debt for sale at 8.30 a.m. By 9.30 a.m. he received a call offering to sell him the debt he
had offered only one hour earlier! He later discovered that the potential buyer, to
whom he had spoken, had offered the debt for sale to a second trader who had offered
it to a third trader who was then offering it back to the original vendor. Only when a
chain of transactions like this was in place would each trade be confirmed by telex. See
Interview with a former trader withJP Morgan and other trading houses, NewYork City
(April 19, 1993) (interviewee's name withheld on request).
59. See Buchheit, supra note 26.
60. See de Filippis Interview, supra note 10; see also Interview with Martin Schubert,
Chairman of European InterAmerican Finance Group, New York City (April 22, 1993)
[hereinafter Schubert Interview].
61. See de Filippis Interview, supra note 10 (matching author's own experience in
the market in 1987 and 1988).
62. See Buchheit, supra note 26, at 2.
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body viewed tranches of loans as securities, and the hand-crafted
nature of each swap meant that the loans did not trade like se-
curities.63 Accordingly, few bothered to comply with the U.S. se-
curities laws. The market was not reliable, as some brokers
would withdraw from verbal trades, even those they had con-
firmed.64 It was a typical "cowboy" market - he who was quick-
est on the draw and had the best inside information, won.
4. Confidentiality
The need for confidentiality was a product of the politically
sensitive nature of banks selling their LDC loans, and the capac-
ity for transactions to move the market. The principal reason for
confidentiality was that large transactions could move the mar-
ket and would do so more readily if counterparties knew the
identity of the purchaser or seller, and thus could form conclu-
sions about why that party may be doing that deal.65 However,
banks were also sensitive to allegations they were abandoning
some sovereign borrowers.66 Bankers Trust was heavily criti-
cized for its 1983 swap of US$100 million of Brazilian debt and
US$90 million cash for US$190 million of Mexican debt from
Banco Real.6 7 This swap was exceptionally large in 1983 and at-
tracted a great deal of publicity.6" Many bankers felt this swap
sat ill with Bankers Trust's role in soliciting new money from
other banks as part of the restructurings.69
During those years, it was more common than not for bro-
kers to keep the identity of their clients secret. A marketing
brochure promoting the LDC swap expertise of Shearson Leh-
man Brothers discussed confidentiality ten times in its four page
introduction.7" Swaps would often be documented between one
party and the broker for the other party, or even between the
two brokers. The debt transferred immediately thereafter to the
respective parties.
63. It is highly unlikely that the traded parts of loans were securities within the
meaning of the Securities Acts at this time.
64. See Glynn, supra note 56, at 201 (quoting Martin Schubert).
65. See Pettis Interview I, supra note 22.
66. See Glynn, supra note 56, at 201.
67. See Ollard, supra note 15, at 74.
68. See id.
69. See Glynn, supra note 56, at 197.
70. See id. at 200-01.
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Under the terms of the relevant loan agreements, transfers
had to be notified to the agent bank and the consent of the bor-
rower obtained so that these parties would learn the identity of
the eventual holder of the debt, as was necessary so interest
could be paid. Nonetheless, secrecy was common. Banks could
not avoid the borrower learning of their debt sales, but often
sought to prevent this information from becoming common
market knowledge at the time of the sale.7"
Furthermore, secondary market prices were a closely kept
secret. Brokers would not readily quote indicative prices72 for
the reasons given above and.because the market was too thin to
permit their accurate prediction. A broker could, at best, give a
customer a rough estimate of the range within which certain
debt may be bought or sold. For anything more accurate, the
broker would have to attempt to make the purchase or sale on
the open market.
It has been estimated that debt with a face value of US$500-
US$700 million was traded in the market in 1983, w rising to
US$2 - US$2.5 billion in 1984.74 The absence of reliable sources
means these figures are probably little more than estimates, al-
beit well informed ones. The most commonly traded loans were
those of Brazil and Mexico. 5
D. Participants
In February 1983, the European Interamerican Finance
Corporation ("Eurinam") was formed by Martin Schubert to
71. A silent participation in the debt would have been completely confidential and
avoided the need to notify the borrower. These were used at times but suffered from
the large disadvantages that the transferor remained the lender of record and thus (i)
would receive the interest payments (and have to account for these to the participant)
and (ii) would not be relieved of the 'new money obligations' associated with the loan.
For as long as the 1982 exposures were used as the basis for 'new money' calls, this
latter factor was insignificant but most transferring banks were at least hopeful of being
able to avoid 'new money' calls on transferred loans at some time in the future.
72. See Glynn, supra note 56, at 201.
73. Interview by Smith Barney Research with Martin W. Schubert [hereinafter
Schubert Interview II] (on file with Fordham International Law Journal)
74. See In the spotlight, supra note 73. The US$2 - US$2.5 billion estimate was made
by Schubert, in BankNotes, supra. Wallenstein estimated 1984 volume at US$2 billion.
See Wallenstein, Debt-Equity Country Funds: Problems and Prospects in THIRD WORLD DEBT,
supra note 50, at 32.
75. See Schubert Interview I, supra note 60; Wallenstein, supra note 74; Pettis Inter-
view I, supra note 22.
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serve as a broker of Latin American debt.7 6 Five months later,
Giadefi Inc. was formed by Giacomo de Filippis for the same
purpose.7 The establishment of these specialist brokerages in
1983 marks the birth of the modern secondary market.
Schubert and de Filippis were each well placed to see the
coming opportunity. In 1982, Schubert was president of Rosen-
thal International Ltd., a small merchant bank he had helped
spin off a fabric factoring concern in the 1960s. 7' De Filippis was
treasurer of Banco Rio de la Plata. 79 Each man saw the need for
LDC loan brokers and established their own small brokerage
house; a risk each was richly rewarded for taking.8 °
These earliest days of the market were well adapted for
small, innovative, risk-taking brokers. Hence, the small in-
dependent houses such as Eurinam, Giadefi and, to a lesser ex-
tent, Turan Corporation81 all played a significant role. In early
1984,82 Eurinam entered into a joint venture with Singer &
Friedlander Ltd of London which lasted untilJuly 1991.83 Banco
Rio de la Plata and a number of other Latin American banks
were involved from the beginning in swapping and trading their
own portfolios to raise credit. Banco Rio de la Plata was the first
Latin American bank to extend this role to brokering deals for
others and was in the secondary market from the beginning.8 4
76. See Schubert Interview I, supra note 60; see also Gewirtz, Bankers Cool to Dis-
counted Debt Proposal, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, Apr. 11, 1983 (discussing founding of
Eurinam); Pearlman, Martin Schubert Strikes Back, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, June, 1983;
Edwin A. Finn Jr, There Goes the Neighborhood, FORBES, June 29, 1987, at 35.
77. See de Filippis Interview, supra note 10. De Filippis maintains that his was the
first corporation established exclusively to facilitate swaps of this debt, implying that
Eurinam was established to serve a broader purpose and only specialized in this market
as it grew. Id.
78. See Glynn, supra note 56, at 201.
79. See de Filippis Interview, supra note 10; Ollard, supra note 15, at 75.
80. See Benegas-Lynch Interview, supra note 46 (confirming surmise, at least with
respect to de Filippis).
81. See Turan "Tombstone" announcement, WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 1992. Turan Cor-
poration bills itself as "the world's oldest and largest independent dealer in Third
World Debt." Id. It was formed by a lawyer, Robert P Smith, in 1978. See Linda
Corman, Selling the Third World, INT'L Bus., Apr. 1989.
82. See Martin Schubert, Speech at the Hospitality Industry Investment Confer-
ence, New York, NewYork 1 (June 3-5, 1990) (on file with the Fordham International Law
Journal).
83. See Changing Times, 29 LATINFINANCE 8 (1991); see also Joint-Venture Agreement
Changed 886 INT'L FIN. REV. July 13, 1991 at 31.
84. See de Filippis Interview, supra note 10; Schubert Interview, supra note 60. In
one early transaction, Banco Rio acquired US$10 million of notes issued by a Mexican
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The first European bank into the market was Nederlandsche
Middenstandsbank, universally known as NMB, and now part of
ING Barings. They claim to have been involved in trading LDC
debt since September 1982.5 This early start was to serve NMB
well. It was to become one of the major traders of LDC debt. By
the late 1980s, NMB and Libra were the only significant traders
which were not major U.S. investment or commercial banks.'
At this time, some of the major U.S. commercial banks like-
wise established "swap units", often of only one or two people, to
handle the disposition of some of their own assets. 8 7 However,
the U.S. banks were much slower than some of their Latin coun-
terparts in permitting those units to represent other parties.
The high profile of the 1983 swap between Bankers Trust and
Banco Real attracted other banks and brokerage houses to the
business. In 1984 Bear Steams & Co, Shearson Lehman Broth-
ers and Salomon Brothers all established or augmented special-
ised swap units.'
E. Impact of the Market
The impact of the market in these years was twofold. Firstly,
it afforded an exit route for those banks with small exposures
upon which they could afford to take the losses or those far-
sighted banks willing and able to absorb losses on larger hold-
ings of debt to be free of their LDC debt exposure. Secondly,
and more significantly for there were few banks in the former
category,89 the market permitted portfolio adjustment for banks.
With the exception of the debt-equity scheme implemented
by Brazil in 198390 for which the market supplied most of the
company and guaranteed by a Mexican bank for 75 cents on the dollar and swapped
the notes with a U.S. bank for US$1.1 million of Mexican private sector debt, then
considered almost worthless, and US$8.9 million in cash. See de Filippis Interview,
supra note 10.
85. See Mary Tobin, Innovations May Dampen Debt Crisis, UNTED PRESS INT'L, Feb. 5,
1988. It would be remarkable and surprising if NMB was actually brokering loan swaps
one month after the announcement of the debt crisis.
86.
87. For instance, by 1985, Bankers Trust had four people in its swap unit.
88. Glynn, supra note 56, at 197.
89. During this period, none of the major British, Canadian, or U.S. banks could
afford to take the losses involved in selling their loans.
90. Derek Asiedu-Akrofi, A Comparative Analysis of Debt Equity Swap Programs in Fwe
Major Debtor Countries, 12 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 537, 546 (1989).
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debt, the market had little impact on the debtor nations in these
years.
II. THE MARKET IN INFANCY: May 1985 to May 1987
A. Major Events in this Period
This period of the market's development began with the is-
suance of an accounting guideline which was to have a signifi-
cant impact on the activities of U.S. banks in the market for
many years to come.
1. May 1985 Accounting Guideline
In May 1985, the American Institute of Certified Public Ac-
countants ("AICPA") issued an opinion notice which, while not-
ing that valuation for non-cash swaps is "highly judgmental," sug-
gested that when a swap involved credits to financially troubled
countries "the estimated fair value of the consideration received
will generally be less than the recorded investment in the consid-
eration paid" in which case "a loss should be recognised."91
This accounting guideline would appear to have made ratio
swaps no longer effective to avoid writedowns on swaps of credit-
impaired assets and the market had been built on ratio swaps.92
However, the guideline only applied to U.S. banks. European
banks, which did not have to incur writedowns on ratio swaps,
93
came to represent an increasing proportion of sellers. Further-
more, even though the opinion notice provided that "in the
course of preparing financial statements, a bank must review the
loan portfolio in order to assess the adequacy of the allowance
for loan losses,"94 there remained doubts about whether the bal-
ance of a bank's portfolio to a debtor would have to be written
down to the extent of the loss taken on a swap.
Clearly, private sector debtors from the one country are sep-
arate entities and a loss on a swap of a loan to one need not
91. See Notice to Practitioners Accountingfor Foreign Loan Swaps, reprinted in CPA Letter
(Special Supplement), May 27, 1985, at 31 [hereinafter Notice to Practitioners].
92. See Glynn, supra note 56, at 198 (noting in September 1985 that virtually all
swaps done in 1984 were done as what I have termed ratio swaps and without banks
taking any write-downs).
93. Finneran, Remarks at a conference sponsored by The Heritage Foundation,
Center for International Economic Growth (Jan. 21 1987) in DEBT/EQUITY CONVERSION
- A STRATEGY FOR EASING THE THIRD WORLD DEBT 29 (1989).
94. See Notice to Practioners, supra note 91, at 31.
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impact the book value of one's loans to another. However, in
the words of Roberts and Remolona, "with public sector debt,
... it is not always obvious whether the loans to one parastatal
should be treated separately from loans to the central govern-
ment or to another parastatal."95 Doubtless the argument was
that the sovereign may permit some of its parastatals to fall into
default while remaining current on its own debts and/or those
of other parastatals. This was a thin argument given that virtu-
ally all loans to parastatals were now the subject of a sovereign
guarantee but it was an argument nonetheless and the banks
were going to have to be carried, kicking and screaming, to the
wall on this one.96
An early draft of the opinion notice declared that in most
loan swaps there should be a "general presumption" of loss, as
banks were required to mark loans to "fair market value."9 7 This
horrified most loan swappers and brokers. A vigorous opposi-
tion to this wording was mounted, led by Shearson Lehman
Brothers and joined by many regional banks. They alleged that
the money center banks had pushed for the strong "presump-
tion of loss" language in the notice to hobble the market be-
cause they were unhappy that the emerging market publicly ex-
posed a real value for their vast portfolios of LDC debt and, in
time, would lead to inexorable pressure for realistic loan loss
reserves to be taken on those portfolios. One swap unit head is
reported to have said angrily, "They tried to railroad through
this presumption of loss language."98 A Citicorp official was re-
ported as saying, "the idea that we pushed for some new ruling
to stop swaps is ridiculous. These are not 'new' accounting
rules, they are simply a codification of long-standing practice."99
It is true these rules were simply commonsense and what one
95. See Roberts & Remolona, supra note 47, at 26. A February 1986 publication of
the IMF noted that the opinion notice "does not necessarily carry implications for valua-
tion of a bank's other loan claims on that country." See Maxwell Watson & Russell
Kincaid, International Capital markets - Developments and Prospects, OcCASIONAL PAPER No.
43, 57 (1986).
96. See Glynn, supra note 56, at 198. Virtually all private sector loans were guaran-
teed by the sovereign under the restructuring agreements. See Buchheit, Legal issues in
trading sovereign debt, INT'L FIN. L. REv. 17, 19 (February 1986) (considering effect of
opinion notice); see also Newman, supra note 33, at 69-70; Roberts & Remolona, supra
note 47, at 25; Watson & Kincaid, supra note 95, at 57.





would expect from prudent auditors. However, they were new
- the long-standing practice of most U.S. banks active in the
market before May 1985 had been to enter into ratio swaps with
equal face values of debt and cash exchanged and, as a result,
take no loss onto their books. In the end, the potent "general
presumption" language was deleted from the final draft
although the "fair value" language remained.
Only days after the AICPA notice, the Comptroller of the
Currency elected to throw some of the federally chartered banks
over his shoulder and carry them to the wall of financial recti-
tude.' The Comptroller's circular resurrected the dreaded
'presumption' language, as follows:
The estimated fair value of the consideration given and re-
ceived in a loan swap must be determined. Certain foreign
countries are currently experiencing financial difficulties.
For exchanges involving loans to debtors of such countries, it
is presumed the estimated fair values will be less than the re-
spective face values of the loans and other consideration. As-
suming the general presumption is not overcome, this would
result in a loss on the swap. 10 1
The circular went even further and suggested that after a
swap a bank should reconsider its loan loss provisions for similar
credits remaining in its portfolio although it did not require that
the valuation of the swapped assets be applied to the balance of
the portfolio.1 1 2
The effect of asset trades leading to a mandatory writedown
of the balance of one's portfolio of loans to that borrower is
known in the industry as "portfolio contamination." l 0' This is a
curious term. 'Contamination' is defined as the action of ren-
dering something impure by contact or mixture.1 0 4 In this case,
the impure contact was with a value for these loans determined
by their sale and purchase in a market. 10 5
100. The Comptroller has jurisdiction over federally chartered banks. Accord-
ingly, his banking circular did not affect state incorporated banks such as Citibank,
Chase Manhattan, and Morgan Guaranty.
101. Comptroller of the Currency, Accounting for Loan Swaps, BANKING CIRCULAR
No. 200, May 22, 1985, rqrrinted in 3 BANKING L. REP. (CCH) 1 51,145 (Sept. 30, 1988).
102. Buchheit, supra note 96, at 17, 19.
103. See Buchheit, The Capitalization of Sovereign Debt: An Introduction, 2 U. ILL. L.
REv. 401, 411 (1988) (considering this effect).
104. See OXFORo ENGLISH DICIONARY 184 (1st ed. 1982).
105. The market was argued by many to be a very inaccurate guide to the loans'
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Terminology notwithstanding, the common approach of
major U.S. banks to this risk of portfolio contamination was a
strict segregation of the bank's own portfolio from the activities
of its loan swap unit. Banks typically would not permit the swap
unit to swap or sell any loans from the bank's own portfolio. If
the unit needed certain assets for a particular transaction, it had
to find them elsewhere.1 °6 Generally Accepted Accounting Prin-
ciples in the U.S. did not require mark-to-market accounting for
assets held to maturity in a loan or investment portfolio, only
assets in trading portfolios were generally required to be marked
to their market value.10 7 Many of the assets in the bank's own
portfolio and those traded by its loan swap unit would have been
utterly indistinguishable - yet this fine distinction did work to
prevent 'contamination' of the banks' own portfolios with their
market values in these years.
2. Mexican Troubles
The next major events to affect the market occurred in
Mexico. In September 1985, Mexico fell out. of compliance with
its International Monetary Fund ("IMF") economic reform pro-
gram. Many people have long thought the IMF behaves with the
self-certainty of private divine guidance. When, a few days later,
two earthquakes shook the country0 8 and the price of oil plum-
meted over sixty percent between November 1985 and April
real values. However, traders typically see these arguments as fatuous. Their view is
that an assets' true value is the price at which buyers and sellers are prepared to trade it.
See Pettis Interview I, supra note 22. Whatever perspective one takes, the market value
of these debts was certainly a closer approximation to their "real value" than the almost
full face value at which most U.S. banks were still carrying these loans.
106. In Michael Pettis' words, "Many times I had to pay to borrow assets from
Chase, while the Chase traders had to pay to borrow equivalent assets from my bank.
What a magnificent waste of money!" See Interview with Michael Pettis, Managing Di-
rector of Bear Stearns & Co, New York City, Feb. 20, 1996 [hereinafter Pettis Interview
II].
107. See Robert R. Bench, Deputy Comptroller of the Currency, Statement before
the Senate Subcommittee on International Finance and Monetary Policy of the Com-
mittee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Washington, D.C. (April 2, 1987), in 6
O.C.C. Q.J. 21 (1987); see also Brooks, Should Banks Mark It to Market? Depositary Institu-
tions' Accounting Treatment for Debt Investment Securities 11 ANN. REV. BANKING. L. 425
(1992).
108. See R.A. Pastor, The Debt Crisis: A Financial or a Development Problem, in LATIN
AMERICA'S DEBT CRISIS - ADJUSTING TO THE PAST OR PLANNING FOR THE FUTURE 13
(1987).
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1986,1°9 it must have been tempting to believe that the IMF did
indeed have a direct line to the Almighty., Normally these two
events would have caused a precipitate decline in the prices for
Mexican debt. However, the debt was trading at around eighty
cents on the dollar in June and October, 1985 and fell to around
fifty-five cents in April 1986.11° Most other nations' debts lost
between five and ten cents on the dollar in this period so Mexi-
can debt was relatively resilient in the face of these two set-
backs. 11' The reason for this resilience was the demand for the
debt in debt-equity conversions.
3. The Baker Plan
In October of 1985, at the joint meeting of the IMF and the
World Bank in Seoul, South Korea, U.S. Treasury Secretary
James Baker announced his "Program for Sustained Growth" for
the most highly indebted nations.' 12 This program was immedi-
ately dubbed the "Baker Plan" and became the nucleus of the
U.S. government's debt policy for the following three years."'
The plan proposed that, over the next three years, the commer-
cial banks were to provide new loans of US$20 billion: US$7 bil-
lion from U.S. banks and US$13 billion from non-U.S. banks,
and the official agencies, particularly the World Bank and the
Inter-American Development Bank, were to provide a further
US$9 billion.1 14 The official loans were to be tied to policy re-
forms in the debtor nations. These included trade and invest-
ment liberalization, tax reform, budget cuts, elimination of gov-
109. See id. Oil and gas accounted for about seventy percent of Mexico's exports
in 1984. The price of oil fell from US$30.80 for one barrel of West Texas intermediate
crude on November 21, 1985 to US$11.50 on April 2, 1986. Id.
110. See Peter Montagnon, An Impasse That is Difficult to Resolve, FIN. TIMES, Sept.
26, 1986, at 1 (providing special supplement on Peru with price table whose source is
Finance Ministry in Lima).
111. Id.
112. The fifteen nations targeted by the Baker Plan were Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Ivory Coast, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines,
Uruguay, Venezuela and Yugoslavia (as it then was). A comparison with the World Debt
Tables shows that these were not the fifteen most highly indebted, financially troubled
countries in the world - the influence of U.S. policy and its concern with its "own
backyard" in Latin America is evident in the choice of nations.
113. See Carmichael, The Debt Crisis: Where Do We Stand After Seven Years? 4 REs.
OBSERVER 121, 125 (1989); see also Mexican Kick-off to The Baker Plan Highlights Switch to
Growth 642 INT'L FIN. REV. Oct 4, 1986 at 2930.
114. See Goldman, Confronting Third World Debt: The Baker and Bradley Plans, 559
BACKGROUNDER Jan. 22, 1987, at 5-6.
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ernment subsidies, large scale privatization, cuts in minimum
wages and liberalization of domestic financial markets.115 In a
subsequent interview, Secretary Baker summarized his plan by
saying that the "increased financing not only will ease current
debt servicing difficulties, but will facilitate and support domes-
tic policy changes to increase economic growth."116
The Baker Plan aimed at defeating the debt crisis through
long-term growth in the debtor nations (as opposed to the short-
term stabilization programs of the preceding three years). 1 7
With hindsight it bought time and precious little else. Neither
the commercial banks nor the official agencies came close to
lending the targeted amounts of fresh funds. 8 Probably the
most important aspect of the plan was that it amounted to an
explicit acknowledgment by the governments of the developed
world that any resolution to the debt crisis required their in-
volvement."19
By early 1987 the Baker Plan was beginning to unravel as
regional U.S. and continental European banks began increas-
ingly to, resist lending new money to the debtors. 2 ° As reported
115. Id. Carmichael, supra note 113, at 125.
116. See Goldman, supra note 114, at 6.
117. See William Cline, From Baker to Brady: Managing International Debt, in FINANCE
AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 85, 85-86 (R. O'Brien & I. Iversen eds., 1990).
118. Id. at 87-88. Cline acknowledges that new money loans fell far short of the
targets but argues that the US$26 billion in debt conversion and reduction in the three
years of the Baker Plan should be added to the bank's contributions to the region.
While some banks incurred losses on selling the debt for use in the conversions and
debt buy-backs, the funds provided to acquire the debt came from the investors (in the
case of conversions) and the debtor nations (in the case of buy-backs). His interpreta-
tion and application of these figures is far too favorable to the commercial banks. The
generally accepted position is that the major commercial banks "were not able to mobil-
ize anything close to the US$20 billion in new money facilities expected of them as part
of the Baker initiative." But see UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR LATIN AMERICA & THE
CARRIBEAN & UNITED NATIONS CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, TRANSNA-
TIONAL BANK BEHAVIOUR AND THE INTERNATIONAL DEBT CRISIS 16 (1989) [hereinafter
ECLAC/CTC]; see also Alberto Gonzalo Santos, Beyond Baker and Brady: Deeper Debt Re-
duction for Latin American Sovereign Debtors, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 66, 77 (1991).
119. See DEBS, ROBERTS & REMOLONA, FINANCE FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES - ALTER-
NATIVE SOURCES OF FINANCE - DEBT SWAPS 13 (1987). The Plan attracted criticism due to
the governmental involvement. "Once U.S. commercial banks are part of a package
designed by the government and supranational financial organizations, bankers acquire
a de facto claim on the taxpayers in the event the loans go bad." Paul Craig Roberts,
Debt Upon Debt, WALL. ST. J. June 25, 1986.
120. See Charles F. McCoy & Peter Truell, Lending Imbroglio: Worries Deepen Again
On Third World Debt As Brazil Stops Paying WALL ST. J. Mar. 3, 1987; See also Mexico -
Rescue package announced 632 INT'L FIN. REv. 2208, July 26, 1986.
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in the Wall Street Journal in March 1987, "35 to 40 [U.S.] regional
banks have been refusing to cough up their share of new money
for the rocky Mexico restructuring begun last fall" and "Euro-
pean banks.., are less inclined to throw good money after bad
to keep credits alive." 121
The regional U.S. and continental European banks ob-
jecting to the new money merry-go-round were the same banks
that had sold their exposures on the secondary market. The
market had given them an alternative to endless new money calls
- the liquidation of their LDC debt portfolios. 122 The secon-
dary market provided the regional U.S. and European banks
123
with a back door out of the debt crisis to which the major banks
did not have a key.
4. Peru's Debt Service Limits
In 1985, Alan Garcia came to power in Peru as its new Presi-
dent and promptly announced that Peru would limit its debt ser-
vice payments on medium and long-term debt to ten percent of
exports. 124 The howls of protest from the banking community
were particularly strident as the bankers saw this as a dangerous
precedent. 25 The banks slashed Peru's trade credit lines and
strove to isolate the nation and brand it a pariah.126 The price of
Peru's debt on the secondary market fell from around sixty per-
121. See McCoy and Truell, supra note 120. This resistance by smaller U.S. banks
was no doubt strengthened by the "rather acute schizophrenia" which was afflicting
U.S. bank regulatory policy. See Lee C. Buchheit, The Capitalization of Sovereign Debt: An
Introduction, 1988 U. ILL. L. Rv. 401 (1988). In Buchheit's words, "[a] regional banker
may on one day receive a telephone call from a bank regulator asking why he or she is
not participating in the latest new money loan for country X. The next day, a bank
examiner may call asking why the bank's capital ratio is so low in relation to the bank's
exposure to debtors like country X." Id.
122. This is an alternative not open to the major banks with their massive expo-
sures.
123. See Benegas-Lynch Interview, supra note 46. Most of the Swiss banks, which
had small exposures to LDCs, quietly sold their entire portfolios in 1985 and 1986.
Banco Santander of Spain did likewise in 1986. Id.
124. See Montagnon, supra note 110.
125. Id. The precedent was even the more dangerous because of its apparent rea-
sonableness. A total repudiation of the debt would have lacked credibility in the inter-
national community; this proposal, particularly if repayments were increased to say 20%
of exports, had the capacity to appeal to other debtor governments and a sufficient
appearance of reasonableness and balance to make savage criticism of it difficult to
sustain in the international polis.
126. Id.
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cent in February 1985 to twenty percent by April 1986.127 Other
debtors, however, declined to follow Peru's lead. 1986 was thus a
relatively peaceful year which saw a doubling in secondary mar-
ket activity. The peace lasted until February 1987.
5. Brazil's Payment Freeze
On February 20, 1987 Brazil announced that it was tempo-
rarily suspending interest payments on about US$67 billion of
private foreign debt and effectively freezing about US$15 billion
of short-term credits and money-market deposits by foreign
banks. 128 The Brazilian finance minister noted that in the years
since 1983 Brazil had paid US$45 billion in interest and received
only US$11 billion in fresh funds.129 The'Brazilian government
was also concerned that it had not received from the banks a
generous restructuring package similar to Mexico.' 30
The international banking community was shocked. From
1984 to 1986 Brazil's GDP had risen 5.7%, 8.3%, and 8.2%, re-
spectively. 13 ' It appeared to be leading the region into recovery
with growth rates approaching three times the average for the
ten principal Baker countries. However, this growth was mostly
in the private sector and was of little assistance with the public
sector's indebtedness. At the time Brazil was at pains to stress
that this moratorium was temporary - in fact interest repay-
ments were not resumed until early 1988132 and arrears of inter-
est were not paid until late 1988.1 s
B. Impetus for the Market
The process of portfolio adjustment discussed previously
127. See id., table, citing Ministry of Finance, Lima.
128. See Brazil Calls the Shots, 662 INT'L FIN. REv., Feb 28, 1986 at 667; McCoy &
Truell, supra note 120, and Pastor, supra note 108, at 14.
129. See Pastor, supra note 108, at 14.
130. See ECLAC/CTC, supra note 118, at 133.
131. See World Financial Markets, supra at 2.
132. See Peter Truell, Bolivia Buys Back Nearly Half of Its Debt to Banks at a Fraction of
the Face Value, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 1988. (stating that Brazil paid US$356 million on
February 2 and a further US$530 million on March 3, 1988).
133. See Phillip T. Sudo, Chase Announces Plan to Fortify LDC Reserve, AM. BANKER,
Jan. 24, 1989, at 3 (stating that Brazil repaid balance of outstanding interest in fourth
quarter of 1988); see Peter Truell, Big Banks See Bonanza in Fourth Quarter - Brazil's
Catch-Up on Interest Payments is Main Reason, WALL. ST.J., Oct. 26, 1988 (explaining that
payment of over one year's interest resulted in extremely profitable fourth quarter for
most major U.S. banks).
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continued throughout this period. Historically, European banks
felt more comfortable with East European exposures and U.S.
banks more comfortable with Latin American exposures.' Ac-
cordingly, in this period a good deal of portfolio adjustment oc-
curred along these lines. For instance, a U.S. bank might give
Polish debt in exchange, for Brazilian debt from a European
bank. 35
There were five additional factors which provided further
impetus for loan trading between 1985 and 1987. These were
different regulatory treatment in different countries; the grow-
ing realization that the 'new money' calls of 1983 and 1984 were
not one-off events and were likely to be a way of life for years to
come; swaps to take advantage of the taxation status of the debt;
the swapping of perpetual floating rate notes for LDC debt in
1987; and the expansion in some countries of debt-equity con-
version schemes which provided a use for the debt.
The most influential of the five factors, by far, was the de-
mand created by the conversion of these loans into equity under
debt-equity swaps. Each factor will be considered.
1. Different Regulatory Treatment Between Countries
In this period, some nations began to require that
mandatory provisions be made for loans to borrowers in certain
countries. There was, however, no consistent approach by the
bank regulators of different countries; thus, banks in one nation
were required to take provisions against loans to a different bas-
ket of countries than banks in another nation. This gave rise to
swap activity: banks swapped out of loans for which provisions
were required by their home regulator into loans for which
mandatory provisions were not required. 136
2. The Persistence of New Money Calls
Some banks sold their loans principally to avoid the peri-
odic requests for fresh funds.3 7 These obligations (to make
134. See Write-down - The crucible for a US$350 bn loan swap market?, 674 INT'L FIN.
REV. May 23, 1987 at 1685.
135. Id.
136. See Buchheit, supra note 96, at 17-18. But see Pettis Interview I, supra note 22.
In the words of Michael Pettis, "In a sense, the banks were 'arbitraging' the differences
in the regulatory regimes." Id.
137. See Watson & Kincaid, supra note 95, at 62.
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fresh loans based on a percentage of one's exposure) were not
legally enforceable but intense pressure from -other banks and
central bank regulators made non-compliance very difficult.
The new money was needed so debtor nations could meet their
interest payments. In 1983 and 1984, many believed the new
money packages were one-off affairs, not to be repeated. 138 Ex-
perience had disabused banks of this illusion by 1985139 and
many banks wished to be rid of these obligations.
However, there was no standard practice for the treatment
of transferred loans in new money packages. 140 The base for the
calculation of the new money obligations usually remained the
banks' relative exposures in late 1982, so that subsequent loan
sales and swaps did not assist.1 4 ' During 1987, the practice of
calculating new money obligations as a proportion of 1982 expo-
sures was increasingly challenged by non-U.S. banks, which had
been most active in the secondary market, as the practice failed




Some swaps were tax-driven. For example, a Dutch bank
doing business in New York swapped its Mexican sovereign debt
that carried tax receipts for debt without receipts. 143  The re-
138. See Buchheit, You'll Never Eai Lunch in This Conference Room Again INT'L FIN. L.
REV., April 1992 at 11.
139. Indeed, new money was required periodically throughout the 1980s and into
the 1990s to facilitate debt service.
140. See Watson & Kincaid, supra note 95, at 62. Thus, as part of Mexico's 1987
rescheduling, the bank creditors of Mexico as of August 22, 1982 were "invited" to par-
ticipate in a new money loan to the extent of 12.9% of their exposure on that date in
1982. See Lee C. Buchheit, Alternative Techniques in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, UNI. ILL.
L. REv. 371, 374 (1988). The absence of an accepted practice for dealing with the basis
for calculation of new money calls is highlighted by a Wall Street Journal article in March
1987 which reports the "ludicrous game of hide-and-seek" which had followed the sale
by Republic Bank of New York of some millions of dollars of Mexican loans. Republic,
pointing to the sale, had refused to contribute new money funding but, citing confiden-
tiality, declined to disclose the identity of the buyer of the loans, for which the other
banks had thus been searching. See McCoy & Truell, supra note 120. A more typical
story is that of Bank of Boston which had initially refused to contribute new money to
the Mexico restructuring but ultimately relented and did so because of considerable
pressure from Citicorp, other major banks, and the U.S. Federal Reserve. Id.
141. See Schubert, DEBT/EQuITY CONVERSION, supra note 93, at 5, 7.
142. See ECLAC/CTC, supra note 118, at 137.
143. See Roberts & Remolona, supra note 47, at 15, 22.
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ceipts evidenced the payment of withholding tax within Mexico
on the interest and entitled the bearer to tax credits in other
jurisdictions. '44 The Dutch bank's tax exposure in New York was
low and so it could make little use of the receipts. Tax swaps
were transactions to effect the sale of a tax benefit.1 4 5 The face
value of debt exchanged in tax swaps in 1985 may have ap-
proached US$1 billion. 146
4. The Exchange of Perpetual Floating Rate Notes for LDC
Debt
Perpetual floating rate notes ("FRNs") had been popular in
the United Kingdom and Commonwealth countries. They were
issued by institutions of solid financial standing but, as they
never matured, had some of the characteristics of equities.14 7 In
short, perpetual FRNs were trendy instruments that had fallen
from favor and tended to trade at a discount of ten to thirty per-
cent from face value.' 48 This discount facilitated their exchange
for LDC loans. In 1987 such swaps became very popular and
were described as "the hottest thing in town." '149 At times, the
junk bonds of U.S. corporations and the debt of financially trou-
bled U.S. corporations such as Western Union, Pan Am, Eastern
Airlines, and Dome Petroleum,150 were included in the mix.
However, this proved more problematic as default on this debt
was a real, short-term possibility that was not the case with LDC
144. See generally Schubert, A Critical Appraisal of the Changing Secondary Market for
Discounted Third World Debt, Address delivered at the Debt-Equity / Swap Market Con-
ference sponsored by the Institute for International Research, New York City, October
19-20, 1987, at 13 (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) [hereinafter Schu-
bert Address] (discussing tax sweeps); see also Schubert, Risky Business: Prospects of U.S.
Trade and Investment in Latin America, Address delivered at Washington University's In-
ternational Affairs Program Seminar, Washington University, St. Louis, Feb. 25, 1988, at
10 (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
145. See Newman, supra note 33, at 70.
146. See Glynn, supra note 56, at 201-02 (citing figure as participant's estimates).
147. See The Perpetual FRN Market Rests in Peace, 662 Irr'L FIN. REv., Feb 28, 1987 at
693.
148. Id.
149. See Citicorp's Write-down - The crucible for a US$350 bn loan swap market?, 674
INT'L FIN. REV., May 23, 1987 at 1684. For instance, in March 1987 a U.S. investment
bank was offering the swap of US$10 million of perpetual notes issued by a well-known
and major British bank for US$7.5 million of Mexican debt and US$2.5 million of Chil-
ean debt or for US$7 million of the debt of the Ivory Coast and US$10 million cash. See
Perpetuals vs the Ivory Coast 666 INr'L FIN. REv., Mar. 28, 1987, at 1042.
150. See Schubert Address, supra note 144, at 10-11.
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debt and perpetual FRNs. 5
Swapping perpetual FRNs for LDC debt introduced fresh
money into the LDC debt equation and provided an acceptable
exit vehicle for some banks concerned with reducing their expo-
sures to LDCs. By the end of 1987, however, swaps into perpet-
ual FRNs had fallen from favor due to accounting valuation
problems. 152
5. The Expansion of Debt-Equity Conversion Schemes
Debt-equity schemes permit the conversion of debt into eq-
uity in local industries. Their attraction for investors and debtor
nations is that the secondary market discount is "recaptured"
and divided between them.
In a typical scheme the central bank of the debtor nation
announces that debt can be swapped at a certain rate for equity
in local businesses or used for capital investments in the debtor
nation. The rate of exchange of debt for equity may be set by
the central bank (for instance, the central bank may stipulate
that it will retain 12 cents on the dollar so that, for every dollar
of debt tendered, the investor receives local currency to the
value of 88 cents). Alternatively, the rate may be set by an auc-
tion so that investors bid for the right to convert debt into equity
and those willing to accept the largest discounts receive the right
to convert their debt.153
The attraction of these schemes is that the investor who has
received, in my example, 88 cents worth of pesos for one dollar
of debt, may typically have paid only 50 to 60 cents for that dol-
lar of debt on the secondary market. For example, in late 1986,
Mexican government debt was trading at 57 cents on the dollar
and Mexico was taking an average redemption discount of 11
151. See Martin Schubert, A Practical Exit Approach to LDC Debt. A Critical Appraisal
of the Secondary Market and Alternative Exit Possibilities for Regional Banks, Address delivered
at the ABA International Banking Policy Forum, 1987, Washington, D.C., Sept. 25-27,
1987, at 11 (discussing swapping of LDC debt for perpetual FRNS); see also Schubert
Address, supra note 144.
152. See Martin Schubert, A Debt Strategy for International Commercial Banks in 1988,
Address delivered at a conference of the Bankers' Association for Foreign Trade, Wash-
ington, D.C., Jan. 24-26, 1988, at 10.
153. See Martin Schubert, Trading Debt for Equity, BANKER, Feb. 1987, at 18; see also
Schubert, Third World Debt as a Trading and Investment Tool, Countertrade & Barter,
April/May 1987, at 38.
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percent.1 54 If one allows three cents on the dollar for the fees of
the trader who assembles the package of convertible debt the
investor obtains 89 cents worth of pesos for every 60 cents spent
- an increase in their buying power of over 48%.155
In effect, a debt-equity swap results in a preferential ex-
change rate for the foreign investor. 156 In exchange for such a
preference there are usually limitations.' Often, eligible invest-
ment is limited to certain industries and has to meet certain re-
quirements. There are usually, limitations on the repatriation of
capital and the remittance of dividends.157 Furthermore, many
countries nominate only a portion of their outstanding indebt-
edness to be eligible for conversion into equity.
Some appreciation of the scale of these schemes in this pe-
riod can be acquired from the following table which gives the
amounts of debt authorized for conversion into equity as of
April 1987:158
DEBT - EQurIY CONVERSIONS
(MILLIONS OF U.S. DOLLARS FACE VALUE OF DEBT)
Country Total1 59  Period of Program
Argentina 500 February to August, 1985
Brazil 2,300 Since 1982
Chile 1,200 Since June 1985
Mexico 950 Since May 1986
The introduction and/or expansion of these debt-equity
schemes in 1986 revived the secondary market. 60 As we shall
154. See Roberts & Remolona, supra note 47, at 23.
155. This example is modified from the one given by Roberts & Remolona, supra
note 47, to take account of the higher trader's fees and transaction costs which were
typical in the market at that time from the author's experience.
156. See Roberts & Remolona, supra note 47, at 23. For an analysis of the preferen-
tial exchange rate involved in debt-equity swaps, see Anayiotos & De Pinies, The Secon-
dary Market and the International Debt Problem, 18 WORLD DMv. 1655, 1657 (1990).
157. See Remarks of Pardo in DEBT/EQuITY CONVERSION, supra note 93, at 48 (dis-
cussing the Chilean scheme for which capital could not be remitted in first ten years of
investment and dividends could only begin to be remitted in fifth year, and then at a
controlled rate).
158. Roberts & Remolona, supra note 47, at 23.
159. This column records the total conversions authorized, for instance, in
Mexico's case as at April 1987, US$722 million of debt had been converted out of the
US$950 million authorised for conversion.
160. See Philippines - Debt to equity, 632 Ir'L FIN. REV., July 26, 1986, at 2208.
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see, market ,activity had slowed in 1985 due to the accounting
ruling affecting U.S. banks. The need to assemble debt eligible
for conversion into equity fueled a great deal of activity in 1986
and 1987. Typically an investor would approach one of the ma-
jor debt traders and ask them to assemble a package of converti-
ble debt. It was extremely rare to find all the required debt in
the hands of sellers willing to, sell for cash, as most debt was with
the major banks that were not selling or swapping from their
own portfolios."'. Accordingly, the trader would have to arrange
a series of swaps.
For instance, the trader might find that some of the eligible
Chilean debt which her client required was held by Party A.
Party A might only have been willing to exchange its loans for
Venezuelan debt. The trader would have then gone and located
Venezuelan debt, perhaps with Party B who wanted Argentine
debt in exchange. The trader knew she was able to acquire Ar-
gentine debt for cash from a U.S. regional bank wishing to re-
duce its exposure. She would arrange that and then implement
the series of swaps. The final result is that about 162 three times
as much debt had been swapped or sold,161 in three apparently
unrelated transactions, to facilitate one debt-equity conver-
sion. 164 To collate a large parcel of debt, a trader may have had
to undertake such a series of swaps with many parties. 165 Each
debt-equity conversion would generate many secondary market
The Philippines announced its scheme in mid-1986. See generally Asiedu-Akrofi, supra
note 90, at 549-50 (providing consideration of these schemes).
161. See Schubert, in DEBT/EQuITY CONWVaSION, supra note 93, at 12.
162. The amounts of debt exchanged depends on the relative prices.
163. This is aimed at by eliminating the double counting in the swap transactions.
164. Citicorp's Write-down - The crucible for a US$350 bn loan swap market?, 674
INT'L FIN. REv., May 23, 1987, at 1685 [hereinafter Citicorp's Write Down] (presenting
examples of similar chain of swap and sale transactions to assemble package of convert-
ible debt required for conversion). The example given by Salomon Brothers involved
Romanian Swiss Franc and Romanian U.S. Dollar loans, Yugoslavian U.S. Dollar loans
and Chilean U.S. Dollar loans together with banks from France, Sweden, and Bahrain.
The example given in the text is far more prosaic and realistic based on the author's
experience in the market at this time and on the volumes of various loans traded in the
market. The Salomon Brothers example would have been an exceptionally rare trans-
action - still one must expect traders to want to make this business appear more com-
plex and exotic than it really was. Id.
165. See Roberts & Remolona, supra note 47, at 17 (noting in this period that "the
volume of cash sales would still likely be much less than a quarter of the gross total of
swaps."); see also Citicorp's Write-down, supra note 164, at 1686 (noting that there was little
"cash appetite" in the market at this time).
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transactions as the entire package of eligible debt was assem-
bled.16 6 As Roberts & Remolona wrote in 1987:
before 1985, probably three of four swaps were debt-debt
swaps that did not end in a debt conversion. But this pattern
is changing dramatically; ... debt-debt swaps are increasingly
becoming just links in a chain of transactions leading to debt-
equity .... swaps. 1
7
C. Market Characteristics
The four principal characteristics of the preceding two-year
period were identified as the hand-crafted nature of transac-
tions, the structuring of trades as ratio swaps, an absence of
structure and rules, and confidentiality. All except ratio swaps
remained prominent features of the market in this period. Ratio
swaps, as we have seen, were of declining importance for U.S.
banks but were still utilized at times:by European banks.168 In-
creasingly, during these two years, the form of the market was
dictated by the ultimate demand for the debt for use in debt-
equity swaps. Each current principal characteristic will be con-
sidered separately.
1. Demand for Debt for Debt-Equity Conversions
As seen above, the demand for conversion of debt into eq-
uity was the principal impetus for market activity particularly in
1986 and early 1987. It resulted in long chains of swaps as trad-
ers positioned the required amounts of eligible debt with inves-
tors. Naturally, in a demand-driven market such as this one, the
announcement of the implementation of a debt-equity scheme
had a very buoyant effect on prices.
2. Hand-Crafted Transactions
As Ollard wrote in 1986,; ,"arranging swaps is still a tricky,
fiddly business, determining exactly how much loan to, say, a
Venezuelan private sector company is worth in terms of Brazilian
166. As only certain debt w.s eligible for conversion into equity it was common at
this time to see swaps of Chilean public debt for Chilean public debt - to the undis-
cerning eye it would appear that parties were swapping like for like. In fact, they were
acquiring eligible debt in exchange for noh-eligible debt (and typically paying a pre-
mium for the privilege).
167. See Roberts & Remolona, supra note 47, at 19.
168. See Buchheit, supra note 26.
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public sector debt.1 69 And, one might add, repeating the pro-
cess many times over for many different countries' debt in as-
sembling the package of debt required for a conversion.
There were three special types of swaps in this period: "Li-
bra swaps", 'Japanese swaps", and ratio swaps. Libra swaps were
so-called because they were designed to accommodate the some-
what odd accounting rules of Libra Bank, a consortium bank
based in London. If US$100 of the debt of country A, trading at
fifty percent face value, was exchanged for the debt of country B,
trading at seventy, percent, in a Libra swap, the parties would
each exchange US$100 face value of the debts and Libra bank
would then pay or receive a "fee" of US$20. This enabled Libra
to not alter the value at which it held the balance of the relevant
debt on its books. Such a device would not have worked in the
United States: there the accountancy guidelines would treat a
significant amount like fifteen percent not as a fee but as an in-
dication that the value of at least one type of debt was im-
paired. °
Japanese swaps were so-called because they were designed to
accommodate Japan's accounting rules. Under such a swap, the
face value of the assets acquired, including cash, had to equal
the face value of assets sold. With the same values for the debt of
A and B, such a swap would see US$100 of country B debt
swapped for US$60 of country A debt plus US$40 cash. 7 1
Ratio swaps were so-called because the relative amounts of
debt exchanged was determined by the ratio of their prices.
They have already been considered. 172 A variant on a ratio swap,
when two different assets were being exchanged for one, was also
possible. If country C's debt trades at sixty-five percent, then
US$100 of C would be exchanged for US$60 of B and US$40 of
A plus a cash fee of US$3. Provided the fee was a "reasonable"
amount, commonly considered to be up to five percent, then the
equality of face values worked in some jurisdictions to avoid
writedowns. 1
73
169. See Ollard, supra note 15, at 67, 73.
170. See Pettis Interview II, supra note 106.
171. Id.
172. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
173. See Pettis Interview II, supra note 106.
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3. Absence of Structure and Rules
Apart from the impetus towards truth in accounting, pro-
vided by the AICPA opinion letter and the Comptroller of the
Currency's banking circular in May 1985, there was little change
in market practices during this period. There was a broader
range of publicly identified traders but the practices of the trad-
ers remained a free-for-all.
Furthermore, the market remained extremely thin. In the
words of the Deputy Comptroller of the Currency in January,
1987:
applying the term "secondary market" for LDC loans can be
very misleading and confuse important related issues, such as
asset valuation and accounting treatment. The term secon-
dary market conjures images of depth, breadth, volume, rate
and yield structures, homogenous instruments-borrowers-
terms-rates-legal underpinnings, and primary market makers.
Little of this infrastructure is found in the LDC debt mar-
ket. ... . . the secondary market is a bazaar and not an institu-
tionalized arrangement that should be used as a proxy for val-
uing assets totaling over US$400 billion. 174
In short, the scarcity of buyers still resulted in a market too thin
and volatile to deserve the title.
4. Confidentiality
The preoccupation with not appearing to be "selling off a
customer's paper" 175 still existed for many banks, especially in
the earlier part of this period. 176 Few banks were prepared to
signal they had lost confidence in the financial prospects of a
country177 and few major banks were keen for the market values
of the debt in their portfolios to be widely known. Accordingly,
transactions in which the counterparty sheltered its identity be-
hind its broker were common, and most major banks eschewed
publicity for the market. Towards the end of this period an arti-
174. See Bench, Deputy Comptroller of the Currency, in DEBT/EQuITY CONVERSION,
supra note 93, at 60.
175. See Buchheit, supra note 96, at 17.
176. See Glynn, supra note 92, at 201. In September 1985, Glynn noted that most
investment banks still would not "even hint at the number of debt swaps they've done
or the dollar volume involved" - perhaps because they were doing less business than
they were holding themselves out to be. Id.
177. See Buchheit, supra note 96, at 17.
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cle in The Wall Street Journal noted that "the market's higher pub-
lic profile is becoming a minor embarrassment. ' 178 It is instruc-
tive that the table of debt prices in this article listed Salomon
Brothers and Merril Lynch as its source, two brokerages without
their own portfolios of loans to the region. 71
By late 1986, it was certainly true that "trading in debt assets
has certainly come out of the early years' 'closet like' secretive
atmosphere. Quotations for various types of debt are now practi-
cally public knowledge.1180 Tables of prices initially began to ap-
pear in the professional journals8 1 and, by 1986, in newspa-
pers.182
The most common estimate of market volume in 1986 was
that US$5 billion, face value, of debt was traded (eliminating the
double counting potential of swaps) .183 This represented an in-
crease of 100% from 1985 for which most estimates of market
volume are in the US$2.5 billion'84 to US$3 billion a8 5 range.
Nonetheless these volumes represented a tiny fraction of the to-
tal outstanding indebtedness of the Baker fifteen highly in-
debted countries.'8 6 Nonetheless, this market trading played a
major role in providing the debt for debt-equity swaps and in the
178. See S. Karene Witcher & Richard B. Schmitt, Growing Market in Third World
Debt Raises Questions on the Loans' Value, WALL ST. J., Oct. 7, 1986, at 21 col 1.
179. Id. A different table which gave prices every three months from February
1985 until July 1986 appeared in an article in the Financial Times in September 1986. It
gave its source as the Ministry of Finance, Lima, Peru. See Montagnon, supra note 110,
at 3.
180. See Schubert Address, supra note 144, at 6.
181. One such journal is the International Financing Review.
182. See, e.g., Montagnon, supra note 110; see also Witcher & Schmitt, supra note
178.
183. See Witcher & Schmitt, supra note 178; Newman, supra note 33, at 70; Schu-
bert Address, supra note 144, at 5. Roberts & Remolona have estimated that US$5
billion of debt was traded in 1986 after netting out debt-debt swaps ultimately linked to
debt-equity conversion. See Roberts & Remolona, supra note 95, at 19. An article in
International Financing Review estimated the secondary market trading volume in 1986 at
US$8 billion and Wallenstein estimated it at US$7 billion - but these sources did not
specify that the double counting effect of swaps had been eliminated, and if it was not,
these estimates can be seen as a confirmation of the above US$5 billion estimates. See
Citicorp's Write-down, supra note 168, at 1684; Wallenstein, supra note 74, at 32.
184. See Witcher & Schmitt, supra. note 178.
185. See Newman, supra note 33, at 70. Wallenstein's estimate for 1985 was US$4
billion. See Wallenstein, supra note 74, at 32.
186. See supra note 112 (listing fifteen countries targeted by Baker Plan). These
fifteen countries are the ones most commonly considered.
1186 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 21:1152
portfolio adjustment of regional U.S. and continental European
banks.
The most heavily traded debt was that of Brazil (before Feb-
ruary 1987), Chile, and Mexico.1 87 Towards the end of this pe-
riod when the Chilean and Mexican debt-equity schemes were in
full swing, these countries' loans accounted for about two-thirds
of the total volume of the market. 8 The other nations' debts in
which there was regular trading in this period included Argen-
tina, Ecuador, Ivory Coast, Morocco, Philippines, Poland,
Romania, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia."8 9
From mid-1985 onwards, indicative prices began to appear
in professional journals190 and, in 1986, in newspapers. 19' How-
ever, these prices were historical and of questionable accu-
racy. 192 Even those prices commonly quoted by brokers to cus-
tomers were strictly indicative19 - a firm quote from a broker
was a rarity throughout most of this period.194 By the end of this
period, quoted prices were fairly accurate and tight for Chilean
and Mexican debt. 9 5 At the other end of the spectrum, the
quoted prices for Jamaican, Peruvian,"' or Zairean debt were
purely nominal.'9 7
The typical size of transactions for commonly, traded debt
was in the US$2 million to US$5 million range.19 8 Spreads for
brokers remained generous ranging from one to two percent for
larger parcels of regularly traded debt up to five percent for
smaller transactions in less frequently traded assets. 199 However,
187. See Roberts & Remolona, supra note 47, at 20.
188. See Citicorp's WMite-down, supra note 164, at 1685.
189. Id.
190. See, e.g., International Financing Review.
191. See Witcher & Schmitt, supra note 178 (providing examples of tables of
prices).
192. The level of confidentiality in the market was such that there was no way to
accurately confirm these prices.
193. See Citicorp's Write-down, supra note 164, at 1685. It was said at the end of this
period that "the price list is more an indication, a starting point for negotiations." Id.
194. See Roberts & Remolona, supra note 47, at 21.
195. See Citicorp's Write-down, supra note 164, at 1685.
196. For instance, Drexel Burnham Lambert bought some Peruvian debt in early
1987 at ten cents on the dollar when the market price was supposedly twenty to twenty-
five percent. However, the seller was keen 'and clearly they were the only buyer to be
found. See Finneran, remarks in DEBT/EQurry CONVERSION, supra note 93, at 35.
197. See Citicorp's Write-down, supra note 164, at 1686.
198. See Roberts & Remolona, supra note 47, at 20.
199. See id.
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the scarcity of buyers and the need to assemble complicated
chains of swaps to be able to effect one transaction, meant that
traders worked hard for their profits.
D. Participants
By early 1987, many of the major U.S. commercial and in-
vestment banks, and quite a few European ones, had formed as-
set swap departments to act as brokers. z° Some of the more ac-
tive brokers at this time included Bankers Trust, Bear Sterns,
Banco Rio de la Plata, Chase Manhattan, Citicorp, Eurinam/
Singer & Friedlander 2 1  Lazards, Libra, JP Morgan, Neder-
landsche Middenstandsbank, and Shearson Lehman.20 2 Other
brokerages, which could well also belong in the above list, in-
cluded Salomon Brothers and Merrill Lynch. 20 ' Towards the
end of this period boutique brokers, such as Eurinam and
Giadefi, saw their market share begin to go into a decline from
which it has never recovered.20 4 As the size of transactions in-
creased, and traders increasingly began to take positions to facili-
tate the assembly of large packages of debt for debt-equity con-
versions, traders' capital became increasingly important.
The principal suppliers of debt throughout this period re-
mained the smaller continental European and regional U.S.
banks. 2 1 In addition, one large Japanese bank, one major U.S.
money center bank (for a brief period) and a number of Latin
200. See Schubert Address, supra note 144, at 6.
201. Schubert's Eurinam formed a joint venture with Singer & Friedlander of
London in 1984, in the quest for greater global coverage and more capital.
202. See Ollard, supra note 15, at 74 (providing, except forJ.P. Morgan, this list of
active brokers). J.P. Morgan established its loan trading unit in 1985, and was quite
active by early 1987. See Benegas-Lynch Interview, supra note 46.
203. See Witcher & Schmitt, supra note 178. There are simply no figures for the
volumes of trades for individual brokerages at this time, or for many years to come.
These estimates are based on the opinions of market participants. Merrill Lynch
formed its unusually named 'International Exposure Management Group' in May 1986
and claimed to have traded US$500 million of LDC debt in the balance of 1986 and
US$1.5 billion in 1987. See Third World Debt - Watch Out Securitisation is on its Way, 703
INT'L FIN. Rav. 3876, Dec. 12, 1987.
204. See Roberts & Remolona, supra note 47, at 20.
205. See Huhne, Some Lessons of the Debt Cisis: Never Again?, in INTERNATIONAL Eco-
NOMICs AND FINANCIAL MARKETS - THE AMEX BANK REvIEw PmzE EssAys 85, 93 (1989);
John Liscio, How Banks Dump Their 'Toxic Waste, BARON'S, Mar. 16, 1987; Roberts &
Remolona, supra note 47, at 20; Schubert Address, supra note 144; Sebastian R. Sperber,
Debt-Equity Swapping: Reconsidering Accounting Guidelines, 26 COLUM. J. TRANSNT'L. L.
377, 395 (1988).
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American banks all supplied debt at various times. 20 6 At the end
of this period, it was estimated that some 250 banks and fifty
non-financial corporations were involved in the trading of this
debt.207 The latter were a new group of participants in the mar-
ket - investors in LDCs who chose to inject their capital via
debt-equity swaps and thus had to come to the market for the
debt.2 8 These included Bayer, Dow Chemical, IBM, Proctor &
Gamble, 20 9 Chrysler, Ford, Nissan, Volkswagen, 21° and Bankers
Trust investing for its own account.2 11 The effects of the secon-
dary market were being more widely felt.
E. Impact of the Market
The principal impact of the market in this period was the
harsh light of reality it shone on bank behavior throughout the
rescheduling years. In the words of Martin Schubert,
From an historical perspective, the secondary market in LDC
debt has probably brought more realism than any other sin-
gle development to the quicksand-like dilemma which the
LDCs and lending banks [have] found themselves in.21 2
The regulators and bankers involved in the rescheduling
negotiations tended to resent the market as it reduced their bar-
gaining power with the debtor nations213 - an independent
market which valued the loans at a deep discount was a strong
argument for debt forgiveness.21 4 Many major banks were also
anxious that the growth of the market over time would provide a
realistic basis for the valuation of these assets and lead to a revi-
sion of the accounting policy that permitted these assets to not
206. See Roberts & Remolona, supra note 47, at 20; see also How Debt Crisis "Trading"
is Becoming More Sophisticated, 603 Irr'L FIN. REv., Jan 4, 1986 at 16.
207. See Citicorp's Write-down, supra note 164, at 1684.
208. See id.
209. See Schubert Address, supra note 144, at 9.
210. See Asiedu-Akrofi, supra note 91, at 556.
211. See William G. Foulke, remarks in DEBT/EQuITY CONVERSION, supra note 93, at
35, 38.
212. Martin W. Schubert, The Secondary Market for LDC Debt - The Expected Impact of
a Brady ype Initiative 5, Address delivered at the Latin American Financial Strategies
Conference, New York City (June 20-21, 1989) (on file with the Fordham International
Law Journal).
213. The market also reduced their bargaining power with recalcitrant smaller
banks who did not wish to advance new money in the reschedulings because the market
gave these smaller banks an alternative to lending new money - sell their loans.
214. See The Making of a Market, INsTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Apr. 1994, at 66.
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be carried at market value.21 5
One aspect of the realism brought to the debt imbroglio by
the secondary market was to the pricing of the shares of the
creditor banks. Musumeci and Sinkey conducted a detailed
study comparing the effect in the stock market on bank share
prices of Mexico's announcement in August 1982 and Brazil's
announcement in February 1987 of the suspension of debt serv-
icing.216 Their conclusion was that the stock market reacted
more efficiently, accurately, and rationally to the Brazilian an-
nouncement in 1987 than to the Mexican announcement which
heralded the advent of the crisis and that the secondary market
in LDC debt had a major role to play in that more informed and
rational reaction. In their words,
On balance, we think that LDC disclosure requirements and
the development of the secondary markets for LDC debt have
contributed to the efficiency of pricing [bank holding com-
pany] equities.2 17
A further aspect of the realism brought by the market can
be seen clearly in hindsight. In earlyJanuary 1986 Chilean debt
was trading at sixty-five to sixty-nine percent of face value and
Argentine debt at sixty-two to sixty-six percent. An article in the
International Financing Review at the time pointed out that the
market was highly inefficient which "means that banks and inves-
tors who can estimate the risk ... can find significant potential
for profit."218 The article went on to point out that the debt of
Chile with low prices for its major export, copper, and a higher
debt service ratio should have been priced much lower than Ar-
gentina's. In the author's words "Rather than reflect relative
risk - which is clearly lower for Argentina - the price differen-
tial stems from '21 the debt buy-back schemes which Chile had
in place. The article emphasized that these schemes could be
discontinued at any time and that Chilean debt was overvalued.
With the benefit of hindsight, we know that Chilean debt held its
215. See Buchheit, supra note 103, at 401, 411.
216. See Musmeci & Sinkey, The International Debt Crisis, Investor Contagion, and
Bank Security Returns in 1987: The Brazilian Experience, 22 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING
209 (1990).
217. See id at 219.
218. See How Debt Crisis "Trading" is Becoming More Sophisticated, 603 INT'L FIN. REV.
16, Jan 4, 1986.
219. See id.
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value in this range for the rest of the decade 221 while Argentine
debt, by decade's end, was trading at less than twelve percent of
face value.2 2 ' Indeed, Chile's economy was so strong that it
never required the debt relief of a Brady-style restructuring. The
market was inaccurate and inefficient, but less so than the expert
commentators.
A further measure of the impact of the market in these early
years is to be found from a study done by Keefe, Bruyette &
Woods, Inc in 1986. It revealed that from the first quarter of
1983 to the first quarter of 1986, the nine largest U.S. banks in-
creased their exposure to the five largest Latin American debtor
nations by 7.8% to US$46.7 billion; the next fifteen largest U.S.
banks reduced their exposure by 10.2% to US$13 billion and the
next 170 largest U.S. banks reduced their exposure some 8.5%
to US$12.6 billion.22 2 All banks participated pretty well ratably
in the reschedulings and the extensions of new money in this
period. Accordingly, the principal reason that the mid-sized and
smaller U.S. banks were able to reduce their exposure to the re-
gion, beyond the natural increase from new money loans, was
their preparedness to sell debt through the market.223 The nine
major banks were not able to participate in the secondary mar-
ket for the accounting reasons considered, so their exposure in-
creased. As Jay Newman wrote in late 1986, "the tools offered by
this market have provided the basis for a quiet revolution in
banking. ' 22 4 However, a more noisy revolution was just around
the corner - and one of its seeds was the ever-greater publicity
given to the secondary market prices of these debts.
220. OnJanuary 11, 1990, Chilean debt was trading at between 61.5 and 63.5 cents
on the dollar. See Price indications for value impaired debt, 809 INT'L FIN. REv. 26, Jan 13,
1989.
221. See Argentina and Brazil Push LDC Debt Index Down 781 INT'L FIN. REv. 27, June
24, 1989; See also Secondary market report, 807 INT'L FIN. Rv. 29, Dec 23, 1989.
222. See Witcher & Schmitt, supra note 178.
223. Another way to view this is that the debt used in the conversions into equity
came principally from the European banks and those U.S. banks with medium to small
exposures to Latin America - it virtually never came from any of the leader banks
which had done the most to facilitate the lending boom of the 1970s.
224. See Newman, supra note 33, at 70.
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III. THE HAPPY YEARS OF CHILDHOOD: May 1987 to
March 1989
A. Major Events in this Period
This period begins with major U.S. banks taking their first
substantial loan loss provisions on their LDC debt portfolios.
This step was to have a dramatic long-term effect on the supply
of loans to the secondary market.
1. May 1987: Banks Increase Loan Loss Reserves
On May 20, 1987 the Chairman of Citicorp, John Reed, an-
nounced that his bank would add US$3 billion to its loan loss
reserves,225 to reflect its exposure to LDC debtors226 and in-
crease its total reserves to US$5 billion.227 This move resulted in
a US$2.5 billion loss for the quarter,228 an expected US$1 billion
loss for the year,229 and left the nation's largest bank with
reserves of about twenty-six percent of its LDC loans. 230 Reed
announced that the increase in reserves "relates to our decision
to restructure our current exposure through debt/equity swaps,
sales and other measures. 231
This addition to loan loss reserves was the first concession to
reality in the accounting treatment of the LDC loans in the port-
folio of a major U.S. bank.23 2 If secondary market prices are
225. An interesting question is whether Citicorp's debt traders had any advance
notice of this move and had gone short as a result.
226. See Citicorp Debt Writeoffs -John Reed's US$2.5 Billion Gamble Meets Grudging Admi-
ration, 674 INT'L FIN. REv. 1683, May 23, 1987 [hereinafter Citicorp Debt Writeoffs]; Truell
& Guenther, Move, Initiated by Citicorp, Could Lead to Rate Rise for Consumers, Business,
WALL. ST. J., May 21, 1987.
227. See Citicorp Debt Writeoffs, supra note 226.
228. See id.
229. See id.
230. See Jaclyn Fierman, John Reed's Bold Stroke, FORTUNE, June 22, 1987, at 30.
231. See Phillip T. Sudo & Andrew Albert, Citicorp: Facing Up To Latin Debt, AM.
BANKER, May 21, 1987, at 1. In an interview two days later, Reed restated his plans in
these terms: "What I would like to do, over the next two or three years, is use some
piece of my total reserve for the accounting associated with debt-equity swaps, loan
sales, and so forth. I would guess that we might be able to change around various
billions of dollars of our exposure, somewhere between one billion and five billion."
Fierman, supra note 230, at 29. Citicorp was widely reported as intending to unload
US$5 billion of debt over the next three years. Id. at 30; Citicorp's Write-down, supra
note 164, at 1684. See also Peter Truell, Citicorp Plans to Shed Big Part of Loans to Third
World Through Swaps, Sales, WALL ST. J., May 22, 1987.
232. J.P. Morgan, however, may well have been quietly accumulating even larger
reserves for quite some time before this. See Pettis Interview I, supra note 22.
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taken as the value of the loans, this addition to reserves fell far
short of marking Citicorp's loans to market. At the time of the
announcement, Argentine debt was trading at fifty-eight to sixty
percent, Brazil at sixty-one to sixty-three percent and Mexico at
fifty to 59.5 percent. 233 The only significant borrowers whose
debt was trading at discounts of twenty-six percent or less were
Colombia, whose debt traded at eighty-four to eighty-six percent
and Venezuela, at seventy-two to seventy-four percent. 234 None-
theless, in the words of the headline from Fortune, this was in-,
deed 'John Reed's Bold Stroke. 235
2. The Effect of the Secondary Market on the May Reserves
Citicorp's decision to restructure its debt through swaps
into equity and sales was only one of the reasons for this deci-
sion. There were at least five other contributing factors includ-
ing (i) Citicorp's dissatisfaction with the small interest margins
and large new money loan forced upon them by the Federal Re-
serve 236 in Mexico's recent restructuring package; 237 (ii) Brazil's
recent suspension of interest payments and lack of a coherent
economic plan;238 (iii) sluggish economic growth in the U.S. and
abroad;239 (iv) the low values ascribed to bank stocks by the stock
market;24° and (v) the differences in debt policies of U.S. re-
gional and money center banks. The secondary market had a
substantial influence on factors (iv) and (v), which will be con-
sidered in more depth.
a. Stock Market Valuation of Bank Stocks
Bank stocks were valued lowly by the stock market - the
price-earnings multiples of major banks were forty percent of the
average multiples for Standard & Poor's 500 stock index. 241 The
major reason for this was the LDC exposures of the banks. The
prices in the secondary market highlighted a value for the loans
233. See LDC debt pices, 674 INT'L FIN. REv., May 23, 1987, 1686.
234. Id.
235. See Fierman, supra note 230, at 26.
236. See ECLAC/CTC, supra note 118.
237. See Truell, supra note 231.
238. See id.
239. See id.
240. See Fierman, supra note 230, at 28.
241. See id.
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and a magnitude for the undisclosed losses. The stock markets
"couldn't ignore the hard evidence provided by the secondary
market, where most Third World debt dumped by European and
small U.S. banks trades at around 65% of face value. 2 4 2
Citicorp read the market correctly on this point. The mar-
ket welcomed this unusual step towards truth in accounting and
Citicorp's share price jumped US$2.50 to US$53.125 on the day
of the announcement243 and increased a further US$2.25 in the
following week.244
b. Contrast with Regional Banks' Debt Policies
Many U.S. regional banks had reserves to the extent of the
secondary market discounts and had sold some or all of their
loans in the secondary market. The accounting stance of the
money center banks had denied them this opportunity, an op-
portunity in which Citibank now saw real merit.24 5 These addi-
tions to loan loss reserves were necessary if the major banks were
to have the capacity to follow their smaller cousins' lead and
either sell or convert into equity some of their loans. Speaking
like a true trader, de Filippis said of this decision by Citibank:
It's good for one single reason. Up to now, whatever made
sense didn't get done because of regulatory or accounting
guidelines. To the extent banks can do whatever they want
without consulting Arthur Andersen all the time, that should
create more activity in the market.2
46
c. A Sixth Motive for Citicorp's Decision?
There may have been a sixth motive for Citicorp's decision
to ,increase its loan loss reserves, as this decision increased the
pressure upon some of Citicorp's major competitors. These ad-
ditionsto loan loss reserves-came from shareholders equity. Ac-
cordingly, they affected profits and shareholders equity, but not
242. See id.
243. See Truell & Guenther, supra note 226.
244. See Fierman, supra note 230, at 27. In the words of a loan broker at the time,
"Citicorp... takes a US$3 billion hit and its value goes up. What kind of message does
that send to financial America? It says to the other money centers, you guys are missing
the boat." Sudo & Albert, supra note 231, at 1.
245. See Truell, supra note 231.
246. See Sudo & Albert, supra 231, at 2.
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cash flow. 2 4 7 For a profitable bank with a healthy capital base
like Citicorp, reduced shareholders equity was not a problem
and could be rebuilt from retained earnings in the coming
years.248 However, for less profitable banks with slimmer capital
bases, like Manufacturers Hanover and BankAmerica, the cost of
copying this move would be high; equity capital could become so
eroded that the market may lose confidence in the bank.249 Ac-
cordingly, this move by Citicorp was seen as particularly aggres-
sive by some of its less well capitalized competitors.25 °
BankAmerica followed suit and announced that it was in-
creasing its loan loss reserve by US$1.1 billion to US$3.3 billion
in total.251 The response of the stock market was decidedly dif-
ferent from that which greeted Citicorp's announcement -
BankAmerica's stock price fell twenty-five cents to US$11.25.
While the move gave it one of the strongest loan loss reserve
ratios in the United States, shareholders equity was severely de-
pleted and the stock market responded to this weakness. Most
other U.S. money center banks also followed Citicorp's lead.2 5 2
A total of US$15 billion was soon added to loan loss reserves by
fifty of the nation's largest banks.253 The consequences of Cit-
icorp's action were not limited to the United States. The major
U.K. banks made large loan loss provisions shortly thereafter,254
247. See Fierman, supra note 230, at 27.
248. See id.
249. Indeed, there was some doubt as to whether special purpose reserves, which
these in effect were, should countalong with general reserves as primary capital. Ac-
cordingly, there was the further risk that if such reserves were held not to be primary
capital, these moves would have severely eroded the capital of less profitable banks
which followed Citicorp's lead. See Operations of National Banks 7 0. C. C. Q. J. 5, 6
(1988).
250. See John Liscio, Truth in Lending - Or What Has Citicorp Wrought, BARRONS,
May 25, 1987; Peter Truell, Borrowing Trouble: Banks' Reserve Action May Make Debt Crisis
Even More Vexatious, WALL ST. J., July 2, 1987.
251. See William Hall, Bank America Confronts a Capital Issue, FIN. TIMES, June 10,
1987, at 30.
252. Chase Manhattan increased its reserves in the week following Citicorp's an-
nouncement by US$1.6 billion. See Fierman, supra note 230, at 26; Commercial Banks
Move Centre Stage, 675 INT'L FIN. REV., May 30, 1987, at 1779; Truell, supra note 250;
American Express Bank Ltd to Add US$600 Million to Loan Loss Reserve, Bus. Wire, June 18,
1987 (listing major lenders and their additions to reserves in 1987).
253. Mary Tobin, Third World Debt Picture Unchanged; Bank's Loan Loss Provisions,
UNITED PRESS INT'L, Aug. 2, 1987.
254. See S. Griffith-Jones, A History of Debt Crisis Management in THIRD WORLD DEBT,
supra note 50, at 11.
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typically in the twenty-five to thirty percent range.255
Reserves are distinct from write-offs. A reserve provides a
cushion against which to set off future losses from the sales or
swaps of loans at less than book value. An adequate reserve
makes loan sales more likely as the reduction in profits has al-
ready been taken. This wave of additions to reserves was caused
in part by pressures arising from the prices in the secondary mar-
ket. In their turn, these same additions to reserves were to affect
the secondary market profoundly.
3. The Effect of the May Reserves on the Market
In addition to triggering a wave of provisions among other
banks, these provisions by Citicorp had three major effects.
First, the move strengthened Citicorp's position in negotiations
with debtor nations as it had already taken some of the potential
losses from an interest moratorium onto its balance sheet.
256
Second, the move spelled the end for the Baker Plan 257 as it
made further new loans to the region much more difficult to
justify.258 Third, and most importantly from the perspective of
this study, the added supply of loans sent market prices into a
downward spiral which in turn sent market volumes into an up-
ward spiral. This effect is now considered.
At the time, commentators said, "Citicorp's strategy will lead
to a big increase in the size and importance of the secondary
loan market in particular."259 This was predictable as this was
the first time a money center bank had announced its intention
to sell its own loans through the secondary market. 260 The gen-
eral effect on prices of a potentially dramatic increase in supply
of the loans was also predictable although the extent of the ef-
fect took some by surprise.
By mid-July of 1987, before Citicorp had sold any of its own
loans, most debt prices had decreased by about five cents on the
255. Id. at 13.
256. See Fierman, supra note 230, at 26-27; Truell, supra note 250; Citicorp Debt
Writeoffs, supra note 226, at 1684.
257. See Liscio, supra note 250.
258. See Fierman, supra note 230, at 27. Bank directors now had to approve new
loans to borrowers against whom substantial provisions had been made. See Citicorp Debt
Writeoffs, supra note 226, at 1683.
259. See Truell, supra note 231.
260. See Citicorp's Write-down, supra note 164, at 1685.
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dollar.2 61  The prospect of major banks selling their debt
prompted other lenders to offload their paper before the
rush.262
By August, prices had fallen even further. Argentina was
down to fourty-five to fourty-six cents from fifty-eight to sixty,
Brazil was down to fourty-six to fourty eight from sixty-two to
sixty-five (although its suspension of interest payments contrib-
uted greatly to this fall) and Mexico was trading at fourty-hine to
fifty cents from around fifty-eight cents at the time of Citicorp's
announcement. 263 Chile's price, because of its debt-equity
scheme and general economic health was holding up pretty
well, 264 but Ecuador, for instance, was down around fifteen cents
on the dollar. 265
Furthermore, as early as August, the proportion of cash
sales in the secondary market was on the rise, as opposed to the
loan swaps which had dominated the pre-May market.266
Citicorp's addition of US$3 billion to its reserves repre-
sented about twenty percent, of its US$14.9 billion exposure to
LDCs. 26 7 Six months after the move by Citicorp, secondary mar-
ket prices for the nine most heavily traded nations' debts268 had
fallen on average 22.1%.269 The fall in secondary market prices
had already eclipsed the provisions -made by Citicorp in May.
From a prudential perspective, the provisions had been entirely
self-defeating - the increased supply of debt consequent upon
these provisions had led to falls in prices which had eroded away
261. See Sanford Rose, Random Thoughts, AM. BANKER, July 14, 1987, at 1.
262. See id.
263. See Tobin, supra note 253.
264. See id. Chilean debt was trading at 60-63 cents down from 67-70 cents at the
time of the announcement. Id.
265. See id.
266. See id. Martin Schubert was quoted as saying "[b] efore Reed, most secondary
market transactions were swaps for the purpose of arranging portfolios and not cash
sales ... since then, sales are for cash." Id.
267. See Fierman, supra note 230, at 27.
268. See George M. Salem & Steven A. Gavios, Accounting for Debt/Equity Swaps:
Summary and Conclusions from our Investor Seminar, Prudential Bache Securities, BANING
INDUSTRY UPDATE, Dec. 16, 1987, at 5. The nine most heavily traded nations are Argen-
tina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia. Id.
Tbl. 1.
269. See id. (prices at November 19, 1987). The two largest proportional falls were
Peru at 67.7% and Argentina at 37.3% and the two smallest Mexico at 10.6% and Chile
at 17.4%. Id.
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the provisions.2 7° As Schubert said, "after taking reserves, every-
one wants to sell for cash, fearing further price drops... since
sellers outnumber buyers, prices are dropping and the market
has become illiquid."2 71 In a subsequent econometric study,2 72
Mark Stone confirmed statistically that increases in bank reserves
tend to depress secondary market prices2 73 and identified two
further reasons for these declines in prices: (i) investor percep-
tions that the debtors' bargaining positions had been weakened,
and (ii) the consequences of the expected decrease in new
money loans.274
The sinking secondary market prices led to a second round
of provisioning in late 1987 and early 1988, this time by the U.S.
regional banks. In the main, the regionals had not followed Cit-
icorp's lead in May because their provisions were generally well
in excess of the twenty-five percent benchmark set by Citicorp's
US$3 billion reserve. The leader in this second round was the
Bank of Boston, which in late 1987 increased its reserves by
US$200 million, one-fifth of its total LDC loans. 275  Many U.S.
regional banks followed.276
At this time, some of the larger banks with relatively man-
ageable LDC exposures followed the regionals into a second
round of provisioning. Hence, First Interstate Bancorp added
US$180 million to loan loss reserves to bring its total reserves for
LDC loans to fifty-three percent of its portfolio; Continental Illi-
270. See Bernard J. Wolfson, Debt Swap Mart Prices Slide on Weak Demand, J. COM.,
Aug. 26, 1987, at 7A; Rose, supra note 261, at 1; Robert D. Sloan, The Third World Debt
Crisis: Where We Have Been and Where We Are Going WASH. Q., 103, 110 (1988).
271. See Tobin, supra note 253, at 2 (quoting Martin Schubert).
272. See Mark Stone, Are Sovereign Debt Secondary Market Returns Sensitive to
Macroeconomic Fundamentals? Evidence From the Contemporary and Interwar Markets, 10 J.
INT'L MONEY & FIN. 100 (1991).
273. Id. at 113, 118.
274. Id. at 113.
275. See Kate Ballen, et al., A Boston Banker's Bold Stroke, FORTUNE, Jan. 18, 1988, at
8; Stephen Fidler, Busy YearforLDCDebt Trading, FIN. TiME,Jan. 11, 1989, at 33; Peter
Truell & Alan Murray, Debt Breakthrough: Loan Plan May Help Mexico, Some Banks; But It's
No Panacea, WALL. ST. J., Dec. 30, 1987, at 1.
276. Mellon Bank, Banc One, and Riggs National Bank followed almost immedi-
ately. See Ballen supra, note 275, at 8. In addition, in January 1988, American Express
Bank, increased its reserves to a very healthy sixty percent of loans to rescheduling
countries. The reasons given for the extra reserves were the decreasing prices in the
secondary market and the acceleration of the bank's policy of getting out of interna-
tional lending. See American Express Bank Lid Adds US$350 Million to LDC Loan Reserves,
Bus. WIRE, Jan. 12, 1988.
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nois added US$200 million to its reserves to bring them to fifty
percent of its portfolio and Security Pacific added US$350 mil-
lion dollars to its reserves to bring them to fifty-four percent of
its exposure. 277
4. Aztec Bonds - 1988
The next significant event was the announcement in the fi-
nal days of 1987 of a plan for the securitization of up to US$20
billion of Mexico's loans by converting them into bonds, known
as Aztec or Morgan-Mexico bonds, upon which the payment of
principal was secured. 27s This had little impact on the secondary
market as the loans eligible for conversion were those held by
banks as original creditors not those acquired in the market.
Nonetheless, this proposal is significant as the precursor to the
Brady bonds of subsequent years which would transform the
market.2
79
The proposal was structured by Morgan Guaranty280 as an
attempt to recover a portion of the secondary market discount
for Mexico's benefit. 2 1 Under the proposal Mexico invited the
banks to a 'sealed bid auction at which banks could bid to ex-
change their current Mexican loans for the new secured
bonds.282 The bonds had a term of twenty years and paid inter-
277. See First Interstate Adds LDC Loan Loss Reserve, REUTERS, Jan. 13, 1988; Latin
American Nations Petition Banks For New Round of Restructurings, 707 INT'L FIN. REV., Jan
16, 1987, at 172.
278. See Truell & Murray, supra note 275, at 1; First Step to Debt Realism, FIN. TIMES,
Dec. 31, 1987, at 10 (providing excellent contemporaneous accounts of this proposal).
See Michael Chamberlin et al., Sovereign Debt Exchanges, 1988 U. ILL. L. REv. 415, 450-57
(1988) (providing excellent retrospective view) .
279. There are many similarities between Aztec bonds and Brady bonds. Brady
bonds incorporated many of the lessons learned from the Aztec scheme. For the inter-
est the Aztec scheme generated among other debtors, see Paraso, RP Could Try Mexican
Tack in Solving Own Debt Problem, PHILIPPINE Bus. WEEKLY, Jan. 6, 1988.
280. In the media it was reported that Mexico had requested Morgan to put to-
gether such a scheme, which technically, no doubt, at some stage it did. See Robert A.
Bennett, Morgan Bank Outlines Its Mexican Debt Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1987, at D3 col
1. However, Morgan, in its own internal correspondence, notes that "the transaction
resulted from a proposal first put forward byJP Morgan and Co to the Mexican govern-
ment in July 1987." Inter-Department Memorandum from Morgan Guaranty Ltd. to
Hong Kong Corporate Office, re Mexican Debt Exchange,Jan. 5, 1988 (on file with the
Fordham International Law Journal).
281. See Robert Plehn, Securitization of Third World Debt, 23 INT'L LAW. 161, 170
(1989).
282. SeeJohn P. Forde &Jed Horowitz, Bankers Give Mixed Reviews to Mexico's Plan to
Exchange Loans for Collateralized Bonds, AM. BANKER, Dec. 30, 1987, at 1.
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est at 1 5/8th % over Libor,28" as opposed to the 7/8th % mar-
gin generally payable on Mexican bank loans. Principal would
be repaid upon maturity and its repayment secured by the
purchase by Mexico of zero-coupon bonds284 specially issued by
the U.S. Treasury.285 Mexico was prepared to issue up to US$10
billion of these Aztec bonds. The amount of loans that would be
converted into such bonds would depend upon the magnitude
of the discounts bid by the banks. Mexico would select bids on
the basis of price - the higher a discount a bank was willing to
accept the more likely the securitization of its tendered loans.
Mexico hoped to receive bids in the range of the current secon-
dary market price of fifty to fifty-four percent,286 and thus securi-
tize up to US$20 billion of loans.
Why would a bank accept a bond for fifty cents on the dollar
when it could have the same amount of cash from the secondary
market?28 v The principal guarantee could hardly have been the
reason when the twenty years of interest payments were Mexican
risk. Perhaps Mexico and Morgan anticipated that these bonds
would be as attractive as cash as they were "exit bonds", (i.e.
there were to be no subsequent new money calls based upon the
loans converted into these bonds or the bonds themselves) ;288 an
advantage a sale for cash could not offer. Nonetheless, the
promise not to make new money calls based on these bonds
283. Libor stands for the London Interbank Offered Rate.
284. See Plehn, supra note 281, at 164. Zero-coupon bonds, as their name suggests,
do not pay interest. Accordingly, they are issued at deep discounts. Mexico could have
purchased the US$10 billion of 20 year zero coupon bonds for about US$2 billion. Id.
285. See id. at 163-64. The zero coupon bonds were to be held in escrow for this
purpose at the New York Federal Reserve. See Truell & Murray, supra note 275.
286. See Plehn, supra note 281, at 164, 171.
287. One reason is that any bank with a large portfolio of Mexican loans would
have depressed the price in this thin market by trying to sell all of the loans at once and
certainly if a number of large banks were to try to liquidate their portfolios, prices in
the market would have plummeted.
288. There was no legal obligation upon banks to meet new money calls from LDC
debtors. However, recalcitrant banks would typically be the subject of intense pressure
from other banks and bank regulators to participate in the new money loan. In a letter
which accompanied the formal invitation to submit bids sent to all Mexico's bank credi-
tors, Mexico's Minister of Finance and Public Credit, stated that, "neither the Bonds
nor any indebtedness tendered and accepted in exchange therefor will be included in
the base amount for determining any future requests that Mexico may make to its com-
mercial bank creditors generally." Plehn, supra note 281, at 165. For more on "exit
bonds" in this context, see Clark, Deals Available to a Bank With LDC Debt, in TmiRn
WORLD DEBT supra note 50, at 111-12.
1998] 1199
1200 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 21:1152
could be broken by a future Mexican government in sufficiently
dire economic straits. 289
Perhaps unsurprisingly, this securitization proposal was not
as warmly received as Mexico and Morgan Guaranty might have
wished. 29 ° The plan attracted 320 bids from 139 banks covering
US$6.7 billion of loans. Mexico accepted bids from 95 of those
banks covering US$3.67 billion of loans.291 The average price
Mexico paid for this debt was 69.77%,292 which meant that
US$2.56 billion of new, secured bonds had to be issued to re-
place it.293
Even though the interest rate on the new bonds was higher
than on the loans they replaced, the reduced principal means
that Mexico would have saved about US$500 million in net inter-
est payments over the life of the bonds.29 4 Its total debt was re-
duced by US$1.1 billion.295
There were a number of reasons for the relatively disap-
pointing result of this auction. First, an accounting risk associ-
ated with tendering for these bonds probably dissuaded more
potential tenderers than any other factor. Pursuant to Staff Ac-
counting Bulletin 75296 ("SAB 75"), the mere act of tendering
loans at a nominated discount required that they be valued at
their fair market value, even if the tendered loans were not accepted by
289. See Plehn, supra note 281, at 165-66, 169.
290. See Mexico - The auction postmortem continues, 715 INT'L FIN. REv., Mar. 12,
1987, at 798. Indeed, many of the bids were made by banks as a "favor" to preserve
their bona fides with the Mexican government. See Pettis Interview, supra note 22.
291. See Peter Truell, Mexico's Plan to Reduce Debt Is Short of Goal, WALL. ST. J., Mar.
4, 1988.
292. See id. Mexico accepted tenders up to a price of 74.99%. Id.
293. See id; Plehn, supra note 281, at 164. See generally Chamberlin, et al., supra
note 278, at 454 (on results of this offer).
294. See Truell, supra note 291 (citing Morgan Guaranty spokesman). Mexico
stood to save US$1.54 billion in gross interest payments over the 20 year life of the
bonds. Id; see also Mexico - The Auction Postmortem Continues, 715 INT'L FIN. REV., Mar.
12, 1987, 798. However, this statistic fails to tell the full story. The interest foregone on
the reserves used to purchase the zero coupon bonds must be factored into the equa-
tion, which leads to net savings on interest of US$500 million. See Rimmer de Vries,
Chief Economist, Morgan Guaranty Trust Company, Economic and Trade Adjustment in
the United States and Other Industrial Countries and The LDC Debt Issue: Problems and Pros-
pects, Statement to The Asahi-Zeit Symposium, Tokyo, Japan, March 29-30, 1988 at 21
(on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
295. See id; Mexico - The Auction Postmortem Continues, supra note 294, at 798.
296. See Staff Accounting Bulletin No 75, SEC, 17 CFR Part 211, Jan. 4, 1988, repro-
duced in Hay & Paul, REGULATION AND TAXATION OF COMMERCIAL BANKs DURING THE
INTERNATIONAL DEBT CRIsIs 131 (1991).
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Mexico for conversion into bonds.29 7 Furthermore, there was a risk
that the revised valuation would have to be applied to the bal-
ance of loans to Mexico in the creditor's portfolio. 298 This in-
flexibility.of U.S. regulators attracted strong criticism from Mex-
ico. 299 Second, the bonds were in registered, rather than the tra-
ditionally more-attractive bearer, form."°  Third, the principal
guarantee was of small comfort on a twenty year bond which
would trade on the likelihood of timely interest repayments be-
ing made by Mexico.30' Fourth, for that reason most banks ex-
pected that these bonds would trade at less than their full face
value,3 °2 and in hindsight they were right."0  Accordingly, the
banks had to bid above the current secondary market price to
allow for the subsequent discount of these bonds on the secon-
dary market.
While at the time the Aztec bond scheme was disappointing,
in hindsight, it was significant for two reasons. First, lessons
from the Aztec experience were applied to the subsequent Brady
297. See Ricki Rhodaimer Tigert, Recent Regulatory Perspectives on Debt-for-Equity
Swaps and Securitization of Third World Debt, 1988 U. ILL. L. REv. 481, 487-89 (1988);
Ricks & Truell, SEC Tells Banks How to Handle Mexico Debt Swap, WALL. ST. J., Jan. 5,
1988; Peter Truell &Jeff Bailey, Some Big Banks Plan to Shun Mexican Plan, WALL. ST. J.,
Jan. 8, 1988. The authors stated "[t]he SEC said the very act of offering the debt for
exchange means the banks should either write off the difference between the carrying
value of loan amounts tendered and the auction amount bid, or increase reserves allo-
cated to the debt to reflect the difference." Id.
298. See Plehn, supra note 281, at 167; Chamberlin et al., supra note 278, at 455-56.
299. See Mexico - A second bond auction already considered, 714 INT'L FIN. REv., Mar.
5, 1988, 709. The basis of this ruling was that the best evidence of market value was the
discount the bank's management was prepared to accept in the auction process. Id; see
also HAY & PAUL, supra note 296, at 113-14 (reproducing excellent consideration of FAS
75 in Office of Superintendent of Financial Institutions, Canada).
300. See Chamberlin et al., supra note 278, at 455. This was partly because the
principal of the new bonds was secured by a pledge of U.S. Treasury securities. Id. The
consequential ready indentifiability of registered bondholders may also have left some
banks nervous as to future new money calls. See Plehn, supra note 281, at 169-70, 184-
85.
301. This weakness was identified immediately. In the words of an investment
banker quoted on the day following the announcement, "[p ] rincipal isn't as ,important
as interest when you're talking about 20 years. If the interest rate risk is going to be the
same, what's the point?" Forde & Horowitz, supra note 282, at 1; see also Plehn, supra
note 281, at 167-68.
302. See Plehn, supra note 281, at 168-69, 184; Chamberlin et al., supra note 278, at
455; Schubert, supra note 152, at 17.
303. See Lori Ioannou, Banking on a Better Future, EUROMONEY, Sept. 1989, at 251,
252. History bore out this expectation of the banks. In mid-August, 1989, Aztec bonds
were trading at between seventy-two and seventy-four percent of their face value. Id.
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bond proposals. In particular, the Aztec bonds highlighted the
need for at least a partial guarantee of interest payments3°4 and
for greater flexibility on the part of U.S. bank regulators and
accounting bodies. The risk that bidding a certain discount for
the conversion of one's loans would be interpreted by one's au-
ditors as an admission as to the loan's true value, thus necessitat-
ing writedowns, was removed by changes to accounting regula-
tions to pave the way for Brady bonds.3"5 Second, because the
U.S. Treasury assisted the Aztec scheme by making a special pur-
pose issue of zero-coupon bonds,3 °6 this was the first public ad-
mission by the U.S. government that LDC debtors were entitled
to some degree of debt forgiveness °.3 7 This departure from the
former "repayment in full" philosophy was a pivotal step in the
journey towards the Brady Plan.
B. Impetus for the Market
The principal factor driving the market throughout this pe-
riod was the demand for the debt for use in debt conversion
schemes and debt buy-backs. 3 8 A subsidiary source of demand
were the round tripping transactions, commonly known as
bicicletas, under the Mexican and Chilean debt-equity program-
mes. The supply of debt was principally from regional U.S., Con-
tinental European, and Canadian banks; many of which pursued
aggressive programs aimed at liquidating their holding of LDC
debt.30 9 Some of the factors considered previously (particularly
304. In hindsight, the Aztec scheme was a vital dry-run for Mexico's first massive
Brady bond scheme.
305. See The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants Practice Bulletin, Oct.
1987. The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants published a new view in
October 1987 with respect to the valuation of loans to a country a part of which have
been sold at a discount. This interpretation opened the way for unrestricted sales of
loans in the secondary market and conversions of loans into equity as it removed the
risk that the balance of one's portfolio of loans would have to be written down in value
to the price received for the sold or converted loans. Id; ECLAC/CTC, supra note 50, at
139.
306. See Chamberlin et al., supra note 278, at 451.
307. See Truell & Murray, supra note 275. In the words of Truell & Murray, "for
the first time, the U.S. is throwing its weight behind a plan that sanctions losses by
banks on loans to a big debtor country." Id; see also Clyde H. Farnsworth, IMF Weighs
Idea of Debt Forgiveness - It is the First Time Washington has Backed a Plan to Reduce Total
Debt, INr'L HERALD TRIBUNE, Feb. 11, 1988, at 7 col 2; Plehn, supra note 281, at 173.
308. The demand was by both debtor governments and private debtor corpora-
tions.
309. See Schubert, Address, The LDC Debt Debacle -An Update. Historical Perspectives,
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portfolio adjustment 31 ° and, to a lesser extent, differing regula-
tory treatment in different nations), continued to exert some in-
fluence but the overarching influence on the market was the
need to use the debt in debt conversion and debt buy-back
schemes. These two uses for the debt and the role of bicicletas
will now be considered.
1. Debt Conversion Schemes
The principal forms of debt conversion occur in debt-equity
schemes, privitizations for debt, and in debt-for-nature, debt-for-
development, and debt-for-education schemes. Each will be con-
sidered.
a. Debt-Equity Schemes
In this period, a number of nations implemented or ex-
panded debt-equity schemes. The Chilean program, begun in
May 1985, was in full flight in 1987 and 1988.311 Argentina liber-
alized its scheme in October 1987 to make it more attractive to
investors.3 12  Brazil instituted a new program in February
1988,313 in which over US$1.27 billion of external debt was con-
verted into US$1.02 billion of equity in its first seven months of
operation. 14 Mexico's program was suspended briefly in March
The Brady Plan; How Serious Is the Leveraging of America?, delivered to the National Honor
Society in Finance Annual Dinner at Fairleigh Dickinson University, May 5, 1989, at 6
(on file with the Fordham International Law Journal). "Most super-regional banks have
disposed of at least 50 pct of their LDC loans during the past year." Id.
310. See Urwin, An Overview of LDC Portfolio Management, in THIRD WORLD DEBT,
supra note 50, at 63, 69.
311. In excess of US$2 billion of Chilean external debt was converted through its
formal program in 1987 and over US$2.6 billion was so converted in 1988. In addition,
some US$450 million was converted informally in 1987 and over US$1 billion in 1988.
See Mary L. Williamson, Chile's Debt Conversion Program: Its Promises and Limitations, 27
STAN. J. INr'L. L. 437, 490 (1991) (providing bar for figures in table 3).
312. See Asiedu-Akrofi, supra note 90, at 537, 549-50. Argentina variously pro-
moted and suspended its scheme throughout this period. However, once the price on
its debts had fallen to the twenty percent range in 1988 and 1989, conversions became
very attractive to the nation because of the large amounts of debt erased in them. For
instance, in March 1989, US$348 million of debt was discounted to US$79.7 million of
local currency for investment into 22 projects. See Argentina Agrees Latest Debt-Equity Con-
versions, INr'L TRADE FIN., Apr. 6, 1989.
313. This was pursuant to Central Bank Regulation 1416 issued on November 17,
1987.
314. See Peter Truell, Debt Swaps by Brazilians Draw Interest, But Terms Discourage Some
Participants, WALL. ST. J., Apr. 26, 1988. Under this programme, Brazil held monthly
auctions at which prospective investors bid the discount rates they were willing to ac-
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1987, but was soon resumed and operated until October 1987.15
It was then suspended indefinitely amid concerns about its infla-
tionary impact and effect on the allocation of new invest-
ments.316 The Philippines implemented its scheme in August
198617 and expanded it in July 1987 to include a broader range
of government debt to make it more attractive to investors."' 8 In
addition, in this period, debt-equity schemes were implemented
or expanded in the following countries: Costa Rica, the Domini-
can Republic, Ecuador, Jamaica, Nigeria, Poland, the Philip-
pines, Uruguay, and Venezuela.3 19
Often in this period, the permission and procedure for
cept. Half the amount converted at each auction had to be invested in projects in the
depressed regions of north-east Brazil. Up to US$150 million could be accepted for
conversion at each auction, with a further US$50 million per month available for con-
version outside the auction system. At the first auction in March, US$186.5 million of
loans were swapped for local currency for these investments. The loans were dis-
counted by 10.5% for investments in the north-east and by 27% for investments else-
where in the country. Accordingly, this programme allowed Brazil to direct foreign
investment where it was most needed and to recapture a substantial amount of the
secondary market discount for loans. Id. The average discount on the first seven
monthly conversions was 19.7%; and discounts had reached 16.5% in the north-east
and 38% in the free area by October. See The Brazil Auction Series, 2 SwAPs: THE NEWS-
LETTER OF NEW FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTs 3 (1988); LDC Debt - Brazilian Bonanza 719
INT'L FIN. REV., Apr. 9, 1988, 1136; Brazilian Debt Auction: Mood Unsettled 748 INT'L FIN.
REV., Oct 29, 1988, 3524; Record Discounts at Rio Auction, 753 INT'L FIN. REV., Dec. 3,
1988, 3916; See also Asiedu-Akrofi, supra note 90, at 546.
315. See Asiedu-Akrofi, supra note 90, at 556. Mexico suspended its program as a
bargaining tool to use against banks not wishing to advance fresh funds in the then
current rescheduling. Mexico threatened to declare such bank's loans ineligible for
conversion into equity or to deny those banks a role as either an agent or broker for
other investors in conversions. After the new money agreement was executed, Mexico
resumed its programme. Id.; see also Debt-Equity Swap in Mexico 717 INT'L FIN. REv., Mar.
26, 1987, 969 (providing example of debt-equity swap transacted under Mexican
scheme and describing how Whirlpool Corp of U.S. swapped US$108 million face value
of Mexican debt for 49% stake in Mexican plastics and goods manufacturer).
316. See Asiedu-Akrofi, supra note 90, at 560; See also Peter Truell, Brazil Could Cut
Foreign Bank Debt By US$19 Billion by 1994, Study Says, WALL. ST. J. Aug. 23, 1988.
317. The scheme was implemented pursuant to Executive Order 32 issued on July
24, 1986 and Central Bank Circular 1111 issued on August 4, 1986.
318. See Asiedu-Akrofi, supra note 90, at 564. Specifically the scheme was ex-
panded to permit the conversion of Philippine Investment Notes (non-interest-bearing,
foreign currency obligations of the Philippines government) which offered various ad-
vantages to the prospective investor. Id. For a consideration of the Filipino scheme
and the domestic political tensions to which it gave rise, see Uncertain Future for Philip-
pine Debt-Equity Programme 723 INT'L FIN. REv., May 7, 1988, 1439.
319. See Chamberlin et al., supra note 278, at 417 n.17; Schubert, supra note 152, at
12; see also Peter Truell & Charles F. McCoy, Third World Creditors Give Debt-Equity Swaps a
Try, WALL. ST.J., June 11, 1987, at 6, col. 1.
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debt-equity conversions was included in the rescheduling agree-
ments, usually at the insistence of the banks.3 21 Such provisions
would define the scheme and put in place all necessary consents
and waivers. 321 At times, the restructuring agreements would
permit the purchase by the debtor of a portion of its loans on
the secondary market, i.e. the necessary consents and waivers
were provided in advance for a defined amount of debt buy-
backs. 22
The popularity of debt-equity schemes was further en-
hanced in this period by the liberalization of U.S. banking regu-
lations. Before August 1987, U.S. banks were limited to holding
up to twenty percent of the equity in nonfinancial companies.
Regulation K was amended by the Federal Reserve Board in Au-
gust 1987 to permit up to 100 percent ownership in non-finan-
cial companies in the thirty-three most heavily indebted LDCs
provided the companies were state-owned and the acquisition
was from the government.3 2  This change was specifically to
promote debt-equity privatizations.124 The acquiring banks were
320." See Refresher Course - Swap Shop, BARRONS, Sept. 4, 1989. Mexico suspended
its debt-equity program in late 1987 and only "grudgingly" agreed to include advance
permission for the conversion of about US$3 billion of loans into equity as part of its
1989 restructuring package with the banks. Id.
321. See Chamberlin et al., supra note 278, at 421-24; Carsten Ebenroth & Rudiger
Woggon, The Development of the Equal Treatment Principle in the International Debt Crisis, 12
MICH.J. INT'L L. 690, 710-13 (1991). An example of such a provision may be found in
section 5.11 of the Mexico Restructure and New Restructure Agreements of 1985-1987,
reproduced in Chamberlin et al., supra, note 278, at 477-80; reproduced in Ebenroth &
Woggon, supra, at 731- 34.
322. This was the case in June 1988 for Brazil's restructuring agreement which
rescheduled US$62 billion of debt and provided US$5.2 billion of new funds. See Peter
Truell & Roger Cohen, Brazil and Panel of Bank Lenders Agree on Debt, WALL ST. J., June
22, 1987.
323. See De Faria et al., PW/EUROMONEY DEBT-EQuITY SwAP GUIDE (1988);
Buchheit, The Capitalization of Sovereign Debt: An Introduction, 1988 U. ILL. L. REv. 401,
410 (1988); Lee C. Buchheit, Banking Regulation: Federal Reserve Liberalises Foreign Invest-
ment Rules for US Banks, 3JIBL N-ill to N-113 (1988).
324. With their potential for reducing both the debt burden on a country and the
perceived inefficiencies of state-owned enterprises. See also Spencer, Regulation K Allows
100 Percent Ownership, INT'L FIN. L. REv., Oct., 1987 13, 13-14 (citing Federal Reserve
Board's commentary on amendment); OCC Unpublished Interpretative Letter of Feb.
27; 1989 from the Comptroller of the Currency to the President, Miami National Bank,
NA, (Ref. 12 U.S.C. 29a, 12 U.S.C. 24(7)) (giving example of conversion which took
advantage of this liberalized regulatory environment). The Comptroller approved a
transaction in which the named bank proposed to exchange its Argentine debt for
Honduran debt and then swap the Honduran debt for local currency with which to
acquire 100% of the common stock in a Honduran steel foundry. Id.
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expected to sell their stakes in such companies within five years
although extensions of up to a further five years were available
for good cause.3 25 Regulation K was further liberalized in Febru-
ary 1988 to permit banks to invest through debt-equity swaps in
up to fourty percent of any private sector company in a heavily
indebted country3 26 (i.e. investment was permitted in any com-
pany, not only those being privatized).327
These liberalizations of the U.S. bank regulatory regime
were of particular benefit to Bankers Trust and Citicorp,3 28 each
of which committed substantial amounts of debt from their port-
folios into debt-equity schemes. In Chile, Citicorp converted
debt to invest in a range. of resource businesses such as agricul-
ture, mining, fishing, and forestry often in a joint venture with a
subsidiary of the Royal Dutch Shell group.329 It has been esti-
mated that US$3 billion of debt was converted into equity
through formal programs in 1987.330 Schubert noted in Octo-
325. Id.
326. 53 Fed. Reg. 5358 (1988).
327. See Buchheit, supra note 323, at 410-11. See generally Rubenstein, The Federal
Reserve Board's "Liberalization" of the Restrictions on LDC Debt-Equity Swaps, 20 LAw & POLICY
IN INT'L Bus. 163 (1988) (discussing revisions to Regulation K); Tigert, supra note 297,
at 487-89; Chamberlin et al., supra note 278, at 469-74 (providing detailed analysis of
Regulation K revisions).
328. See Peter Truell, Brazil Could Cut Foreign Bank Debt By US$19 Billion by 1994,
Study Says, WALL. ST. J., Aug. 23, 1988.
329. See Peter Truell, Chile Pushes Debt - Conversion Program, WALL. ST. J., Dec. 9,
1987. For instance, Citicorp converted some US$70 million of its loans into 20 percent
of the equity in a Chilean wood-products company, pulp mill and eucalypt forest. See
Ryser et al., Deals That are Making a Dent in Third World Debt, Bus. WK., Oct. 3, 1988,
plll. In Brazil Manufacturers Hanover converted US$115 million of Brazilian loans
from its own portfolio into US$100 million worth of cruzados. These funds were used
to acquire a ten percent equity stake in Companhia Suzano de Papel e Celulose, a
Brazilian forest products concern. Id; see also Better Brazilian Exit Bond Terms Sought, 720
INT'L FIN. REv., Apr. 16, 1988, at 1204 (describing Brazil's privatization programme).
Midland Bank did debt for asparagus and debt for tee-shirts swaps in Peru. See Pettis
Interview, supra note 22. A number of New Zealand corporations were also significant
players in this industry. Carter Holt Holdings and Fletcher Challenge used debt ac-
quired in the secondary market to invest in Chilean forest products companies. Carter
Holt Holdings Ltd used US$160 million of debt and US$50 million cash to buy a sub-
stantial stake in Copec, a Chilean forest products company. See Peter Truell, Chile
Pushes Debt - Conversion Program, WALL. ST. J., Dec. 9, 1987.
330. See De Faria et al., supra note 323, at ch 2. Between June 1985 and May 1987,
US$714 million of Chilean debt was converted through Chapter XVIII investments and
US$484 million through Chapter XIX investments. See Asiedu-Akrofi, supra note 90, at
545. The majority of debt-equity exchanges in this period were made by multi-national
industrial corporations as a way of subsidising additional investment in their local sub-
sidiaries. The first debt-equity conversion in Mexico was typical in this regard - it was
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ber 1987 that "debt equity conversion transactions drive the mar-
ket and there is a good likelihood that more than sixty percent
of loan exchange transactions are for ultimate debt equity con-
version." 31 This fact remained true for debt-equity programs in
1988, particularly Brazil's. 33
2
Debt-equity swaps had been rapidly embraced by most
banks and commentators, and, after a short period of time, the
U.S. government. 333 As a potential market-based response to the
debt crisis, conversions into equity held out a hope against the
spectre of mandatory debt forgiveness. To the extent the debtor
country can recapture the discount by its debt being converted
into equity at less than full face value, these schemes involve an
element of debt forgiveness. This element is usually in the range
of ten to fifteen cents on the dollar; although, in Brazil's case, it
did at times climb as high as thirty-eight cents on the dollar.
b. Privatizations for Debt
A number of Latin American countries, including Brazil 334
and Mexico, announced or implemented privatization schemes
in this period, especially during 1988. A typical scheme would
provide for local state-owned companies to be sold in exchange
for cash and/or government debt. These schemes generated
substantial demand for debt which, with the expectation of fu-
ture demand as the schemes expanded, supported the market
during 1988 and early 1989."15 One of the largest transactions
an injection of further capital by Nissan Motor Company of Japan into Nissan Mexi-
cana, its Mexican affiliated company. See Chamberlin et al., supra note 278, at 431-32.
331. See Schubert, A Critical Appraisal of the Changing Secondary Market for Discounted
Third World Debt, Address delivered at the Debt-Equity / Swap Market Conference spon-
sored by the Institute for International Research, New York, New York, Oct. 19-20, 1987.
332. See Mexican Mine Sale and Brazilian Auction Fuel Rates, 754 INT'L FIN. REV., Dec.
10, 1988, 4003.
333. Debt-equity swaps have also had their vociferous critics. Professor Rudiger
Dornbusch, Remarks at Panel Discussion on Latin American Adjustment: The Record and
Next Steps in PANEL DISCUSSION ON LATIN AMERICAN ADJUSTMENT: THE RECORD AND NEXT
STEPS 312, 324 (J Williamson ed., 1990). "Washington has been obscene in advocating
debt-equity swaps and in insisting that they be part of the debt strategy. The U.S. Treas-
ury has made this dogma, and the IMF and the World Bank, against their staff's profes-
sional advice and judgment, have simply caved in." Id.
334. Brazil announced its privatisation programme in April 1988 listing 64 state-
owned companies that were potential candidates. See Better Brazilian Exit Bond Terms
Sought, 720 INT'L FIN. REV., Apr. 16, 1988, 1204.
335. See Mexican Mine Sale and Brazilian Auction Fuel Rates, 754 INT'L FIN. REV., Dec
10, 1988, 4003.
1998] 1207
1208 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 21:1152
was the privatization of Mexicana de Cobre, a huge copper
mine, that was sold for US$1.36 billion in debt and equity. 3 6
c. Debt-for-Nature and Other Types of Swaps
Three types of debt exchanges, in addition to those for eq-
uity, were developed. These exchanges merit consideration be-
cause of their innovative nature and because the secondary mar-
ket facilitated them to varying degrees. The three types of ex-
change are debt-for-nature swaps, debt-for-development swaps,
and debt-for-education swaps.
There are two broad forms of debt-for-nature swaps. 37 In
the first form, a nation's debts are purchased and offered to it
for cancellation in exchange principally for its ongoing protec-
tion of a designated part of its land. An example is the first debt-
for-nature swap in July 1987 in which Conservation International
(a U.S. conservation group) purchased about US$650,000 face
value of Bolivian debt for US$100,000. Under an agreement
previously reached with the Bolivian government, the external
debt was cancelled in exchange for two commitments: (i) the
protection by legislation of some 1.2 million acres of biosphere
reserve and regional park and some 2.8 million acres of adjoin-
ing forest reserve as a buffer zone, and (ii) the establishment of
an operational fund in local currency to the equivalent of
US$250,000 for the ongoing management and protection of the
biosphere reserve. 8
336. See id.
337. See Lovejoy III, Aid Debtor Nations' Ecology, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1984, at A31.
Debt-for-nature swaps were first proposed in 1984 by the then Vice-President ofthe
World Wildlife Fund, Dr Thomas Lovejoy. Id; see generally Priya Alagiri, Give Us Sover-
eignty or Give Us Debt: Debtor Countries' Perspective on Debt-For-Nature Swaps, 41 AM. U. L.
REV 485 (1992); David Barrans, Promoting International Environmental Protections Through
Foreign Debt Exchange Transactions, 24 CORNELL. INT'L. L.J. 65 (1991); Daniel H. Cole,
Debt-Equity Conversions, Debt-for-Nature Swaps, and the Continuing World Debt Crisis, COLUM.
J. TRANSNT'L. L. 57 (1992); Tamara J. Hrynik, Debt-for-Nature Swaps: Effective But Not
Enforceable, 22 CASE W. REs.J. INT'L. L. 141 (1990); Julian C.Juergensmeyer & James C.
Nicholas, Debt For Nature Swaps: A Modest But Meaningful Response to Two International
Crises, 15 FLA. J. INT'L. L. 193 (1990); Wee, Debt-for-Nature Swaps, A Reassessment of Their
Significance in International Environmental Law, 6 J. ENV. L. 57 (1994).
338. See Chamberlin, et al., supra note 278, at 441-43; Hrynik, supra at 142-45; Wee,
supra at 61; Bolivia: Son of Debt-Equity, Part 1, 2 SWAPS - THE NEWSLETrER OF NEW FINAN-
CAL INSTRUMENTS 4 (1988). Another example is the somewhat controversial cash-for-
nature swap in which Australia agreed to donate US$2 million to the Solomon Islands
upon condition that logging of an important lagoon habitat be halted. See Astbury,
Malaysia angry at Solomons Deal, AUSTRALIAN FIN. Rv., Aug. 29, 1994, at 14 col. 1.
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In the second form of debt-for-nature swap, the debt is ex-
changed for local currency which is then used by local conserva-
tion groups (often in association with international conservation
groups) for various environmental projects in the debtor coun-
try. An example of this form of transaction is, coincidentally, the
second debt-for-nature swap, which was between the World Wild-
life Fund and Ecuador in December 1987."' 9 The World Wild-
life Fund acquired Ecuadorian debt with a face value of US$1
million. Under prior agreement this was then exchanged with
the Ecuadorian government for local currency bonds to the
value of US$1 million at the official exchange rate. The interest
on these bonds was then applied by Fundacion Natura (Ecua-
dor's leading private conservation organization) to a range of its
activities concerned with protecting and managing natural areas.
Upon maturity, the principal of the bonds will be used to estab-
lish an endowment fund for Foundacion Natura.34 °
The second form of exchange has a number of advantages
over the first. The perceived loss of sovereignty is far less when
there are a range of projects selected with local input rather
than when the entire transaction is for the preservation of one
area of country designated by the foreign conservation group.
Sovereignty is a highly sensitive issue in many LDCs34 1 where the
IMF's structural adjustment programs have seriously eroded
much of their economic sovereignty. The second advantage is
that the designation of an area as protected is a developed world
notion that may not be entirely appropriate when applied in the
context of a LDC in which people still have to forage for food
and fuel in the designated areas342 or, for that matter, in Poland,
a nation with catastrophic pollution problems, in which the set-
ting aside of a wetlands reserve was seen as highly inappropriate
and pollution cleanup was seen locally to be a far higher priority
than preservation of birdlife habitats:
339. See Chamberlin, et al., supra note 278, at 443-45. This swap was completed in
March 1988. Id.
340. See id.
341. See Alagiri, supra note 383, at 496-503; Barrans, supra note 383, at 79-80; Wee,
supra note 383, at 63-65.
342. The first debt-for-nature swap, in Bolivia, attracted criticism on these
grounds. See Alagiri, supra note 383, at 499; and Wee, supra note 383, at 64 n. 71; See
generally Barrans, supra note 383, at 81-82.
343. See Cole, Cleaning Up Krakow: Poland's Ecological Crisis and the Political Economy
of International Environmental Assistance, 2 COLO.J. INT'L. ENVr'L L. & POL'Y. 205, at 217-
19981 1209
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Debt-for-nature exchanges have also been implemented in
Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, the Philippines,344 Mada-
gascar, Mexico, Poland, and Zambia. 45 Between 1987 and 1990
debt-for-nature swaps resulted in about US$100 million of face
value of debt being exchanged for environmental protection.346
Their impact should not be measured upon the debt crisis as the
stock of land available and suitable for conservation was never
going to permit this mechanism to resolve that problem.347
Their success should be seen in offsetting to a limited extent the
environmental damage, particularly deforestation,34 occasioned
by the need to earn foreign exchange to service the debts of the
crisis, rather than in terms of the ever so slight reduction in the
debt burden of some countries.349 In the words of the Minister
of Natural Resources, Energy and Mines of Costa Rica, Mr Alvaro
Umana, "debt-for-nature swaps, even thought they affect less
than 1 percent of the total debt, are absolutely essential . . .
There would [otherwise] have been no money to purchase land
bridges between parks, to start tree nurseries for farmers, or
even to fight forest fires." 350 Furthermore debt-for-nature swaps
20 (1991); Cole, supra note 383, at 76. Scientists predict up to twenty-five percent of all
Poles will contract some form of pollution-related cancer. Id.
344. The Philippines exchange involved the WWF and was in the second form.
The application of the funds was governed by the relevant Philippine government de-
partment, a local environmental foundation and the WWF. See Chamberlin, et al.,
supra note 278, at 444-45, n. 114.
345. See Minujin, Debt-for-Nature Swaps - A Financial Mechanism to Reduce Debt and
Preserve the Environment, ENVr'L. POL. & L. 146, 147 (1991). Furthermore, debt-for-
nature swaps have been expanded dramatically in scope by the donation of debt by
some OECD governments; such as the U.S. government donating up to US$100 million
of debt and the German government donating US$60 million of debt to Poland to
finance environmental programmes. See Cole, supra note 383, at 80-81. These develop-
ments are beyond the scope of this work as they do not involve the secondary market.
Id.
346. See id. at 77.
347. See id.
348. Latin America is home to fifty percent of the world's remaining forests. See
Gibson & Curtis, A Debt-for-Nature Blueprint, 28 COLUM. J. TRANSNT'L. L. 331, at 332.
349. See Wee, supra note 383, at 57-59; The Debt-for-Nature Option, in 2 SWAPS - THE
NEWSLETTER OF NEw FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 1 (1988).
350. See Wee, supra note 383, at 63; See also Aluaro Umana, Costa Rica Swaps Debt
for Trees, WALL. ST. J., March 6, 1987, at 31. As an interesting aside, one Costa Rican
swap permitted the purchase of extra forest for a national park. Salomon Brothers
arranged the swap and obtained some of the debt for free. In gratitude, Dr. Jansen, of
Cornell University, named three newly discovered wasp species after John Gutfreund,
the Chairman of Salomon Brothers, and Mark Franklin and Stephen Dizard, who
headed the trading desk. The bankers may have preferred something more cuddly
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have spawned two useful variants: debt-for-development swaps
and debt-for-education swaps.
d. Debt-for-Development Swaps
The first true debt-for-development transaction involved the
donation of US$1 million of Nigerian loans by American Express
Bank Ltd. to the International Foundation for Education and
Self Help. The loans were then exchanged for local currency in
Nigeria to be used in a program to fight hunger, disease, unem-
ployment, and illiteracy in that country.35 '
In a later transaction in December 1988, Midland Bank
donated its entire portfolio of some US$800,000 face value of
Sudanese debt to the United Nations Children's Fund
("UNICEF"). UNICEF had arranged for the Sudanese govern-
ment to continue servicing the debt in local currency (as op-
posed to the foreign currency in which it was denominated) and
these interest payments were invested in water, sanitation, refor-
estation, and health education programs administered by
UNICEF in the Sudan.352
CARE, a large development and relief organization head-
quartered in the United States, was quick to hop on the debt-for-
development bandwagon by developing a "Developing Country
Loan Contribution Program." Under the program banks could
donate loans to CARE. CARE would arrange with the local Cen-
tral Bank for these loans to be paid out in local currency which
CARE would employ in its programs in that country.353
Such loan contribution programs and donations of debt by
U.S. banks to charities took advantage of Revenue Ruling 87-124
(November 12, 1987) 354 from the U.S. Internal Revenue Ser-
than a wasp, but it is nonetheless rare for a banker to give his name to an new species.
See Pettis Interview I supra note 22.
351. See Griffith-Jones & Wainman, Donations of LDC Debt by Banks to Charities, in
THIRD WORLD DEBT, supra note 50, at 99-100.
352. See id at 100-101.
353. See The Developing Country Loan Contribution Program (1/19/88) and The Devel-
oping Country Loan Contribution Program - Honduras (1/22/88), flyers produced by CARE
(on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
354. See Hay & Paul, supra note 296, at 146 (reproducing text of Revenue Ruling
87-124); See also the letter to SenatorJohn Chafee reproduced in HAY & PAUL, supra note
296, at 149, Annex 7 regarding Debt For Nature Swaps.
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vice. 55 This ruling was designed to clarify the taxation conse-
quences of, and otherwise promote, debt-equity swaps. The rul-
ing meant a bank donating debt could take a loss equal to the
difference between the book value of the debt and its fair market
value and then deduct the fair market value of the debt as a
charitable contribution, so that the entire book value of the debt
was a tax deduction to the bank.356
The volume of debt-for-development swaps soon surpassed
the debt-for-nature swaps out of which they grew. It has been
estimated that from 1987 to 1994 between US$750 million and
US$1 billion face value of foreign debt was cancelled in debt-for-
development swaps3 57 with UNICEF alone converting nearly
US$193 million of debt for development.3 58 In the same period,
a total of about US$177 million of foreign debt was converted in
debt-for-nature swaps. 59
In summary, debt-for-development swaps are a highly effec-
tive means for aid agencies to increase the buying power of their
foreign currency in local currency. If handled properly they
pose none of the infringement of sovereignty problems associ-
ated with some styles of debt-for-nature swaps and "enhance the
ability of aid organizations to operate programs that make peo-
355. See Leslie A. Sowle, International Debt for Equity Swaps: Does Revenue Ruling 87-
124 Make Sense?, 83 Nw. UNI. L. REV. 1079 (1989); Barrans, supra note 383, at 89.
356. See CARE, The Developing Country Loan Contribution Program - Honduras (1/22/
88) (copy on file with the Fordham International LawJournal). The U.S. Agency for Inter-
national Development also promoted debt-for-development initiatives by permitting its
grants to private aid organisations to be used to acquire debt on the secondary market
for conversion into local currency. See Meuchner, US Funding LDC Debt Purchases on
Secondary Market, XIII Bank Letter, March 20, 1989, 1. As these grants used ' taxpayers
money this was a somewhat controversial step as it could be seen as a taxpayer bailout of
banks. Nonetheless the opportunity for aid agencies to multiply the buying power.of
their aid funds by converting them through debt exchanges was too potent a benefit to
let slip. See generally Eve Burton, Debt for Development: A New Opportunity for Nonprofits,
Commercial Banks, and Developing States, 31 HARv. INT'L. L. J. 233 (1990); Barrans, supra
note 383, at 86-88.
357. See Kaiser & Lambert, DEBT SwAPs FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT - A PRAcrt-
cAL GUIDE FOR NGOs 14 (1996). Much of the debt converted in debt-for-development
swaps was offical bilateral debt (i.e. loans made by developed nations to the LDCs) and
was donated for the purpose by the developed nations. For instance, in 1994 Canada
forgave seventy-five percent of the US$ 22.7 million of Peru's official bilateral debt and
converted the balance for development purposes. Similar arrangements were entered
into between Finland and Peru (1995), Germany and Peru (1994), Switzerland and
Bulgaria (1995), and the United States and the Philippines (1995). Id. at 8.
358. See id. at 16.
359. See id. at 12-13.
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ple their first concern. '"360 As a side benefit, these swaps permit
the country receiving aid to convert small amounts of its foreign
debt into local obligations.
e. Debt-for-Education Swaps
Debt-for-education swaps are another application of the ba-
sic principle developed above: the acquisition of debt and its
tender to the debtor nation for discharge can, by virtue of the
debt's secondary market discount, magnify the purchasing
power of one's hard currency for local currency. 36 1 In the first
debt-for-education swap, Harvard University multiplied its pur-
chasing power almost three times.36 2
On July 10, 1990, Harvard University and Ecuador entered
into a debt-for-education agreement. Pursuant to the agree-
ment, Harvard acquired US$5 million of Ecuadorian debt in the
secondary market and exchanged these loans with the Central
Bank of Ecuador for fifty percent36 of their face value in local
currency bonds. As Harvard acquired the loans at a price of
15.5% of face value their total investment was US$775,000. 364
The bonds were transferred to a local Ecuadorian educational
foundation, formed for the purpose. This foundation sold the
bonds in Ecuador and used the proceeds to purchase U.S. dol-
lars in the local market. The proceeds amounted to some US$2
million, or almost three times Harvard's initial contribution.
These funds, now owned by the local foundation, were invested
in the United States. The investments are designed to realize
about US$150,000 per annum of which about eighty-five percent
will be used to fund scholarships for Ecuadorian students to at-
tend Harvard and the balance will fund local costs for research
and study in Ecuador by Harvard faculty and students.365
360. See Burton, supra note 402, at 243.
361. See Minujin, supra note 393, at 147-48. The discount in the secondary market
is of the essence of all of these debt exchanges as noted, with respect to debt-for-nature
swaps. Id.
362. See Jennifer F. Zaiser, Swapping Debt for Education:. Harvard and Ecuador Provide
a Model for Relief, 12 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 157 (1992).
363. The Ecuadorian government drove a hard bargain here, recapturing 50per-
cent of the loans value for free. The reason to insist upon such favorable terms was
probably that the government wished to minimise the inflationary impact of the local
currency bonds which had to be issued to "repurchase" the debt.
364. See Zaiser, supra note 408, at 180-81.
365. See id at 182-83.
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2. Debt Buy-Backs
As their name implies, debt buy-backs involve the acquisi-
tion of the debt by the debtor either directly from the creditors
or through the secondary market. They are not a new idea. Be-
tween 1935 and 1939, Chile repurchased about one-third of its
bonds at an average price of fifteen percent of face value. 6 6
Debt buy-backs did not receive from the banks the warm wel-
come that had greeted debt-equity swaps. Banks resisted buy-
backs strongly as those who chose not to sell their debt perceived
the buy-backs resulted in the transfer of reserves to the selling
banks. This would have been true if the buybacks were at prices
that overvalued the debt, i.e. that the "real" value of the debt was
less than the price the debtor paid to repurchase it, Yet it was
principally the major, money center banks that objected to buy-
backs on these grounds; and these banks had long argued that
the secondary market undervalued the debt. Incredibly, such
flawed reasoning long served as a major impediment to the
growth of buy-backs. 6 7 Buy-backs met further opposition be-
cause the debt forgiveness was so obvious. The game of images
and mirrors of the rescheduling years could accommodate cov-
ert debt forgiveness, but blanched at the prospect of overt for-
giveness.
As a result, buy-backs were only tolerated initially for "bas-
ket-case" countries,368 and, anomalously, for Chile. Bolivia estab-
lished a buy-back scheme in July 1987369 for which the foreign
exchange was donated by anonymous sources thought to be The
Netherlands, Spain, and some wealthier Latin American coun-
tries.370 Bolivia offered to repurchase its debt directly from all of
its 131 creditors in a coordinated scheme at a price of eleven
cents on the dollar.3 71 At the time, Bolivian debt traded at six to
eleven cents in the secondary market, 372 interest payments hav-
ing ceased in mid-1985. For an outlay of US$34 million, the
366. See Anayiotos & De Pinies, supra note 156.
367. See Pettis Interview II, supra note 106.
368. See Peter Truell, Latin.American Debt Prompts Action, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 1988.
369. See Dutch Bank Sees More Countries Repurchasing Debt, REUTERS, Nov. 19, 1987.
370. See Peter Truell, Bolivia Buys Back Nearly Half of Its Debt at a Fraction of the Face
Value, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 1988.
371. See Dutch Bank Sees More Countries Repurchasing Debt, REUTERS, Nov. 19, 1987.
Bolivia had sought and received a four month waiver of the sharing provisions in its
loan agreements to enable this offer to be made. Id.
372. See Derek Asiedu-Akrofi, Sustaining Lender Commitment to Sovereign Debtors, 30
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country repurchased some US$308 million of debt, which repre-
sented about forty-six percent of its US$670 million foreign com-
mercial bank debt.373
The first buy-back scheme in Latin America was imple-
mented by Chile in May 1985. Its debt conversion program had
two limbs commonly referred to as Chapter XVIII and Chapter
XIX after the legal provisions which implemented them. Chap-
ter XVIII was a debt purchase program for Chilean companies
or persons wishing to purchase foreign debt and convert it into
local currency.374 Yet this program met with surprisingly little
resistance from the international banking community.375 Even
Chile itself was able to buy back its own debt regularly in 1988.76
The cause of this surprising degree of acceptance is not known;
it may have been because Chile's economic growth3 77 and stabil-
ity and the orderly efficient administration of these debt conver-
sion programs made Chile the international banks' favorite LDC
debtor. It may even have been because the transactions were
commonly called Chapter XVIII conversions r ather than debt
buy-backs. 378 All that can be said is that Chile's debt-equity con-
version programs have been consistently hailed as the most suc-
COLUM. J. TRANSNT'L. L. 1, 25 (1992); Bolivia's Loan Repurchase Programme Heads For
Success, 715 Ir'L FIN. REV., Mar. 12, 1987, at 796 .
373. See Truell, supra note 328.
374. The consideration of Chile's debt conversion programs has been slightly sim-
plified for their full complexity does not advance our consideration of the secondary
market. For instance, certain debt-equity swaps could be conducted under Chapter
XVIII and conversions were also possible under Decree Law 600, which represented a
third limb of the conversion program. In addition, some thirty-two percent of conver-
sions between 1985 and 1990 occurred outside the formal programme, typically by way
of direct agreements between debtor companies and their creditors. For a full consid-
eration of Chile's debt conversion program, see generally Mary Williamson, supra note
311; see also Williamson, supra note 311, at 449 (providing more information on infor-
mal conversions).
375. Hernan Sommerville, Chile's cheif debt negotiator, Free Fall in Secondary Mar-
ket, 750 Ir'L FIN. REv., Nov. 12, 1988, at 3864-5. "We have signed at least two amend-
ments (one that allowed the buyback) and we have been able to get endorsement of
100percent of banks in record time." Id.
376. For instance, Chile repurchased some US$229 million face value of its debt
for US$168.4 million accepting all bids lower than 57.5% in a debt buy-back auction in
October 1988 (the average price was 56.3%, considered remarkably low at the time).
Id.
377. See Peter Truell, Chile Buy-Back of Foreign Debt at Discount Set, WALL ST. J., Sept.
22, 1988. Economic growth averaged about five percent p.a. throughout this period,
and in 1988 Chile's trade surplus approached US$500 million. Id.
378. Never underestimate the power of appearances in international finance -
the 1980s was in many respects one long game of images and mirrors.
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cessful of any debtor nation 7 9 and the appropriate precedent
for other debtors to follow38 ° and one of its central components
was a debt purchase scheme.
Under chapter XVIII, the Chilean government held regular
fortnightly auctions at which local companies would tender the
amount of discount they were prepared to accept in exchange
for the right to purchase and convert external debt.381' A typical
discount was usually about fifteen percent of the face amount of
the debt.3 8 2 If its tender was accepted, the Chilean entity would
then buy the external debt of Chile in the secondary market with
dollars. These dollars would either be acquired at a slight pre-
mium within Chile,383 or, perhaps more commonly, were dollars
all ready held abroad.3 84 The external debt would then be con-
verted at the official exchange rate, less the tendered discount,
into peso-denominated bonds (which could be sold in the local
market).85 Hence, a Chilean person or company which
purchased the debt at sixty-five percent on the secondary mar-
ket, and tendered a discount of fifteen percent, would have re-
ceived eighty-five cents worth of pesos for sixty-five cents of U.S.
currency and would have increased the value of its foreign cur-
rency some thirty percent (less associated transaction costs).
These transactions were debt purchases rather than debt buy-
backs as the debt purchaser was not necessarily the debtor. The
common criticism that debt-equity programs subsidised foreign
379. See Truell, supra note 328.
380. See id; Williamson, supra note 311, at 441-42. What is intriguing is whilemany
other countries implemented debt-equity schemes along the lines of Chapter XIX, few
implemented debt buy-back schemes similar to Chapter XVIII. This may be because
few other economies shared Chile's distinctive capacity to absorb new long-term debt.
Id. at 443.
381. The government would accept the bids of those companies willing to accept
the largest discounts.
382. See Foulke, Remarks at a conference sponsored by The Heritage Foundation,
Center for International Economic Growth in DEBT/EQuITy CONVERSION, Jan. 21, 1987,
at 37.
383. The typical premium was about five percent.
384. See Asiedu-Akrofi, supra note 90, at 543 n 14. Chapter XVIII can be viewed as
a scheme to facilitate and make attractive the repatriation of flight capital as partici-
pants under a Chapter XVIII conversion do not need to reveal the origins of the for-
eign debt being converted whereas under Chapter XIX detailed information was re-
quired on the source of the funds and the nature of the investment. ld; Williamson,
supra note 311, at 450.
385. See Asiedu-Akrofi, supra note 90, at 542-43.
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investors at the expense of locals was rarely heard in Chile be-
cause these transactions were open to Chileans.
Chapter XIX was a conventional debt-equity scheme distin-
guished by its consistency - it was the only scheme not periodi-
cally suspended or cancelled - and the timely efficiency of its
operation. 6  Interestingly, while Chile was repeatedly ap-
plauded for its debt-equity scheme by the international banks,
more debt was converted under Chapter XVIII than Chapter
XIX.38 7
In early 1988, Chile was able to amend its debt agreements
to incorporate permission from the international lenders to use
up to US$500 million of its reserves to repurchase its own debt
directly in a true buy-back, 388 rather than having a Chilean com-
pany do so under Chapter XVIII. In October of that year, Chile
proceeded with a large government buy-back in which banks
were invited to tender for the repurchase of their Chilean Cen-
tral Bank debt;389 the result being that Chile retired US$299 mil-
lion of central bank debt for US$168.4 million of cash from its
foreign exchange reserves. 9°
Perhaps the most significant use of buy-backs in this period
was in the repurchase of private sector debt by Mexican corpora-
tions. Between 1983 and 1988, Mexican corporations almost
halved their level of indebtedness from US$22.3 billion to
US$14.5 billion. 39 1 Buy-backs were the principal tool of this debt
reduction. For example, in a mixed debt buy-back and equity
swap Grupo Alfa, one of Mexico's largest corporations, agreed
with its foreign creditors in 1988 to exchange US$25 million in
cash, US$200 million in Mexican government paper, and forty-
five percent of the group's stock for US$920 million of the
386. See Foulke, supra note 350, at 38 (discussing efficiency of Chile's scheme). Up
to December 1987, about US$1.5 billion of debt had been converted through Chapter
XVIII and about US$660 million through Chapter XIX. See Truell, supra note 328.
387. See Foulke, supra note 350, at 38. Up to December 1987, about US$1.5 billion
of debt had been converted through Chapter XVIII and about US$660 million through
Chapter XIX. See Truell, supra note 328.
388. See Truell, supra note 328.
389. See Peter Truell, Chile Buy-Back of Foreign Debt at Discount Set, WALL ST. J., Sept.
22, 1988.
390. See Peter Truell, Chile Is Using Its Reserves to Buy Back US$299 Million of Bank
Debt at Discount, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 1988. Chile received 129 offers to sell the country
US$822 million of its debt and accepted all offers up to a price of 57.5 cents on the
dollar. It paid an average price of 56.3%. Id.
391. See Truell, supra note 328.
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group's debt.392 The Mexican government debt would have
been acquired for cash through the secondary market.393
Argentine and Brazilian companies also repurchased their
debt by negotiating private buy-backs with their creditors in this
period.394 In Brazil, local banks and industrial companies were
particularly active buying back about US$150 million of their
debt a month through much of 1988 in informal transactions.395
In the words of Kenneth Telljohann of Salomon Brothers, "The
informal conversions have accounted for a lot of the demand
and have helped Brazil debt to rally thirteen percent in market
value since the beginning of the year [i.e. from thrity-seven cents
on the dollar at the end of 1987 to above fifty cents on the dollar
in April 1988]."396
An example of a pure debt buy-back in this period is to be
found in the repurchase of US$75 million of floating rate notes
by Grupo Tolteca in late 1987. 397 Morgan Guaranty Trust Com-
pany of New York acted as Coordinator of the buy-back. 98
Grupo Tolteca offered to repurchase the notes at a discount of
38.5 percent. Morgan negotiated with each note holder to
purchase their notes either for cash, sovereign debt or a combi-
nation thereof to the value of 61.5% of the face value of the
notes39 (so as to facilitate the participation of noteholders not
prepared to sell for cash). As Mexican sovereign debt was trad-
392. See Asiedu-Akrofi, supra note 90, at 557.
393. See Pettis Interview I, supra note 22. Player Crosby, formerly of Salomon's,
formed a partnership with Finamex, of Mexico, at this time and allegedly made a for-
tune. Their U.S. partnership bought from banks at bargain basement prices a lot of
Grupo Alpha shares which the banks had received in the swap and did not otherwise
know what to do with. Id.
394. See Martin W. Schubert, Speech Delivered at a Seminar entitled, Latin Ameri-
can Investors'Issues: 1988-89 - Salient Trends and How to Profit from Them, New York, NY,
Sept. 16 1988, at 21 (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) reprinted in
OVERVIEW OF FINANCIAL AND BUSINESS TRENDS FOR 1989 - How TO PROFIT FROM THE
USE OF DEBT AS A MEANS OF EXCHANGE IN A CHANGING LATIN AMERICA. .
395. See Better Brazilian Exit Bond Terms Sought, 720 Irr'L FIN. Rav., Apr. 16, 1988, at
1204. Banks did these conversions under Resolution 63 and industrial companies
under Resolution 4131. Id.
396. Id.
397. The Tolteca Group was composed of Empresas Tolteca de Mexico SA de CV
and its subsidiaries.
398. Reimbursement Agreement between Grupo Tolteca and its subsidiaries and
Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York dated as of Oct. 9, 1987 [hereinafter
Reimbursement Agreement] (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) (defin-
ing Morgan as coordinator).
399. Id.
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ing at fourty-eight to fifty-two cents on the dollar,"' a note-
holder could have received up to twenty-five percent more face
value of sovereign debt by engaging in the exchange. An inter-
esting question is that as Tolteca had the funds to pay for 61.5%
of its indebtedness in cash,40 1 why were the banks willing to ac-
cept that payment in discharge of their loans? A borrower which
has the funds to repay nearly two-thirds of principal today would
appear a good credit risk for the repayment of the entire princi-
pal and interest over the coming four years.4 2 However, such
straightforward reasoning fails to accommodate the realpolitiks
of the debt crisis. The foreign currency for servicing loans was
controlled and rationed by the Central Bank. While Tolteca
could clearly have repaid its loans over the following four years it
may not have been permitted to do so by its local authorities.
The debt repurchase, on the other hand, probably involved
Tolteca funds that were held offshore and thus beyond the Cen-
tral Bank's purview.40
Waivers of certain provisions by some stated proportion of
creditors were necessary for virtually all debt buy-backs.4"4 This
was necessary because loan agreements invariably contained pro-
visions along the following lines: (a) payments received by any
creditor through exercise of any right of counterclaim, setoff,
banker's lien or otherwise which exceed that received by any
other creditors should be shared with the other creditors so that
all creditors benefit equally (commonly called a "sharing
clause");405 (b) any prepayments by the debtor should be on cer-
400. See Market Prices for Developing Country Debt, 703 INT'L FIN. REV., Dec 12 1987,
3876.
401. See Reimbursement Agreement, supra note 366.
402. Note Agency Agreement dated as of March 20, 1986 among Empress Tolteca
de Mexico SA de CV, the Guarantors, the Noteholders and the Morgan Guaranty Trust
Company of New York, as Note Agent, for US$75,000,000, Floating Rate Notes Due
1988-1991 [hereinafter Note Agency Agreement].
403. See Pettis Interview II, supra note 106.
404. See Reimbursement Agreement, supra note 366. For instance, in the Tolteca
transaction, under the terms of the original note issuance agreement, the consent of
51% of noteholders was required to waive the clauses of the note issuance agreement
which could have otherwise prohibited this repurchase transaction. One of Morgan's
roles as Coordinator was to solicit consents and waivers from the required number of
creditors. Id; Letter Agreement between Grupo Tolteca and Morgan of October 12,
1987, as amended by Letter Agreement of October 21, 1987 (on file with the Fordham
International Law Journal).
405. See Lee C. Buchheit, How to Negotiate the Sharing Clause, INT'L FIN. L. REv., July
1993, 36; see also MacMillan, The Next Sovereign Debt Crisis, 31 STAN. J. INT'L. L. 305, 348-
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tain dates and in multiples of a certain amount (the "prepay-
ments clause");406 and (c) the creditors should be repaid ratably
with other comparable creditors under other debt agreements
(the "mandatory prepayment" clause).4°7 The purchase of the
debt at a discount from the participating creditors to the exclu-
sion of those who chose not to participate might be construed as
a payment received by those creditors and a prepayment by the
debtor. Accordingly, waivers of these provisions by the required
proportion of creditors4 °8 was a necessary precondition to most
debt buy-backs.4 °9
In addition to the formal debt-exchange auctions and buy-
backs, foreign investors in need of local currency in this period
began to initiate private buy-backs, most often in Brazil. The for-
eign investor would seek a private sector debtors' agreement to
349 (1995) (considering sharing clauses); Ebenroth & Woggon, supra note 321, at 695-
97.
406. See generally Asiedu-Akrofi, supra note 340, at 26-27 (discussing clauses (a) &
(b)). The language referred to in clauses (a) & (b) comes from sections 3.07 and 3.05
respectively of the Note Agency Agreement. See Note Agency Agreement, supra note
370.
407. See Lee C. Buchheit, The Capitalization of Sovereign Debt: An Introduction, U.
ILL. L. REv. 401, 407-08 (1988); Lee C. Buchheit & Ralph Reisner, The Effect of the
Sovereign Debt Restructuring Process on Inter-Creditor Relationships, U. ILL. L. REv. 493, 511-
13 (1988); Clark, supra note 288, at 110-11; Ebenroth & Woggon, supra note 321, at 695-
99. Mandatory prepayment clauses typically confer remedies upon the bank creditors
under the loan agreement if the debtor services comparable indebtedness in a manner
preferential to its servicing of this indebtedness. See Clark, supra note 288, at 111-12.
Mandatory prepayment clauses were included, for instance, in the rescheduling agree-
ments for the debt of Argentina, Chile and Mexico. See Chamberlin, et al., supra note
278, at 420 n. 23. For an example of a sharing clause see the clause from the Mexico
New Restructure Agreement of 1985 reproduced as Appendix I to Ebenroth & Wog
gon, supra note 321, at 722. For an example of a mandatory prepayment clause, see the
clause from the Mexico New Restructure Agreement of 1985 reproduced as Appendix II
to Ebenroth & Woggon, supra at 726.
408. Many of the restructuring agreements between 1982 and 1985 required the
consent of all creditors to waive such a provision. See Buchheit, Making Amends for
Amendments, INT'L FIN. L. REv., Feb. 1991, 11 (providing explination of difficulties
caused by such amendments). Buchheit described such amendment clauses as
"Frankensteinian monsters." Id.
409. In addition, a buy-back usually required the waiver of a host of other clauses
which might be technically infringed by it, including (i) the funding losses provision
which protects the banks against any loss occasioned by a repayment by the debtor on a
date which breaks into the bank's matched funding of the loan, (ii) certain provisions
regarding the maintenance of foreign currency accounts with the debtor nation's cen-
tral bank, and (iii) certain of the events of default. See terms of the Waiver, Consent
and Agreement of Each Bank prepared by the Coordinator for use in the Tolteca repur-
chase (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
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repay the debt in local currency and then acquire, at a substan-
tial discount, the external debt of that debtor."' The investor
thus obtained local currency without the limitations on the use
of the proceeds imposed in the formal debt-exchange auctions,
and usually at a more advantageous price. It has been estimated
that up to US$500 million of external Brazilian debt was dis-
charged in this manner between September 1987 and June
1988.411
3. Bicicletas
"Bicicleta" is the Chilean name for a round-tripping transac-
tion. Over time, the term came to be used to describe all round
tripping transactions. These served as the final impetus to the
market in this period. In essence, a bicicleta is a way to convert
external debt into local currency in such a way that the foreign
exchange value of the local currency exceeds the value of the
converted external debt.
The classic round tripping transaction occurs when a local
company under-invoices exports or over-invoices imports so that
it surrenders less foreign currency or receives more foreign cur-
rency from the Central Bank than it needs and, in so doing, en-
gineers capital flight. Alternatively, a local company that would
otherwise retain foreign currency earnings in the local economy
may remit them abroad to use in a round-tripping transaction.
Debt buy-backs and debt-equity conversion schemes provide a
preferential exchange rate for investors. In round tripping
transactions funds are taken abroad and returned to the country
of origin via a buy-back or equity conversion to take advantage of
the preferential exchange rate for purposes for which it was
never intended.
The potential for round tripping has been analyzed in the
literature on debt-equity swaps.4 12 The market, however, kept its
role in facilitating these transactions quite secret. This writer has
410. See Chamberlin, et al., supra note 278, at 459; See also Brazilian Debt Arbitrage
May be Too Good to Last, EUROMONEY, Apr. 1988, at 40.
411. See Chamberlin, et al., supra note 278, at 459 n. 166.
412. See Lee C. Buchheit, Debt Equity Conversion Programmes from the Debtor Country's
Perspective, in A GUIDE To DEBT EQUITY SWAPS 33, 37 (S. Rubin ed., 1987); Shilling &
Toft, DEBT EQUrTY CONVERSION ANALYSIS - A CASE STUDY OF THE PHILIPPINE PROGRAM
3.19 -3.20 (World Bank Discussion Paper No 76, 1990); DEBS, et al., FINANCE FOR DEVEL-
OPING COUNTRIES - ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF FINANCE 35 (1987).
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been able to find no literature on this aspect of the market.
There were three reasons for the secrecy:
(i) most bicicletas involved exploiting the inability of the local
central banks to control the loopholes in their complex debt-
equity and currency control regulations - the transactions
would typically be within the letter but not the spirit of the
regulations, and thus were likely to invoke the displeasure of
the central bank if they came to light;
(ii) at times bicicletas involved transactions of dubious legal-
ity in terms of exchange control regulations; and
(iii) the trading desks earning handsome returns from the
bicicletas knew that the profitability would be squeezed from
these transactions if too many traders learned of, and partici-
pated in, them.
Mexico and Chile were host to the majority of bicicleta transac-
tions and an example of a typical transaction in each country will
be given.
In Mexico, bicicletas centered on the Ficorca Agreement.
This agreement governed the foreign obligations of Mexican pri-
vate sector corporations. Under it, the Mexican debtor could
convert its original foreign currency loan obligation to a foreign
bank into a peso-denominated obligation to Banco Central de
Mexico. The Central Bank then assumed the indebtedness and
foreign currency exposure and paid the foreign bank on terms
similar to those of the Mexican restructuring agreements.4 13
The Ficorca Agreement provided for the prepayment of
their peso obligations by the Mexican corporate debtor. Indeed,
one of the approved uses of converted debt, in the debt-equity
conversion program of 1987, was the prepayment of Ficorca
debt. A number of Mexican companies took up the offer. Pre-
paid Ficorca obligations earned the peso rate of interest in an
account at the Central Bank. The potential for a bicicleta came
to light when Michael Pettis, of Manufacturers Hanover, realized
that under Ficorca the original lender could at any time cancel
the loan and take over the pesos at the Central Bank. The prov-
enance of this provision is unclear but the Mexican drafters of
Ficorca surely expected few foreign banks to avail themselves of
this right to convert a foreign currency debt into pesos. Fred
413. See Asiedu-Akrofi, supra note 90, at 557.
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Manger at Lazards made the same discovery within days of Pettis
and so began a highly lucrative venture for these traders.
For the traders, step one was to identify the prepaid Ficorca
debts, and then check the value of the pesos in the relevant ac-
count at the central bank. Step two was to locate the holder of
the original loan and offer them a swap of that loan for Mexican
government indebtedness plus a cash fee.414 This was usually
very attractive because, from the lenders' perspective, the only
difference between private sector and government debt was that
the market for the latter was more liquid. The trader would
then take the original loan for the prepaid Ficorca debt to the
Central Bank, exchange it for the pesos in the relevant Ficorca
account and profit to the extent of the secondary market dis-
count less the cash fee and transaction costs. 41
5
These schemes were fabulously lucrative, at least initially.
As an example, consider a loan of US$1,000 to a Mexican corpo-
ration that had been prepaid at the prevailing controlled rate of
2,400 pesos to the dollar (loans were converted from dollars at
the official exchange rate (the "controlled rate") that was be-
tween fifteen and thirty percent below the free-market rate).
The corporate thus had 2.4 million pesos to its credit at the Cen-
tral Bank. If we assume an annual interest rate of eighty percent
for these pesos, which is not unrealistic, after two months, there
were 2.72 million pesos in the account. If the free market peso
rate was 3,125 to the dollar, the pesos in the account were now
worth US$870. The US$1,000 face value of the original loan
could be purchased in the secondary market for about US$480
- its price of about forty-three cents on the dollar, plus a five
cent on the dollar fee to the holder of the loan to induce their
participation. Once Manufacturers Hanover and Lazard had
made their discovery that the original loans could be exchanged
for the prepaid pesos, it was a relatively simple matter to realize
US$870 for an outlay of US$480. To make these figures realistic,
increase the amounts by a factor of about 1,000; and the poten-
tial profits become obvious. The two trading houses spent the
414. The trader would have been equally prepared to buy the private sector debt
but because most lenders had inadequate provisions against these debts, few were will-
ing to sell for cash, hence the swap.
415. The trader would typically also pray there was not a devaluation in the two
week processing period the Central Bank required between receiving the original loan
and paying out the pesos.
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summer of 1988 buying up all the prepaid Ficorca loans in the
market, of which there were about US$150 million. In the pro-
cess they drove up the premium they had to pay to acquire the
loans to as much as thirty cents on the dollar, so the bicicletas
were not as profitable at summer's end as they had been at the
beginning. Nonetheless, it was one of the more highly profitable
exercises in the market's history.
The second example of a typical bicicleta is from Chile. It
also was quite legal. In Chile the Central Bank was aware of
these transactions and felt that they served Chilean interests. In
the usual way in the 1983 restructuring, the Chilean government
decided to assume the foreign currency exposure and stand be-
tween its private sector borrowers and the foreign banks. Chil-
ean corporates would repay their debts in Chilean pesos to the
Central Bank which, in turn, assumed the obligation to repay the
foreign loans pursuant to the terms of the restructuring.
Some Chilean corporates were in a position to prepay their
loans and convinced the Central Bank to permit the prepayment
in full of these peso debts. However, the Central Bank did not
consequently repay the foreign loan. As the foreign creditors
were not receiving the funds their original debtor had now re-
paid, they sought access to the prepaid pesos, to "relend" them
to their Chilean customers as part of their ordinary banking
business. The Central Bank agreed (which incidentally gave
birth to a small secondary market in "relending" rights).416
Once the peso loan was disbursed, the foreign creditor had no
claim on the Central Bank and the restructuring agreement no
longer applied to that debt. The new Chilean borrower of the
peso loan was free to do whatever it liked with the pesos. This
bicicleta was born when traders realized that these pesos could
be used to buy dollars at the parallel exchange rate.
The first two trading houses to come to this realization were
Manufacturers Hanover, again, and Chase Manhattan. Citibank
and Security Pacific discovered it shortly thereafter and, by the
final stages, a large number of traders were playing this bicicleta
and thus reducing its profitability. Its form was much like the
Mexican one. A trader would acquire prepaid private sector
416. Banks would trade, in this secondary market, the right to relend pesos on
deposit with the Central Bank of Chile (or at times with Central Banks elsewhere, par-
ticularly Argentina).
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debt from a creditor in the secondary market, typically by swap-
ping it for Chilean government debt. This would cost about
US$630 for US$1,000 face value of Chilean debt.417 The pesos
would then be relent to a friendly borrower in Chile, which
could be any entity interested in earning a fee for its troubles (in
one case it was a small private school). If an exchange rate of
250 pesos to the dollar is used, the US$1,000 of debt results in
250,000 pesos at the Central Bank available to be relent. The
new borrower passes these pesos on to the trader, their debt is
extinguished, and the trader converts the pesos into dollars.
The Chilean entity will be paid a fee, perhaps three percent,
which leaves the trader with 242,500 pesos. Their conversion
into dollars would be in the parallel market at rates higher than
in the official market: 270 pesos to the dollar being typical. At
this rate, the trader ends up with US$898; and a profit of forty-
three percent on an initial investment of US$630.
Finally, there was another type of bicicleta used in Chile
that involved breaching the debt-equity conversion guidelines.
Unlike the above transactions, this one was quite illegal.
None of these innovative types of debt exchanges would
have been possible without the secondary market. For most the
market was necessary as the source of the debt. Even those trans-
actions in which the loans were donated, however, owe a debt to
the market for without the groundbreaking work of debt-equity
swaps, for which the market was essential, these more esoteric
forms of swaps would probably never have been developed.41
C. Market Characteristics
The four principal characteristics of the preceding period
were identified as the demand for the debt for debt-equity con-
versions, the hand-crafted nature of transactions, the absence of
market structure and external regulation, and confidentiality.
.417. At this time, 60 cents on the dollar was a typical price for Chilean debt and 3
cents on the dollar was typical of the cash fees paid to induce the counterparty to par-
ticipate in the exchange.
418. This is true notwithstanding that the idea of debt-for-nature exchanges was
first proposed in 1984. See Lovejoy, supra note 383, at A31. Debt-equity schemes
showed how to do it. In the words of Randall Curtis, director of Costa Rica's debt-for-
nature program for the Nature Conservancy, "the ideas for debt-for-nature didn't really
get off the ground until debt-equity programs had been launched ...Really these
programs can be viewed as son-of-debt-equity." The Debt-for-Nature Option, 2 SwAPs - THE
NEWSLETrER OF NEW FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 1 (1988).
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As we have seen, the demand for debt for use in debt-equity con-
versions remained the major determinative of the market
throughout this period. Throughout this period there remained
more sellers than buyers.419 Accordingly, the market tended to
be heavily influenced by any sources of demand for the debt. A
new influence upon the market in these years was the emerging
tendency for traders to take large positions in the debt. At the
beginning of this period, US$20 million (face value of debt) was
a large position for a trading house to take.4 20 During the pe-
riod, the traders took progressively larger positions so that by
March 1989 it was true to say that "it is not unusual for major
institutions to create or liquidate trading positions of up to
US$100 million. 421
1. Hand-crafted Transactions
Throughout this period a progressively higher proportion
of sales were for cash. The ratio swap was accepted by very few
U.S. auditors as an effective channel through which to avoid hav-
ing to writedown the swapped assets to market value, therefore,
the principal U.S. sellers remained the smaller and mid-sized
banks that had sufficient reserves to facilitate cash sales. Euro-
pean banks, served by a more generous and flexible accounting
profession,422 continued to engage in some swaps, but increas-
ingly their preference was to liquidate their LDC portfolios, thus
cash sales were the preferred form of most transactions.423 This
shift in the fundamental nature of the market from a swap mar-
ket to a cash market was one of the most significant develop-
ments of this period.424
This rise in the prevalence of cash sales simplified the mar-
ket considerably. By the end of 1988, long chains of transactions
419. See Urwin, supra note 309, at 67.
420. See Pettis Interview II, supra note 106. The market value of the position,
which is the correct way to value it, would have been between 40 percent and 60 per-
cent of face value. Id.
421. See Urwin, supra note 309, at 66; Pettis Interview II, supra note 106 (confirm-
ing Urwin's conclusions).
422. See Urwin, supra note 309, at 72.
423. In the words of a report in International Financing Review, "[r]egional US
banks and some foreign banks have been the major participants in cash debt sales with
many willing to... take substantial write-downs to put the LDC turmoil behind them."
See 733 INT'L FIN. REV., July 16, 1988, 2289.
424. See Pettis Interview II, supra note 106.
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and the valuation of one nation's debts in terms of another's
were no longer the norm.
425
During this period, the market was further simplified by a
degree of standardization in swap and sale documentation. Vir-
tually all debt had been rescheduled and virtually all of a coun-
try's rescheduling and new money agreements, by now, included
identical loan assignment provisions. This permitted the larger
traders to move the drafting of the required loan assignment
agreements in-house, resulting in substantial savings of legal
costs.
2. Absence of Structure and Rules
In the words of Peter Truell 
4 2 6
the Third-World debt market isn't an official market at all.
Rather it's an informal network of large banks, big multina-
tional corporations and some Wall Street investment banks
that trade loans of troubled debtor nations over the tele-
phone and by telex.427
As we have seen in the immediately preceding section, the prac-
tices in the market had become somewhat simplified during this
period. However, the formal structure of the market remained
unchanged.
3. Confidentiality
The periodic quotation of secondary market prices in jour-
nals 428 and their regular appearance in newspaper articles429 was
425. See id.
426. Peter Truell, a staff reporter for The Wall Street Journal, was the most persistent
and accurate market commentator on the market of the 1980s.
427. See Peter Truell, Third-World Debt Market Sinks, Hurt by Debtor Moves, Rumors,
WALL. ST. J., Jan. 23, 1989.
428. The first journal to publish LDC debt prices with any regularity was probably
the International Financing Review. See e.g. 603 INT'L FIN. REv.,Jan. 4, 1986, 16; 642 INT'L
FIN. REV., Oct. 4, 1986, 2933; 663 INT'L FIN. REV., Mar. 7, 1987, 763; 674 INT'L FIN. REV.,
May 23, 1987, 1686. Other journals followed suit. For instance, The American Banker,
published fortnightly bid and offer prices for the loans of 27 countries and a commen-
tary on the market (for example, see issue of November 7, 1988); Swaps - The Newsletter
of New Financial Instruments, published price ranges each month for the loans of the ten
principal debtor nations and a commentary on the market (for example, see vol 2 no
11, November, 1988); and Barrons'published the values of the major debtors' loans each
week in the statistics section under the title, "Latin American Debt." See e.g. Refresher
Course - Swap Shop: the Whys and Ways of the Market in LDC Debt, BARRONS, Sept. 4, 1989.
429. See e.g. Peter Truell & Steve Swartz, Drexel's Milken Is Trying to Find a Lode in
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now commonplace, as was the reference to such prices by gov-
ernmental and regulatory bodies. By the beginning of this pe-
riod, the prices of different nations' debts were no longer confi-
dential. In January 1989, towards the end of the period, the In-
ternational Financing Review, began a regular weekly section
entitled LDC Finance or LDC Debt, which quoted market prices.
At times, a seller would not wish to be identified, for the reasons
identified earlier, and would hide behind its broker. However,
such instances were less common in this period - the market
was well and truly out of the closet.
Market volume in 1987 is commonly estimated to have been
in the range of US$12 billion to US$15 billion43 ° - a dramatic
increase of some 300% over 1986. The market continued to ac-
celerate in 1988 and the range of estimates regarding its size
continued to broaden. Volume estimates for 1988 range from
US$20 billion to US$50 billion.4"1
Regardless of its exact size, with additional loan loss reserves
permitting a supply of debt at low prices and debt-equity conver-
Latin Debt, WALL. ST. J. Sept. 14, 1987, at 6; Wolfson, Debt Swap Mart Prices Slide on Weak
Demand, THEJ. oF COMMERCE, Aug. 26, 1987, at 7A col. 2.
430. See Stone, supra note 272, at S101 (providing for this US$12 billion esitmate);
Wallenstein, supra note 74, at 32. The Bank of England estimated the secondary market
size in 1987 to be US$15 billion, without double-counting. See Urwin, supra note 310, at
68. NMB also estimated the volume to be US$15 billion but acknowledged that some of
the volume might involve double counting. See Tobin, Innovations May Dampen Debt
Crisis, UPI MARKET NEWS SERVICE, Feb. 5, 1988 (citing NMB estimate by NMB). Martin
Schubert, on the other hand, estimated the volume in 1987 to be only US$10 billion.
See Schubert, supra note 152, at 6. Indeed, there was one estimate as low as the US$5
billion to US$8 billion range. See Anayiotos & De Pinies, supra note 156, at 1665.
431. Schubet t, ever scornful of high estimates which he considered fanciful and
ridiculous, estimated that in 1988 over US$20 billion face value of debt was traded in
the market. See Martin Schubert, The Growing International Debt Menace; Its Impact on the
U.S. Banking Sector. How Serious is the Leveraging of America?, speech delivered at the
Executive Management Seminar sponsored by the Missouri Bankers Association, Kansas
City, Kansas, Dec. 6-8, 1988 (copy on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
Remarkably, with the benefit of nine months for reflection, Schubert's estimate for
1988 volume had more than doubled to between US$40 and US$45 billion. See Martin
Schubert, The Secondary Market in LDC Debt - 1990 and Beyond, speech delivered at the
third Annual Latin America Financial Forecasts Conference, Miami, Florida Sept. 29-30,
1989, at 5 (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal). The Bank of England's
estimate was US$25 billion. See Urwin, supra note 310, at 68. Wallenstein's estimate
was US$30 billion. See Wallenstein, supra note 74, at 32. Libra Bank, a consortium bank
based in London and a significant market participant, estimated market turnover to be
as high as US$40 billion in 1988. See Fidler, supra note 275, at 33. The estimate of
US$50 billion, which may well be too high, was made by Stone. See Stone, supra note
272, at S101.
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sion and debt buy-back schemes providing the demand, the mar-
ket was now growing at a dizzying rate.
Notwithstanding this growth in volume, the market re-
mained exceptionally thin. At the end of this period less than
two percent of total LDC debt was being traded432 and there was
a legitimate debate over whether the secondary market com-
prised a true financial market at all.433 A dramatic example of
the thinness of the market was given by Richard Marin of Bank-
ers Trust while speaking at a conference in 1988. 4 3 ' Four banks
were appointed by a large corporation to sound out the market
with respect to acquiring US$200 million face value of Brazilian
debt, the most heavily traded in the market, for use in a debt-
equity conversion. On the strength of these factors alone, and
before the actual acquisition of any loans, the price went from
about fourty-two cents on the dollar to fifty-five cents on the dol-
lar.435 In other words, other demand for Brazilian paper was so
minimal that the mere rumour of the acquisition of three tenths
of one percent of the total Brazilian debt resulted in a thirty per-
cent price increase. 436 Research by the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency disclosed that in the year 1988 about eight percent of the
total stock of LDC debt changed hands,437 compared to an aver-
age daily turnover of six percent of the total stock of government
securities.438 The concentration of the debt in the hands of the
major U.S. and U.K. banks4 39 made a deeper market impossible.
In 1987, the most actively traded debt was of Chile and Mex-
ico because of the demand supplied by their debt-equity
schemes.4 40 In 1988, Brazil's debt was the most heavily traded
for the same reason.441
Throughout this period, the general trend in market prices
432. See Anayiotos & De Pinies, supra note 156, at 1656.




437. While, there are many ways of calculating such figures, the point is, nonethe-
less, well made.
. - 438. Testimony of Mr Herriman of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,
Federal News Service, June 27, 1989, at 21.
439. The major U.S. and U.K banks only began to sell loans on relatively small
scale in 1989 and 1990 whereas banks from other countries had been far more active in
selling off or converting their LDC exposure. See ECLAC/CTC, supra note 118, at 138.
440. See Schubert, supra note 152, at 12.
441. See Fidler, supra note 275, at 33.
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was consistently downward. Indeed, prices fell virtually without
interruption between February 1986 and March 1989.442 The
only slight departures from this trend were provided by the stop-
start operation of the various debtors' debt-equity schemes.443
Margins for traders contracted as the market grew, but over-
all margins remained robust. A typical margin on a routine
transaction in this period was about one-half of one percent of
the transaction amount.4 4 4
D. Participants
The market was described at this time as "a loose configura-
tion of some fifty commercial banks, investment banks, and
newly created boutiques that make markets, as principal and/or
agent, for swaps and sales of LDC loans." '445 Whether any of the
traders at this stage were true market makers is highly questiona-
ble, but the estimate of the number of regular traders is about
right.
446
One of the major debt traders in this period was a small
Dutch bank which had been in the market from the beginning
and, unlike the boutique brokerages, had the capital to remain a
major player. By its own estimate NMB had about twenty per-
cent of the market in 1987 with US$3.5 billion in trading vol-
442. See From the Desk of Geoffrey Bell, INT'L REP., June 8, 1990; Pettis Interview I,
supra note 22.
443. In the words of Schubert, "In countries where debt equity conversion pro-
grams exist, secondary market trading in that country's debt accelerates and prices
creep up. Where programs are not operative, or are tightly restricted, demand for that
debt dries up and prices retreat." See Schubert, supra note 152, at 12-13.
444. See Pettis Interview II, supra note 106; but see Fidler, supra note 275, at 33.
445. See Refresher Course - Swap Shop - The Whys and Ways of the Market in LDC
Debt, BARRONS, Sept. 4, 1989. This article was reporting the comments of Ken Hoffman
and Lawrence Krohn of Shearson Lehman Hutton.
446. In October 1987, Martin Schubert thought there were probably more than
fifty traders, "although about eight institutions probably account for more than 85per-
cent of the volume." See Martin Schubert, A Critical Appraisal of the Changing Secondary
Market for Discounted Third World Debt, address delivered at the Debt-Equity / Swap Mar-
ket Conference sponsored by the Institute for International Research, New York, NY
October 19-20, 1987 (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal). New players
were still entering the New York market during this period. For instance, in July 1988
Midland Monatagu, the investment banking subsidiary of the British Midland group,
assembled a new asset trading group in New York to trade Midland's own portfolio and
others LDCs loans and to complement its London group. See Midland Montagu Hiring
for New LDC Unit, BANK LETrER, July 18, 1988. Such trading groups were not necessarily
large - Midland sought three traders for this operation.
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ume.
447
Another major trader was Libra Bank, a consortium bank
formed in London to hold and trade LDC debt. It claimed to
have traded US$1.2 billion face value of debt in 301 transactions
in 1986, US$2.6 billion in 681 transactions in 1987, and US$5.6
billion in 1,667 transactions in 1988.448
This period saw a new type of participant in the market -
individual investors. 449 These investors had to be comfortable
with large risks and typically were either from the debtor nation
or knew it well.45° The minimum face value of investments
tended to be about US$1 million, as transaction costs made
smaller purchases uneconomic. 4 1  However, such purchases
were not only for millionaires - US$1 million face value of Ar-
gentine debt could be acquired in May 1988 for about
US$290,000 and, for the brave, the same amount of Peruvian
debt was available for about US$90,000.4 5 2
While some traders, such as Merrill Lynch, had a policy of
not encouraging individual investors; more were active in pro-
moting the debt to individuals.453 While the risks were signifi-
447. See Tobin, supra note 431; Tobin, NMB's Record Year for LDC Debt Trading 721
IFR 1287 (Apr. 23, 1988). NMB was subsequently acquired by and merged into the
Internationale Nederlanden Groups ("ING"). Traders were notorious for overstating
their level of business in this market in which there was no way to verify volumes done.
The option of counting the total amounts of debt traded, which in swaps results in the
one transaction being counted twice, was a convenient method. This is not to impugn
NMB's estimates, but merely to put it into context. There is no doubt NMB was a major
player in this market at this time. Within Latin America it had trading desks in Sao
Paulo, Montevideo and Buenos Aires. In 1990 it was described as a "disproportionately
influential participant in developing country's debt markets, particularly in Latin
America, where it is almost certainly the largest single player." See DEBT EQuITY CONVER-
SIONS, supra note 6, at 27.
448. See 764 INT'L FIN. Rv. 25 (1989) (advertisement by Libra Bank PLC dated
Jan. 30, 1989); See also 1988's Scales Tip in Libra's Favour 766 INr'L FIN. REv. 30, Mar. 11,
1989.
449. While the odd individual had bought debt from time to time, their first ap-
pearance in significant numbers was in 1987-1988. The transfer of loans was generally
restricted to "banks or financial institutions," so individual investors would have to own
such an entity to participate in the market. Of course, depending upon the view of the
central bank of the particular debtor, a corporation with the sole function of investing
in LDC debt could well be considered a financial institution.
450. See George Anders & Peter Truell, For Investors Who Are Strong of Heart, Third-
World Debt Holds Some Allure, WALL ST. J., May 17, 1988.
451. See id.
452. See id.
453. Id. Examples of these are Bear Stearns, Drexel Burnham Lambert and Ned-
erlandsche Middenstandsbank. Id.
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cant the rewards that could be realized by recieving a large cou-
pon on the full face value of a loan for which one had paid,
perhaps, fifty cents on the dollar were, perhaps, disproportion-
ately larger.454
E. Impact of the Market
Quite simply the primary impact of the market in this pe-
riod was that it made debt-equity conversions possible. The eco-
nomic raison d'etre of conversions was that the investor and the
host country could each share in the secondary market discount
on the debt, so each party to the conversion was better off.455
As we have seen, the Citicorp reserving decision with which
this period commenced was heavily influenced by the pressure
that the secondary market prices brought to bear on banks'
stock prices and by the dramatic improvement that U.S. regional
banks had been able to realize on their balance sheets by of-
floading their debt through the market.
The other major impact of the market in this period, was
the opportunity it provided to many of the smaller U.S. banks
and some European banks to divest themselves of their LDC
loan portfolios.4 5 6 In the words of one senior banker, "the uni-
verse of banks involved in the debt crisis has shrunk dramati-
cally. '457 Many of these smaller U.S. banks, as well as many Euro-
pean banks, were proving increasingly reluctant to lend new
money as part of each rescheduling package.458 From the per-
spective of these smaller banks, the leader banks had involved
them in the debt crisis by encouraging their participation in the
syndicated lending of the late 1970s and then eschewed all re-
454. See Pettis Interview II, supra note 106.
455. See Chamberlin, et al., supra note 278, at 417-18. Debt-equity conversions
could have occurred without the secondary market as banks converted loans from their
own portfolios and investors acquired loans on an ad hoc basis for conversion. How-
ever, conversions on the scale witnessed in this period could never have occurred with-
out the support of an organized secondary market because sufficient amounts of debt
would have not been available at such relatively low prices. See Schubert Remarks,
supra note 93.
456. In 1988, Blackwell & Nocera wrote, "Most sales of debt paper have come from
the continental European banks and smaller US regional banks with relatively small
exposure to the heavily indebted countries." See Blackwell & Nocera, The Impact of Debt
to Equity Conversion, FIN. & DEv., June 1988, 15.
457. See Ryser, et al., supra note 329, at 112 (citing Louis G Schirano, senior vice-
president at First Interstate Bank Ltd).
458. See ECLAC/CTC, supra note 118, at 69.
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sponsibility when the crisis broke. As the 1980s progressed, the
smaller banks became increasingly disenchanted with the man-
agement of the debt crisis by the major banks which, by and
large, comprised the steering committees for the restructurings.
The smaller banks felt that there was a conflict between the du-
ties of these large banks as members of the steering committee
and their interests as the largest creditors of these nations.459
The smaller bank also thought that the large banks were being
too lenient in the reschedulings and were taking steps that fa-
vored themselves over the community of lenders as a whole.46 °
The secondary market permitted many smaller banks to liqui-
date their exposure to the region. This reduction in the number
of creditors and removal of many of those who were the most
disenchanted simplified the process of gaining agreement to
fresh restructuring packages and to the Brady bond proposals
that were to come. The down side was that this trend led to an
ever-increasing concentration of LDC debt in the hands of the
U.S. money center banks. In the words of a U.N. sponsored
study in 1989:
Thus, again, those banks which were the least prudent during
the credit boom and least flexible during the debt restructur-
ing process are being brought back to the forefront of the
international debt crisis and, ironically, the debt crisis is be-
coming an essentially United States one, from the point of
view of the creditor banks involved.461
The secondary market made possible this substantial re-
alignment of the creditors of the crisis. The major money
center banks began to use the market in this period. For in-
stance, the twelve largest U.S. banks reduced their LDC expo-
459. See supra note 118, at 59-61 (providing consideration of one manifestation of
this conflict in ECLAC/CTC).
460. See id. at 14-16. One such step taken by the restructuring committees which
unduly favoured the leader banks was the grouping together of all loans to the corpora-
tions and government of one country together under the sovereign's guarantee. The
leader banks had a much higher proportion of loans to private sector corporations than
other banks. The loans to these borrowers, to whom the leaders had charged higher
fees and interest rates to compensate for the higher risk, were by this step rendered
equally creditworthy as the loans-to sovereign borrowers made by the challenger and
follower banks at lower fees and interest rates. Id.
461. See id. at 138.
462. This greater concentration of debt also led to the significant increase in vola-
tility the secondary market was to experience.
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sure by some US$6 billion46 in the first three quarters of 1988
by the same means. 464 However, this reduction in exposure was
not sufficient to counteract the overall trend towards a greater
concentration of the debt in the hands of the U.S. money center
banks. In Canada, the escape route afforded to banks with small
exposures was demonstrated by Toronto Dominion Bank which
disposed of US$1.7 billion of its LDC loans in 1988, leaving it
with only US$602 million of LDC debt.465 Such a radical reduc-
tion in exposure to LDC debtors would have been virtually im-
possible for Toronto Dominion without the secondary market.
Another interesting effect of the market in this period was
its influence upon regulators. Market prices were factored into
the calculation of the appropriate level of provisions on LDC
debt by the Bank of England,4 66 were the basis of a proposal to
Congress suggesting that banks mark their loans to market4 6 7
463. See Peter Truell, Big Banks See Bonanza in Fourth Quarter - Brazil's Catch-Up on
Interest Payments Is Main Reason, WALL ST. J., Oct. 26, 1988.
464. The sales of loans into the secondary market played a larger part in these
reductions of the LDC portfolios of the largest U.S. banks than did the conversion of
these banks' own debt into equity. See Peter Truell, Cutting Losses: When They Can't Take
the Money and Run, Banks Agree to Swap Debt for Local Equity, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 1988;
See also Chase to Continue Debt Sales, Loan Loss Reserves at 1988 Rate, REUTER Bus. Rep.,
Jan. 23, 1989 (describing Chase Manhattan's experiance which reduced its LDC debt
portfolio some ten percent in 1988 from US$8.6 billion to US$7.9 billion through loan
conversions and sales); Phillip T. Sudo, Chase Announces Plan to Fortify LDC Reserve, Am.
BANKER, Jan. 24, 1989, at 3.
465. See Fred Langan, Canadian Banks Clear LDC Debt, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, Nov. 30, 1988, at 22.
466. In the United Kingdom the secondary market prices were factored into an
equation, formulated by the regulator, the Bank of England, to determine the extent of
provisions which ought to be taken against exposures to different nations. See Letter
from the Bank of England, with enclosures, to all U.K. incorporated institutions
authorised under the Banking Act, Aug. 5, 1987 (on file with the Fordham International
Law Journal); I-A & PAUL, supra note 296, 33 et seq. The prices were one of fifteen
factors in the so-called matrix, ranging from debt/GDP ratios and debt/export ratios to
over-dependence on a single crop or commodity. Some of these other factors were
weighted more heavily than others. Nonetheless, this is an interesting official applica-
tion of secondary market prices at a time when the market was still illiquid and prices
were driven by many factors other than the economic fundamentals of the relevant
borrower. See Stone, supra note 277, at 118. In 1990, the matrix was revised to retain
secondary market prices as a factor. The revised matrix of 1990 is considered in Hay &
Paul, supra, note 246, at 33-59.
467. In April 1989, Representative Joseph Kennedy (Democrat from Massachu-
setts) proposed to the House Banking Subcommittee that after two years on a bank's
books loans, including LDC loans, should be marked to market value based on secon-
dary market prices. See House Panel Defeats Bank Accounting Change, REUTas, Apr. 11,
1989. While this proposal was defeated by a vote of 31 to 14, its incorporation of secon-
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and were used by the General Accounting Office in its investiga-
tion of the adequacy of the reserves required by the U.S. bank
regulatory agencies.468 Indeed, the General Accounting Office
consistently advocated the use of "secondary market prices as a
primary consideration in setting reserve requirements."4 69 The
banking regulators argued against the use of secondary market
prices by citing the failure of the market to differentiate between
different debtor's capacities to repay and the general inaccuracy
of the market as a guide to the real value of the loans.470 None-
theless, Congressional subcommittees put considerable pressure
on the bank regulators471 because of the secondary market
prices and it is highly unlikely banks would have increased
reserves as rapidly as they did without the pressure of secondary
market prices. The market had, in effect, undermined the ma-
jor reason for the ongoing lending of new money - to avoid the
revaluation of these loans.472
dary market prices, illustrates the influence of these market discounts on the minds of
bank regulators and politicians.
468. Further testament to the influence of the secondary market is found in a
report by the General Accounting Office addressing the supervision of overseas lend-
ing. The GAO investigated the regulatory requirements of the Federal Reserve, the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion and found their requirements to be lacking. This was due partly to the large gap
between required reserves and the discounts in the secondary market. See Bureau of
National Affairs, Supervision of Foreign Lending Is Inadequate, GAO Study Reports, Daily Re-
port for Executives, May 13, 1988. The GAO relied heavily on the secondary market
prices of January 1989 in its testimony given before the House Banking Committee
recommending higher loan loss reserves for LDC debt. Moody's Investors Services
agreed with the recommendation in its testimony and based its conclusion upon secon-
dary market prices and its own, in-house analysis of the capacity of debtor nations to
repay. See GAO, Moody's Tell Congress Banks Are Under-Reserved for LDC Debt, XIII, Bank
Letter, Jan. 16, 1989, at 5.
469. See Testimony of Dr Mendelowitz, Federal News Service, June 27, 1989, at 6.
The secondary market discount was also the foundation of various solutions proposed
to the debt crisis at this time. SeeJames D Robinson III, Chairman of American Express,
Third World Debt: What's the Solution?; I2D2 Could Start Moving US$250 Billion Problem Off
Dead Center, THE AM. BANKER, Mar. 11, 1988, 4. In late 1987, Moody's cited the sharp
decline in secondary market prices for LDC debt as one of the factors which prompted
their placing most of the major U.S. banks' credit ratings under review. Another reason
given by Moody's was the "decreasing cohesion with the bank creditor group" which as
we will see was, in part, also a result of the secondary market. See Moody's Downgrades
Latinos, Puts US Banks on Review, 702 INT'L FIN. REV., Dec. 5, 1987, 3796.
470. See Testimony of Mr Herriman, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, June 27, 1989, at 21.
471. See generally Testimony Before the Congressional Subcommittee, FEDERAL NEWS SER-
VICE, June 27, 1989.
472. See MacMillan, The Next Sovereign Debt Crisis, 31 STAN. J. INT'L. L. 305, 329
(1995).
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In summary, the principal impact of the market in this pe-
riod was expressed by Fulvio Dobrich,4 7 3 who stated "Debt relief
is already here. Brazil's latest package, the Mexico [Aztec]
bonds, Chile's buyback, debt-debt and debt-product swaps are all
forms of debt relief in the sense that they reduce the amount of
debt on the books. 4 7 4
While debt forgiveness remained a political hot potato, the
secondary market made possible the latter three market initia-
tives listed by Dobrich. Debt relief could be a part of a formal or
informal buy-back, a debt-equity swap, or a debt-product swap
(such as the exchange of debt for exports) without attracting
much political opposition.4 75 This was the most important im-
pact of the market for the debtor nations in this period.
CONCLUSION
In its first six years, the face value of debt traded in the mar-
ket increased from about US$600 million to about US$35 bil-
lion, and the number of trading houses increased from about
eight to fifty. The basic transaction in the market changed from
a loan swap to a cash sale. The change was facilitated by increas-
ing levels of bank loan loss provisions and increasing realism
from the accounting profession as to the value of these loans.
This change simplified the market considerably and laid the
groundwork for its explosive growth in the next period. The
role of traders changed from hand-crafting each transaction,
often involving numerous phone calls over a period of weeks in
return for proportionally high fees of three or four cents on the
dollar, to processing relatively standard trades quite quickly
(although still not immediately as in mature securities markets)
for fees that, while still generous, had declined to around one-
half of one percent of face value. However, in this period one
characteristic remained constant. The market remained thin
and volatile, fluctuating wildly in response to actual or rumoured
increases in demand for the debt.
In its first six years, the market had three principal effects
473. Employee of Manufacturers Hanover Trust.
474. See The Debt Forgiveness Debate, 745 INT'L FIN. REv., Oct. 8 1988, 3264 (quoting
Dobrich).
475. This was probably due to the fact that because the complexity of the transac-
tion masked the extent of the implicit debt relief.
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and consequences. First, it brought pressure to bear on banks to
increase their loan loss provisions. The secondary market
shined the harsh light of reality onto the value of the banks'
LDC debt portfolios. Without the market, the major U.S. and
U.K. banks would not have taken loan loss provisions as early or
as substantially as they did. The fiction that these loans were
worth their full face value would have been continued long past
May 1987 and may have made the Brady Plan impossible. If all
of the losses occasioned by the securitization of the loans into
Brady bonds had been taken onto the bank's books at one time,
it is highly unlikely that the Plan would have gotten off the
ground. The reality testing forced by the market upon the
banks eventually benefited them.
Second, the market facilitated the exit of certain banks from
LDC lending. It enabled regional U.S. and Continental Euro-
pean banks to dispose of their LDC debt portfolios in the late
1980s and early 1990s. These banks could do what their larger
cousins could not because, generally, their exposures were rela-
tively small, their loan loss provisions relatively large, and their
capital relatively healthy. Many of these banks took the opportu-
nity and got out of LDC lending altogether. This led to a break-
dow'n in creditor solidarity as more and more of these banks re-
fused to participate in the extensions of new money that accom-
panied each restructuring under the Baker Plan. Particularly,
many regional U.S. and Continental European banks decided
not to advance new money based on loans they had made previ-
6usly and since sold. This unraveling of the Baker Plan made a
new plan necessary and thereby helped bring about a radical
new approach, the Brady Plan, which was to benefit all banks.
Third, the market facilitated debt-equity swaps, debt buy-
backs and other debt exchanges. The secondary market pro-
vided the debt for use in debt-equity swaps, debt-for-nature
swaps, debt-for-development swaps, and debt buy-backs, each of
which afforded a measure of debt relief to the debtor nations.
Without a secondary market, debt-equity swaps would only have
been open to the original bank creditors, whereas the major
users of this device were multi-national corporations increasing
their investment in the host country. Debt-equity swaps were a
boon to banks. They provided the opportunity for banks to con-
vert their loans into direct investments in the debtor nations;
they provided a demand for the debt so that banks that wanted
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to sell their debt at a discount could do so, and they provided a
significant income to the trading desks, most of which were in
banks, from assembling the portfolios of debt for conversion.
Whether debt-equity swaps were as positive for the debtor
nations is a more complicated issue, principally because of their
inflationary effect, although they are generally portrayed as posi-
tive. Debt-for-nature and debt-for-development swaps contrib-
uted to nature conservancy and development programs in the
debtor nations, but were on too small a scale to have an appreci-
able effect on levels of indebtedness. Debt buy-backs, on the
other hand, were the principal source of debt relief for debtors.
They afforded many times the debt relief of debt-equity pro-
grams while attracting a fraction of the attention. Indeed, the
very degree of relief contributed to the parties keeping relatively
quiet about these transactions. Particularly when secondary mar-
ket prices for the nation's debt were especially low, the short-
term costs of the buy-back would be recouped entirely by the
interest savings of the next few years, if, in fact, they were not
funded by the savings from a moratorium on the repayment of
interest that had driven secondary market prices so low in the
first place, as was the case with Brazil. Furthermore, buy-backs
were typically funded with foreign exchange reserves, not by
printing money or by issuing local currency bonds and, there-
fore were not inflationary. In sum, from the debtor's perspec-
tive, buy-backs were an effective form of debt reduction and the
greatest gift the secondary market gave the debtor nations.
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